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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The Peloponnesian War is a clash of two Greek superpowers competing for both mili-
tary superiority and regional influence. Athens and Sparta have different political systems 
(democracy vs. oligarchy) and each polis has a specific political culture (participatory vs. 
hierarchical). But most importantly, Athens and Sparta differ significantly with respect 
to their foreign policies. Sparta employs then conventional arguments of power to justify 
her belligerent policies. In contrast, the reasoning of the Athenian reveals a new approach 
to foreign policy. Athenian politicians claim that in international relations, Might is Right 
and that moral considerations do not apply to conflicts of unequal powers. This line of 
reasoning and its rigid execution throughout the Peloponnesian War provoke resentment 
and resistance amongst other Greek city states, who claim that Athenian policies violate 
the long established traditions of Greek warfare. It is the aim of this essay to estab-
lish why these Athenian policies known as Political Realism developed in Fifth Century 
Athens1 and which historical, cultural and political factors provided the ground for this 
development. 
1.1 Scope 
In the course of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians develop a foreign policy that 
establishes the supremacy of power over moral concerns. This approach to politics is 
called Political Realism. It is a policy backed by rhetoric, justified by relativism and 
buttressed by force. Our enquiry explores why and how Political Realism emerges in 
Fifth Century Athens. Firstly, we are interested in the intellectual, historical and cultural 
origins of this political philosophy and in the relationship between these factors. Secondly, 
we aim to understand Athenian Political Realism based on a comprehensive analysis of its 
intellectual foundations. We attempt to determine the relation between philosophy and 
1Throughout the rest of this essay we will refer to the Fifth Century BCE simply as the Fifth Century 
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political thinking on the one hand, and between political thinking and political action on 
the other. We will examine the extent to which the ideas that Athenian Political Realism 
is based on are rooted in contemporary Presocratic and Sophist philosophy, while also 
establishing how these ideas translate into political actions. Finally, we seek to describe 
Athenian political culture in order to determine the role it plays in the transformation of 
politics. Political culture is influenced by the structure and by the characteristics of the 
Athenian democratic system, as well as by the type of politicians the system produces. We 
argue that ideas alone cannot bring about a change in foreign policy. In order to have an 
impact on politics, ideas need to be related to political institutions, the decision-making 
processes and the political culture of a given state. 
Our analysis will shed light on two intriguing questions. These are: What makes 
an idea thinkable? and What makes an idea realisable? While the first question is 
concerned with the intellectual history of Political Realism, the second question relates 
to the historical context which allows Political Realism to flourish. In chapters 1 and 2 
we examine the first question, while in chapters 3 and 4 we look at the second question. 
In chapters 1 and 2 we aim to reveal the connections between different ideas on the one 
hand, and the links between ideas and politics on the other hand. We ask: how do new 
ideas surface? To what extent are new ideas linked to already existing ones? How and 
in which manner can ideas influence politics? Can philosophical concepts be applied to 
the political sphere and if so, how are they transformed in the process? Our working 
hypothesis is that Athenian Political Realism would not have been thinkable without 
Sophist Moral Relativism which in turn is closely related to Presocratic Philosophy. At 
the same time, we are aware that the intellectual origins of Political Realism do not 
explain the ability of Athens to implement her realist policies. In order to address this 
issue, chapters 3 and 4 deal with the historical factors that contribute to the development 
of Political Realism. We conjecture that both the Athenian political system and the 
type of politician it produces influence her foreign policies. Athenian domestic political 
culture determines her relations with other poleis. With this two-dimensional analysis, 
we attempt to give a credible explanation for Athens' pursuit of Realist Policies during 
the Peloponnesian War. 
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1. 2 Contents 
Nearly 2,500 years after its emergence in Fifth Century Athens, Political Realism still 
influences the foreign policies of many modern states. Indeed, contemporary political 
thinkers and politicians frequently refer to the Athenian historian Thucydides as the father 
of Political Realism. But while phrases and passages of his History of the Peloponnesian 
War are routinely quoted, the political philosophy of the text is often ignored as are the 
historical, cultural and intellectual circumstances. As a result, our knowledge of Athenian 
Political Realism is for the most part incomplete and inaccurate. In order to address this 
problem, we propose to study Athenian Political Realism as a comprehensive body of 
thought. 
The Peloponnesian War is widely regarded as 'the product of its reporter'. 2 Although 
we agree with Finley that the History of the Peloponnesian War reflects Thucydides' 
perspective, we assert that it is more instructive to regard it primarily as a product of its 
historical context. 
The second half of the Fifth Century has been described as 'the greatest age of 
Athens'. 3 Democratic reforms, social and political change and thriving intellectual ac-
tivity create a climate in which established patterns of life and experience dissolve in 
favour of new ones. Traditional beliefs and values are questioned as new intellectual cur-
rents compete for recognition. This dynamic atmosphere coupled with freedom of speech 
attracts intellectuals from all over the Greek World to Athens. Amongst them is a group 
of teachers who educate young men in the art of rhetoric. The newly formed democratic 
structures create a need for a new kind of education. Athenian democracy requires cit-
izens from all social backgrounds to hold office and to participate in the political life of 
the polis. In order to join the public debate in the Assembly, to propose policies, and 
to defend themselves in court if necessary, Athenian citizens require the rhetorical skills 
taught by the Sophists. Although rhetoric in itself is not a new discipline, for the first 
time it is instructed and employed as a political technique. 
Despite the fact that most of the Sophists teach rhetoric, it would be wrong to consider 
2 lVLI. Finley, introduction to Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (London, Penguin Books, 
1972), p. 9 
3 G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.1 
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them as a homogenous group of thinkers. We subscribe to Guthrie's view that 
to claim that philosophically they had nothing in common is to go too far. They shared the 
general philosophical outlook described... _under the name of empiricism, and with this went 
a common scepticism about the possibility of certain knowledge, on the ground both of the 
inadequacy and fallibility of our faculties and of the absence of a stable reality to be known. 
All alike believed in the antithesis between nature and conventions. They might differ in their 
estimate of the relative value of each, but none of them would hold that human laws, customs 
and religious beliefs were unshakeable because rooted in an unchanging natural order.4 
Within the framework of our analysis, we are mainly concerned with two aspects of 
Sophist thinking and teaching. On the level of philosophy, we are interested in Scepticism 
and in the Sophists' questioning of absolute knowledge. On the level of politics, we 
explore the implications of this philosophy on Sophist teaching as well as on the politics 
inspired by it. By analysing the link between Sophist Epistemological Scepticism, Moral 
Relativism and the art of rhetoric we seek to understand the ways in which Sophist ideas 
influence Athenian political life. Our main hypothesis is that by instructing Athenian 
citizens in the art of oration, the Sophists contribute to the transformation of Athenian 
political culture both in the domestic and in the international sphere. As Sinclair points 
out, the Sophists 'differed widely in their methods, doctrine and subject-matter, but 
their presence in Athens and their educational activity there demonstrated the connection 
between politics and culture, the profound influence of the education of the citizens on 
the nature and value of the State. '5 The Sophists teach their students how to argue 
convincingly, regardless of their actual conviction. Applied to politics, this technique 
serves as an instrument of persuasion and manipulation: it allows politicians to win public 
support for any policy. As a result, instead of revolving around the content of different 
policies, political debates resemble rhetoric competitions. And since both domestic and 
foreign policies are determined by majority votes in the Athenian Assembly, all policy 
areas are subject to the influence of rhetoric. Through the instruction of rhetoric and 
4W.C.K. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1969), p. 47/8 
5T.A. Sinclair, 'Socrates and His Opponents' in C.J. Classen (ed.), Sophistik (Darmstadt, Wis-
senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), p. 71 
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its application, the Sophists shape the characteristics of the democratic decision-making 
process, which in turn influences policy contents as well as the general conception of 
politics. 
By shaping Athenian political culture, Sophist philosophy has a major impact both 
on the way the Athenian political system functions and on Athenian foreign policy. Our 
analysis will demonstrate that the impact of Athenian political culture on foreign policy 
is twofold. Firstly, in international conflicts, the Athenians use rhetoric to defend their 
actions. By imitating the patterns of the domestic political discourse Athens aims to 
convince her adversaries that her policies are advantageous for both sides. Secondly, the 
philosophical assumptions on which rhetoric is based facilitate the Athenian Might is 
llight approach to international relations. The Sophists' Epistemological Scepticism and 
their Moral Relativism provide the intellectual framework for Political Realism in Athens. 
Our enquiry approaches Athenian Political Realism from four distinct but related 
perspectives. Chapter 1 examines the relationship between Presocratic and Sophist ideas. 
We analyse the extent to which Sophist Moral Relativism can be regarded as a response 
to Presocratic thinking. Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we will trace the links 
between Presocratic and Sophist ontology. We ask how we can account for the Sophist 
rejection of the Presocratic conceptions of Being and what the philosophical consequences 
of this refutation are. We then consider Sophist epistemology and its relationship to 
Presocratic ontology. Finally, since ontology and epistemology together provide the basis 
for Sophist Relativism and Subjectivism, we examine their interplay. It is our hope 
that investigating the philosophical background of Sophist Moral Relativism will help us 
understand why and how it emerged. 
Chapter 2 deals with the impact of Sophist philosophy on Athenian foreign policy dur-
ing the Peloponnesian War. We will study the extent to which Sophist Subjectivism and 
Moral Relativism influence Athenian foreign policy by comparing philosophical fragments 
with the political speeches recorded in Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War. 
We seek to know if there is any evidence that the Athenians apply Sophist ideas to the 
political sphere, and if this is the case, how can we explain it? 
While the first two chapters are concerned with the relationship between ideas both 
on the philosophical and on the political level, the third and the fourth chapters seek a 
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broader perspective. This is reflected in the type of sources we consult as well as in our 
overall approach. In chapters one and two we focus on primary sources (i.e. Presocratic 
and Sophist fragments and extracts from Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War). 
Once we have established the relationship between Sophist philosophy and Presocratic 
thinking, as well as the connections between Sophist ideas and Athenian foreign policy, 
we refer to the historical context to substantiate our assertions. Chapter 3 thus analyses 
the historical, cultural and political context of Athenian Political Realism and addresses 
our central question liVhat makes a thought thinkable? We will examine the way in which 
Athenian politicians instrumentalise Sophist ideas and seek to explain why the historical 
circumstances allow them to do so. 
Finally, chapter 4 will scrutinise the impact the Athenian political system, its political 
culture and her politicians have on both the conduct and content of foreign policy. We 
conjecture that there is a link between the functioning principles of Athenian democracy 
and the type of foreign policy pursued by Athens. The democratic institutions established 
by the reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles produce a particular way of conducting politics 
which requires a particular type of politician. Both have a considerable impact on the 
domestic as well as on the international politics of Athens. 
1.3 Method and sources 
As highlighted above, the analyses in chapters 1 and 2 are based entirely on primary 
sources. It is our view that any further analysis must proceed methodologically from 
this starting point. We have to make sense of the primary material first, in order to 
broaden our perspective and to contextualise it. Additionally, for those of us not versed 
in Ancient Greek it becomes essential to consult and compare different translations of the 
original sources. By doing so we may gain a thorough understanding of the original frag-
ments, while simultaneously increasing our awareness of the multidimensionality of their 
meaning. In our study of Presocratic philosophy, we have relied mainly on Waterfield's6 
6 R. Waterfield, The First Philosophers: The Presocratics and Sophists (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2000) 
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translation of presocratic fragments, while also consulting the translations of McKirahan 7 
as well as Kirk and Raven's8 translations. When studying Sophist philosophy, our main 
sources are Freeman's translation of Diels' Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker9 and Gagarin 
and Woodruff's Early Greek Political Thought 10 . We have also studied the Platonic dia-
logues in which some of the Sophists are portrayed, including the opening dialogue of the 
Republic. As to how the fragments are numbered, we have decided to use each author's 
own system. 
Like all scholars of ancient Greek philosophy, we find ourselves in the difficult position 
of trying to reconstruct an entire philosophical tradition from what can be described as 
very meagre and often inconclusive evidence. In the case of the Sophists, this challenge 
is exacerbated by the fact that Plato, our main contemporary source, is highly sceptical 
of the Sophists and therefore likely to misrepresent Sophist ideas. These inauspicious 
circumstances serve to challenge the analytical skills and creative thinking of any scholar 
of Sophist philosophy. Given the fragmentary nature of Presocratic and Sophist writings, 
every scholar will understand the extant sources in his/her own way. Though we are aware 
of the views of others, we have primarily focused on our own interpretations, supporting 
them with as much evidence and explanations as necessary. Rather than indicating a 
disregard for established ideas, our approach is born out of necessity since two important 
relationships have been noticeably overlooked by scholars in the field. These are: the 
relation between Presocratic philosophy and Sophist thinking and the connection between 
Sophist philosophy and Athenian Political Realism. 
As for our analysis of Athenian foreign policy during the Peloponnesian War, our 
primary source is Thucydides' narrative of the events. In the History of the Peloponnesian 
War Thucydides describes the events of the war as well as the policies of the states that 
participate in it. His aim is to produce an objective account of the historical developments, 
distilled from various subjective perspectives: 'And with regard to my factual reporting of 
7R.D. McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1994) 
8 G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1966) 
9K. Freeman, Ancilla to The Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1948) 
10M. Gagarin and P. Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
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the events of the war I have made it a principle not to write down the first story that came 
my way, and not even to be guided by my own general impressions; either I was present 
myself at the events which I have described or else I heard of them from eye-witnesses 
whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible.' 11 Despite his efforts 
to establish the facts, Thucydides recognises that his historical enquiry is influenced as 
much by his own subjectivity as that of other witnesses. This is particularly evident in 
the case of the political speeches Thucydides recounts to explain the sequence of events: 
'in this history I have made use of set speeches... I have found it difficult to remember 
the precise words used in speeches which I listened to myself and my various informants 
have experienced the same difficulty; so my method has been, while keeping as closely as 
possible to the general sense of the words that were actually used, to make the speakers say 
what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation. '12 Although Thucydides' account 
may not always be fully accurate or objective, it is the only source that can provide an 
insight into the politics of the Peloponnesian War. We have therefore decided to treat his 
representation of Athenian politics both as possible evidence of the actual events and as 
a reflection of what kind of policies would have been thinkable in the second half of the 
Fifth Century. 
While chapters 2 and 3 are based on primary sources, the third and fourth chapter 
make reference to secondary sources in order to broaden our spectrum of analysis. This 
contextualisation will hopefully shed light on the connections between circumstances and 
politics and demonstrate that Athenian foreign policy cannot be divorced from its context. 
The rationale behind dividing our discussion into two methodologically distinct parts 
is the following: in the first two chapters we build our main thesis based on our analysis 
of the primary sources. Once we have explored the intellectual framework of Political 
Realism, chapters 4 and 5 focus on the factors that support this framework. This twofold 
approach will allow us to explain why Political Realism was thinkable and realisable in 
Fifth Century Athens. 
11 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 1, section 22, lines 9-14 (hereafter cited as 
1.22.9-14) 
12Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.22.1-8 
Chapter 2 
2.1 Background 
The relationship 
between Presocratic 
thought and Sophist 
M oral Relativism 
In order to understand Sophist thought properly, we ought to study it in the context of 
Fifth and Sixth Century philosophy. The relationship between Presocratic and Sophist 
ideas has conventionally been described in rather general terms. Most classical scholars 
have emphasised the differences in approach, focus and subject matter of the two philo-
sophical currents. However, the extent to which one way of thinking developed out of the 
other has not been examined thoroughly yet. 
The Presocratics are preoccupied with the scientific contemplation of nature. Their 
aim is to determine the nature of reality and its relationship to sensible phenomena. This 
quest for stability and an underlying unity in a universe which consists of a superficially 
mutable and unstable plurality fails on two accounts. First, their individual interpreta-
tions of natural phenomena are mutually exclusive. Second, their idea of truth does not 
stand up to closer scrutiny. As Burnet puts it. 
Science had done all it could to make the world intelligible, and the result was a view of reality 
in fiat contradiction to the evidence of the senses. Apparently it was not this world science 
explained but another one altogether. What then, are we to say about this world? ... After all, 
that world is a product of human thinking, and how can we tell that thought is not as misleading 
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as sense is said to be? 13 
As a consequence of this dilemma, in the second half of the Fifth Century, common 
sense revolts against the remoteness and the incomprehensibility of the world as the 
physicists present it and philosophers begin to direct their thoughts towards human life.14 
The Sophists can be credited for shifting the focus of philosophy from nature to men and 
society. Their methods are empirical instead of deductive and aim to generate subjective 
knowledge for practical and political purposes rather than pursuing knowledge for its own 
sake. The Sophistic debate deals with all aspects of human activity; it is a sustained 
attempt to establish a rational structure or framework within which questions can be 
answered. 15 
This chapter explores to what extent specific Sophist ideas are rooted in Preso-
cratic philosophy. Guthrie has characterised the fundamental connection between the 
two strands of thought accurately: 
In spite of the shift of interest from natural phenomena to human affairs, there are nevertheless 
existential connexions between the Presocratic tradition and the new intellectual ferment gen-
erated by the Sophists... The Presocratics [are] preoccupied with the nature of reality and its 
relation to sensible phenomena. This question of the relation between reality and appearance 
remains at the root of things, and in one form or another constitutes the fundamental difference 
between rival philosophies [i.e. Sophist philosophy vs. Socratic/Platonic philosophy]. On the 
one hand we have a complex of ideas whose basis may be loosely summed up in such terms as 
empiricism, positivism, phenomenalism, individualism, relativism and humanism. Appearances 
are constantly shifting, from one moment to the next and between one individual and another, 
and they themselves constitute the only reality. In morals this leads to "situational ethics", 
an emphasis on the immediately practical and a distrust of general and permanent rules and 
principles ... 16 
Ultimately, our aim is to establish a link between Sophist philosophy and Athenian Po-
13 J. Burnet, Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato (London, Macmillan, 1932), p. 105 
14W.C.K. Guthrie, The Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle (London, Methuen and Co Ltd., 
1967), p. 63 
15G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 174 
16Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 4 
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litical Realism. We will therefore focus on those aspects of Sophist thinking that are 
intimately related to Political Realism. Our central aim is to understand to what extent 
the Moral Relativism of the Sophists (i.e. what Guthrie calls 'situational ethics') is rooted 
in Presocratic philosophy. 
There are three guiding questions that will help us determine this relationship: 1. To 
what extent and in which ways have the Sophists built on Presocratic thought? 2. Which 
Sophist ideas would have been inconceivable without Presocratic ideas? 3. In which 
respects does Sophist philosophy vary from Presocratic philosophy? We will analyse the 
connections between specific ideas to identify various areas of continuity and of progress 
of thinking. 
Sophist Moral Relativism rests on four pillars. The first and most fundamental pillar 
represents ontological reflections: What is there? This is closely related to the second 
pillar concerned primarily with epistemology: what can we know about it? Relativism 
is embodied in the third pillar: if there is no secure knowledge, nothing is either true or 
false. The last pillar establishes man as the measure of all things: without universal truths, 
there is but individual perspectives. Erecting the first pillar is a necessary precondition 
for constructing the second and so on. Each pillar constitutes an indispensable axiom 
of the theory of Moral Relativism. Our task is to examine each individual pillar and its 
relationship to Presocratic ideas. We will demonstrate that Presocratic thought has an 
important impact on the more elementary first two pillars. However, with the increasing 
complexity of Sophist thought as embodied in the third and fourth pillars, Presocratic 
influence fades. In other words, Presocratic philosophy is crucial for Sophist ontology 
and epistemology. Although it requires both ontology and epistemology as a basis, Moral 
Relativism in itself is influenced only indirectly by Presocratic ideas. 
2.2 Being- What is there? 
Though he is certainly not the only Sophist to reflect on and write about Being, Gorgias' 
treatise On Not Being is indisputably the most comprehensive and most influential extant 
source of Sophist ontology. Scholars still debate whether Gorgias meant the treatise to be 
serious or ironic. In any case, his original refutation of fundamental ontological questions 
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expresses his scepticism towards all knowledge. As de Romilly notes, 'this possibly playful 
exercise in polemics is thus in line with more serious philosophical critiques, and . . . in 
that it sweeps aside everything that seemed secure or even thinkable, it opens the door 
to scepticism in all forms. m The playfulness of Gorgias' argument does not obscure the 
serious content thereof. We agree with Guthrie who suggests that one should look behind 
appearances and appreciate the philosophical depth of the treatise: 'It is a parody with 
serious intent, showing that the opponent's own arguments could be used to prove the 
opposite of their conclusions. '18 What is interesting for our discussion is that On Not 
Being provides evidence of the extent to which the Sophists borrow from and respond 
to Presocratic ideas, and thus illustrates the close relationship between Presocratic and 
Sophist philosophy. In Gorgias' treatise we detect the roots of Sophist Radical Scepticism, 
which is essentially a reaction to the extreme Rationalism of the Eleatics. 19 Gorgias 
displays the absurdity of Eleatic logic by inverting it and thus proving what Parmenides, 
the central Eleatic philosopher, denies; that it is and it is not both exist. By disproving 
Parmenides, Gorgias dismantles the underlying assumptions of all natural philosophers: 
that behind the apparent changing and unstable natural world, there is a substance, a 
non-sensible reality. 
Gorgias develops four arguments about Being that are inherently connected to Preso-
cratic ideas. His reasoning reflects not only his familiarity with post-Parmenidan Preso-
cratic thought, but is based on Parmenides' ideas. The purpose of Gorgias' ontological 
discussion is to exhibit the inaccuracies of Eleatic philosophy. He disproves Parmenides' 
assumptions using mostly his own philosophical concepts (and to a lesser extent the con-
cepts of Zeno and of Melissus). Gorgias thus reveals the fundamental difference between 
essential and accidental Being; he opposes Parmenides' self-existent or absolutely existent 
Being with his own conditional or relative Being. 20 
Gorgias' first claim is that whatever there is, it is not possible for it to either be or not 
be. Being and Not-Being are the same. As a consequence, 'things no more are than are 
17J. de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 97 
18W.K.C. Guthrie, 'The First Humanists', Proceedings of the Classical Association, Vol. 65 (1968), p. 
22 
19 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 8 
20 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 193 
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not. 121 With this assumption, Gorgias follows in Parmenides' philosophical footsteps while 
simultaneously disproving his central tenet. According to Parmenides, there are only two 
conceivable ways of thinking about the world: 'There is the way "that it is and that it 
cannot not be": This is the path of Trust, for Truth attends it. Then there is the way 
"that it is not and that it must not be": This, as I show you, is an altogether misguided 
route. For you may not know what-is-not - there is no end to it - Nor may you tell of it. '22 
For Parmenides, Being and Not-Being are distinct: 'That which is there to be spoken and 
thought of must be. For it is possible for it to be, but not possible for nothing to be. '23 If 
we can think of something coherently, it can exist. It is not possible for Nothing to exist, 
since what is not cannot be thought of. If something does not exist we cannot know it 
or express it in words, there is nothing to be known or to be expressed; nothing is true 
of the nonexistent. Gorgias deconstructs the mutual exclusivity of Parmenides' Being 
and Not-Being by demonstrating that it is in fact possible to think of Not-Being. As a 
logical consequence, Not-Being, just as Being, must exist. This circular argument leads 
Gorgias to conclude what Parmenides disputes: things can be or not be, be something or 
be nothing. 
Gorgias' second argument revolves around the coming into being of things. His rea-
soning is firmly based on the ideas of both Melissus and Zeno and makes reference to 
Parmenidan philosophy. Gorgias' initial assertion is that 'if there is anything, it is either 
unborn or born. '24 He proceeds to demonstrate that neither of these claims is true. In 
order to prove that it is impossible for it to be unborn, he starts from Melissus' assertion 
that to be unborn, it needs to be unlimited. Melissus says 'But as it always exists, so too 
it must always be unlimited in magnitude. '25 Gorgias shows that it cannot be unlimited 
because this would mean that it is anywhere. And it cannot be anywhere since what is 
unlimited is indivisible; it cannot be in different places at the same time (i.e. in itself and 
in something else). In order to substantiate this point further, Gorgias borrows from the 
argument Zeno makes about space. Zeno holds that the idea of a local place is absurd; 
21 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought fr. 18a, p. 207 
22Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F3, p. 58 
23McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates fr. 11.6, p. 153 
24Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18a, p. 207 
25Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F3, p. 84 
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since everything is in something else. Every place is in another place which is in another 
place still and so on ad infinitum. Hence whatever is cannot be anywhere, and must 
therefore be nowhere. But if it is nowhere, concludes Gorgias, it cannot be unborn but 
must be nothing. 
Having proven that Being is not unborn; Gorgias argues that it cannot be born either. 
His argument reiterates Parmenides' belief that the birth of Being from either Being or 
Not-Being is inconceivable. In Parmenides' view, Being cannot come into being from Not-
Being because the latter does not exist. Furthermore, since Not-Being has no properties, 
nothing can develop from it. Likewise, Being cannot develop from Being because Being 
is singular, uniform and thus unchangeable; there is no other Being that Being could 
be created from. Melissus reinforces the Parmenidan line of argument: 'Whatever was, 
always was and always will be. For if it came to be, it is necessary that before it came 
to be it was nothing. Now if it was nothing, in no way could anything come to be out of 
nothing. '26 Although Gorgias ultimately reaches the same conclusions as Parmenides and 
Melissus, his reasoning is slightly different: in his view, nothing can be born from either 
Being or Not-Being because neither of these can be changed. He agrees with Parmenides 
and Melissus that nothing can be born from Not-Being if Not-Being is not anything. 
However, unlike the Presocratics, Gorgias allows for the possibility that Not-Being is 
something. Ultimately, this has no effect on his overall argument because even if N at-
Being were Being, nothing could be born from it for the· same reason that nothing can 
be born from Being. Gorgias therefore concludes 'So if there is anything, it is necessarily 
either unborn or born, and since both of these are impossible, it follows in fact that it is 
impossible for there to be anything. >27 
Instead of adopting Parmenides' notion of Being, Gorgias reveals that his thinking 
lacks consequentiality. Parmenidan philosophy, despite the distinctness of its approach, 
betrays the influence of Presocratic Monism. The idea that Being is one and unchanging 
is reminiscent of the single principle of the Monists. In fact, it can be argued that 
Parmenides' concept of Being merely replaces the ruling principle or prime matter of 
earlier thinkers. This would explain Parmenides' insistence on the singularity of Being. 
26 McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates, fr. 15.1, p. 292 
27Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18a, p. 207 
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Within the Presocratic frame of thinking, the dualism of Being (i.e. Being and Not-Being) 
is inconceivable. 
Gorgias' third and final claim is that 'if there is anything, it is one or more [in num-
ber].'28 He argues 'that there could not be a one, since what is truly one is incorporeal 
in so far as it has no magnitude. '29 As we have just discussed, the idea that the world is 
made of one substance or one principle is characteristic of Presocratic thought. However, 
Gorgias' assertion that in order to be one Being has to be incorporeal seems reminiscent 
of the Pythagorean concept of numbers. According to the Pythagoreans, numbers (which 
are incorporeal) are analogues of things and constitute the whole universe: 'Since, then, 
the whole natural world seemed basically to be an analogue for numbers, and numbers 
seemed to be the primary facet of the natural world, they [the Pythagoreans] concluded 
that the elements of numbers are the elements of all things, and that the whole universe is 
harmony and number. '30 Against the backdrop of Pythagorean thought, it is not entirely 
implausible that Gorgias' may be arguing along the following lines: presocratic Monism 
only makes sense if it refers to numerical singularity. But if Being is analogue to the 
number one, it is incorporeal. And since this would imply that Being has no magnitude, 
Being cannot be one. Solmsen shows that Gorgias' rejection of the oneness and of the 
multitude of Being can also be explained without reference to the Pythagoreans: 'Being 
might be either one or many. But if it is one, it would have to subsist as a body, a 
quantity, or something else that is divisible and thus would no longer be one; and if many, 
we must regard the many as a sum of ones, but as the one has been disproved, the many 
cannot exist either. '31 
Gorgias thus rejects Parmenides' notion of the oneness of Being: 'And so it should 
either entirely be, or not be at all. '32 Implicitly, Gorgias' conclusion that 'if there is not a 
one, there could not be a many and if there is neither a one nor a many, there is nothing. '33 
incorporates Parmenides' claim that if Being is not one, it cannot be anything. Finally, 
28Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18a, p. 207 
29Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18a, p. 207 
30Waterfield, The First Philosophers, T25, p. 102 
31 F. Solmsen, Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1975), p. 12 
32Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F8, p. 59 
33Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18a, p. 208 
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we can understand Gorgias' argument as contradicting not only the ontological but also 
the epistemological singularity. Rejecting Monism essentially means rejecting a singular 
truth. Whether this truth is embodied in a single principle or in a singular existence (i.e. 
Being) Gorgias discards both approaches. 
Gorgias concludes his ontological investigation with explaining why Being is unchange-
able. In his view, Being cannot change because this implies that something that did not 
exist previously comes into existence, while something that used to be ceases to exist. 
Being is treated as a property of things rather than as a condition. Gorgias' reasoning 
reinforces merely what Parmenides wrote earlier: 'It stays in the same state and in the 
same place, lying by itself, And so stays firmly as it is. '34 With his treatise On Not Being, 
Gorgias completes Parmenides' half-hearted departure from pre-Parmenidan Presocratic 
thought. Gorgias challenges the Eleatic assertion of a single changeless Being grasped by 
an infallible reason. This has wide-ranging consequences for Sophist philosophy. If Being 
and Not-Being are identical and nothing is, there is no permanent truth to be known and 
all that is left are various opinions. 
The various connections between Parmenides' and Gorgias' conceptions of Being reveal 
the extent to which Presocratic thinking influences Sophist ontology. The Sophists are 
familiar with Presocratic ideas and use them as a basis on which to build their own 
concepts. Despite the fact that some of their ideas overlap, the Sophists ultimately reject 
Presocratic thought using it as ·a stepping stone for their own philosophy. 
Generally speaking, it is rather difficult to reconstruct the exchange of ideas between 
the Sophists and the Presocratics in the Fifth Century. Very few Sophist fragments contain 
cross-references to Presocratic thought as obvious as those in Gorgias' On Not Being. 
That is why his treatise is crucial to understanding the Presocratic influence on Sophist 
ontology. The comprehensiveness of On Not Being allows for a more thorough enquiry 
than any other Sophist fragment. Though other Sophists also deal with ontology, the 
evidence is too scarce to draw wide-ranging conclusions. Bearing this in mind, we conclude 
from our analysis of Gorgias' treatise On Not Being that Sophist ontology develops from 
Presocratic conceptions of Being. 
34Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F8, p. 60 
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2.3 Knowledge- What can we know about it? 
Epistemology and ontology are inherently related. Essentially, knowledge is about What-
Is and What-Is-Not. All other knowledge is derivative. Parmenides' basic tenet what 
can be spoken and thought of can possibly be illustrates this relationship perfectly. Being 
cannot be separated from the knowledge of Being and vice versa. This is the starting point 
of Sophist Epistemology. Protagoras espouses Parmenides' claim in asserting that 'It is 
not possible to think what is not. '35 This reiteration of Parmenidan philosophy reflects the 
predominance of his thought in the early Fifth Century. While the Sophists ignore most 
of the early Presocratics, they make a point of either supporting or refuting Parmenides' 
philosophy. Parmenidan thought serves as a common starting point for different Sophist 
epistemologies. This proves our initial claim: whether Presocratic ideas are rejected or 
embraced, they are incorporated into Sophist philosophy. 
In On Not Being, Gorgias contradicts Parmenides' statement, claiming that it is pos-
sible to think of things that do not exist, for example chariots racing in the sea. Although 
at first sight this appears to be a refutation of Parmenides, it merely shows that Gorgias 
and Parmenides work on different assumptions. For Parmenides, thinking and Being are 
co-extensive. He states: 'Thinking and the thought that it is are the same. For not with-
out what is, in which it is expressed, will you find thinking; for nothing else either is or will 
be except that which is. '36 We can only think of a thing as it is. Being is not existential 
(we can think of things that do not exist) but predicative (we can know something and 
think of something only if it has some attribute) and veridical (we can only ever know 
something that is the case). According to this understanding of thinking, it is impossible 
for us to think of or to know an entity without attributes. In fact, Waterfield points out 
that the Greek word Parmenides uses for 'thinking' carries connotations of 'recognition', 
which implies that what we think of is something out there to be recognised, not a fanci-
ful object such as a unicorn or chariots in the sea.37 Parmenides' notion of Being makes 
thinking about something that does not exist impossible. Gorgias, however, who aims 
to dispose of the concept of Being altogether, purposefully challenges both Parmenides' 
35Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18, p. 186 
36McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates, fr. 11.8, p. 154 
37Waterfield, The First Philosophers, p. 50 
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epistemology and its underlying ontology. 
In Gorgias' view, rational thinking and sensual perception are equally fallible: 'just as 
there is no more reason for things we see to be the case (merely because we see them), so 
things we see are no more likely to be the case than are things we have in mind. '38 We 
have no reason to believe that our mind grasps reality more accurately than our senses. In 
fact, we cannot rely on either since 'The nature of true things is not evident [to the senses]; 
so that even if they are the case, these things would not be knowable, at any rate not by 
us. '39 With this statement, Gorgias challenges commonly held Presocratic assumptions 
and Parmenides' philosophy in particular. While most of the Presocratics agree with 
Gorgias that truth is not accessible to the senses, they insist that it is perceived by the 
rational mind. Presocratic philosophy is driven by the belief that through the application 
of proper philosophical concepts and methodology, one can comprehend the true reality 
of things. Gorgias' claim that everything can be thought (even What-Is-Not) but that 
nothing necessarily exists or is true is a direct challenge to Parmenides' philosophy. 
By questioning the attainability of knowledge altogether, Gorgias follows in the foot-
steps of Xenophanes, the father of Scepticism. In Xenophanes' opinion, it is impossible 
for us to attain truth: 'No man has seen nor will anyone know the truth about the gods 
and all things I speak of. For even if a person should in fact say what is absolutely the 
case, nevertheless he himself does not know, but belief is fashioned over all things [or, 
in the case of all persons].'40 Neither with our senses nor with our mind can we gain 
knowledge of the truth. We might discover the truth accidentally (i.e. 'what is absolutely 
the case'), but we have no means of establishing whether it is actually true. Belief is all 
there is. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Xenophanes would have difficulties proving the truth-
fulness of his own statement, he - and this distinguishes him from the Sceptic Sophists -
seems to believe that there is such a thing as a truth. First of all he does not deny that 
there might be a truth. More importantly, his term 'what is absolutely the case' comes 
very close to describing an objective reality. If we interpret the above fragment in this 
38Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18b, p. 208 
39Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18b, p. 208 
40McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates, fr. 7.19, p. 66/7 
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way, Xenophanes is situated between Presocratic and Sophist thinking: like his fellow 
Presocratics, he believes that there is an underlying truth; at the same time, his Scepti-
cism of the attainability of knowledge makes him doubt that this has any consequences 
for our knowledge of the world. Finally, the paradoxical notion that there is a truth but 
that we cannot know it, sets him apart from Presocratics and Sophists alike. 
Xenophanes' and Gorgias' Epistemological Scepticism is juxtaposed to Presocratic 
ideas of knowledge. Though most of the Presocratics doubt the evidence of the senses, 
their enquiries are nevertheless based on the observation and on the interpretation of 
natural phenomena. In their view, the rational mind compensates for the elusiveness of 
sense perception and gives us access to the truth. 
Presocratic epistemology is a result of Presocratic ontology and methodology. Given 
that their main object of study is nature, it is not surprising that most of the Presocrat-
ics come up with a natural principle or substance to explain reality. They believe that 
everything can be reduced to a first principle or prime matter. Nothing exists beyond 
and outside of this first principle. Consequently, our knowledge is restricted to it. These 
Sophist epistemologies, which are based on natural principles (Pythagoras, Heraclitus, 
Parmenides and some of the post-Parmenidan thinkers are notable exceptions) are char-
acterised by a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, the senses are considered as 
an inadequate tool for understanding the world's functioning principles. This conviction 
is amply illustrated by Anaxagoras, who holds that 'The weakness [of the senses] means 
that we are incapable of discerning the truth. '41 On the other hand, the Presocratics de-
rive their first principles from the (subjectively perceived) natural world. This is a major 
flaw in Presocratic thought: just as perceptions of the natural world differ, so do inter-
pretations thereof. As a result, the Presocratics do not agree on what the first principle 
or substance actually is. As Guthrie points out: 'Each believed himself to be nearest to 
the truth, but were there any solid grounds for trusting one rather than another?'42 This 
and the rather speculative character of their theories43 ultimately deal the final blow to 
presocratic philosophy. Confronted with these deficiencies, post-Parmenidan Presocratics 
41 Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F20, p. 130 
42Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 11 
43 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 15 
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and Sophists alike dismiss sense perception as an inadequate means to discover the truth. 
Against the backdrop of this intellectual context, Parmenides' approach should be 
regarded as the tabula rasa of Presocratic philosophy. His radically new way of thinking 
manoeuvres Presocratic philosophy out of the impasse in which it is stuck: without the 
means to determine which of the various interpretations of reality is true, it is bound to 
stagnate. Despite their emphasis on rational thinking, the attempt of the early Preso-
cratics at providing a coherent answer to the question What is there? ultimately fails due 
to the subjectivity of their various approaches. 
The different philosophies of Parmenides, Melissus and the Sophists are a reaction to 
this failure as well as an attempt to develop theories which compensate for the deficiencies 
of the philosophy of their contemporaries. They try to answer questions that confound the 
early Presocratics, while also asking questions which the latter fail to address altogether. 
Distancing himself from the methodology of his predecessors, Parmenides establishes 
a new way to conceptualise knowledge. He introduces deductive arguments and relies 
on pure reasoning to analyse the nature of logical subjects. This allows him to ask 
new questions: what conditions must existing things satisfy? Is reality what our senses 
tell us it is? This approach fundamentally changes the parameters of philosophy. Some 
Presocratics and most Sophists follow in Parmenides' methodological footsteps. Although 
Parmenides' philosophy may be subject to a lot of disputes, what is important is that none 
of his successors can ignore or bypass his philosophy. Within the context of our analysis, 
his most important legacy is that his ideas allow Sophist philosophy to transcend the 
confined realm of Presocratic thought. 
Besides dealing with Parmenides' explicit ideas, the Sophists also examine the conse-
quences of his thought. In addition to studying the possibility of knowledge, they reflect 
on the universality and on the communicability of knowledge. 
Protagoras discusses the relationship between sensual perception and objective knowl-
edge. The following is attributed to him: 'It is manifest to you who are present that I am 
sitting; but to a person who is absent it is not manifest that I am sitting; whether or not 
I am sitting is obscure.'44 This thought mirrors Anaxagoras' observation 'Appearances 
44Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 21, p. 187 
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are a glimpse of the obscure. '45 And it highlights the considerable influence of Presocratic 
ideas on Sophist concepts of knowledge and sense perception. For Anaxagoras, the true 
nature of things is obscure. But if everything is obscure, how do we know that there is 
such a thing as the true nature of things/of reality? If our senses only perceive appear-
ances, how do we know that there is something behind these appearances? If all we know 
is that what we see is but appearances, what do we actually know? 
Protagoras suggests that although sense perception can give us evidence of things as 
they manifest themselves (i.e. him sitting) this evidence is not universally valid. Two 
people, one of which sees Protagoras sitting while the other does not, will not be able to 
establish whether or not he is sitting. The one who sees Protagoras sitting cannot prove 
that this is actually the case while the other has no means of finding out the truth without 
witnessing it. Someone who does not witness the manifestation of a thing has no means 
of knowing whether this thing exists or not. As a result, it is impossible to establish the 
true reality of things. Nobody really knows whether Protagoras is sitting or not, though 
all of us have our own private knowledge thereof. 
Protagoras' paradigm addresses one of the fundamental issues of epistemology. Whereas 
most of the Presocratics work on the assumption that there is a true reality of things, and 
therefore ask What are all things made of? (In Protagoras' example this would translate 
into: is he sitting or not?). Protagoras discards these kinds of questions by giving an 
unequivocal answer: we just do not know. 
This argument is commensurate with Gorgias' final statement in On Not Being. Bring-
ing his and the argument of Protagoras to its logic conclusion, Gorgias argues that even 
if we could know anything, we would not be able to communicate it or agtee-·nn·it. He 
asks: 'Even if they [things] were knowable, how could anyone make them evident to an-
other? How could someone express in words what he has seen? Or how could such a 
thing become evident to someone who has heard the other speak of it, but has not seen 
it himself?'46 The essence of his reasoning is that the existence and the properties of a 
thing cannot be communicated because a thing is (a) not equivalent to the notion of it; 
(b) one thing cannot exist at the same time in several minds; and (c) two people's notions 
45 Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, fr. 537, p. 394 
46Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18c, p. 208 
2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 22 
of one thing are not necessarily identical. Antiphon makes a similar claim: 'Someone 
who says one thing does not in fact have one thing in mind, nor does one thing exist 
for him, neither something that the one who sees best sees with his sight nor something 
that the one who knows best knows with his mind. '47 A thing as it is, a thing said and 
a thing in mind are neither (necessarily) identical nor is there a causal relationship be-
tween them. This is where Parmenides' deductive reasoning reaches its limit. We might 
be able to make a statement about a thing, but this does not presuppose that we have 
an idea about it and it does not mean that this thing actually exists. Neither the most 
effective sight nor intellectual capacity can assist us in proving the existence of a thing. 
Antiphon thus refutes Parmenides' claim that a thing which can be thought must exist, 
and thereby dissolves the connection between our rational mind/thinking capacity and 
reality. Whereas the Presocratics rely on the rational mind, the Sophists' fundamental 
doubt includes thinking itself. 
Sophist philosophy systematically deconstructs Presocratic notions of the world. In-
stead of replacing Presocratic concepts (i.e. the first principle, prime matter or unchange-
able Being) with their own, the Sophists reject the Presocratics' entire framework of 
thinking. If there is no universally valid knowledge, searching for an underlying reality 
or examining the relationship between Being and Not-Being is a futile exercise. In the 
Sophist world view truth and reality are uncertain. All we can do is come to terms with 
the plurality of perceptions, interpretations, and meaning. 
2.4 Relativism and Subjectivism 
The most significant implication of Sophist epistemology is that there are no universal 
or absolute standards of knowledge. All knowledge is limited to individual experience; 
transcendent knowledge is impossible. The criteria of judgment are thus relative, varying 
with subjects. 'It is our own feelings and convictions that measure or determine the limits 
and nature of reality, which only exists in relation to them and is different for every one 
of us. '48 The existence and the properties of things can only be determined in relation 
47Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 7a, p. 244 
48 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. III, p. 184 
2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 23 
to the person who perceives them or thinks about them. A thing does not exist as such 
but is as it is perceived. There is no reality behind nor independent of appearances: 
being is identical to appearing. Hence Subjectivism implies Relativism and vice versa. 
Subjectivism is the inescapable consequence of Relativism. 
The Moral Relativism of the Sophists, which denies absolute standards of Right and 
Wrong, is intricately related to Presocratic conceptions of the natural world. Presocratic 
doubts of the order and stability of the physical world and the rejection of divinity in 
favour of chance and natural necessity of causes, are seized upon by the Sophists and 
transformed into the relativity of ethical conceptions. 49 
Sophist philosophy is fragmentary and our understanding of Relativism is dominated 
almost entirely by what remains of Protagoras' writings. It would therefore be inadequate 
to classify all Sophists as Relativists. However, a thorough analysis of Protagoras' ideas 
that takes into account the relevant Presocratic and Sophist influences will allow us to 
establish the significance of Relativism for Sophist thought. 
Protagoras' initial claim is that 'On every subject there are two logoi [speeches or 
arguments] opposed to one another. '50 These two opposed arguments represent the mul-
tiplicity of perspectives on the world. Protagoras suggests that all arguments that can 
possibly be made about a given subject are equally valid. No statement can be consid-
ered either true or false. And in the absence of a universal truth, contradictions between 
arguments cannot be resolved. 
In Protagoras' view, and this distinguishes him from his Presocratic predecessors, it is 
impossible to determine whether or not there is such a thing as a single truth. While the 
Presocratics reduce the complexity of the world to a single principle, Protagoras insists 
that we face the multidimensionality of things because this is the only reality accessible to 
us. His line of argument about the good illustrates the complexity of Relativist statements: 
I know many things that are not beneficialunbeneficial to humans: foods and drinks and drugs 
and thousands of other things: and others that are beneficial. Some are neither beneficial nor 
harmful to humans, but are beneficial to horses, some only for cattle, and others for dogs ... But 
49 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. III, p. 59 
50Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 24, p. 187 
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so various and many-sided a thing is the good, that even when we human beings use oil, it is 
good for the outside parts of the body, but the same oil is very bad for our insides. 51 
Protagoras' way of reasoning is reminiscent of Heraclitus' theory of the identity of 
opposites. Heraclitus believes that things are composed of opposites. And given that 
everything is relative, even opposites are identical. Heraclitus illustrates this claim with 
real-life examples. The value of things depends on both the context and the perceiving 
subject: 'Sea: water most pure and most tainted, drinkable and wholesome for fish, but 
undrinkable and poisonous for people'52 or 'Donkeys would prefer refuse to gold'53 and 
'Pigs prefer filth to clean water.'54 Everything is relative: 'A man is thought as foolish 
by a supernatural being as a child is by a man. '55 
Within the framework of Relativism we can no longer make general statements about 
things but need to be specific about particular circumstances and relationships. Since 
there are many different truths, both the applicability and the validity of our knowledge 
are necessarily limited. Against the backdrop of this complexity, Protagoras approaches 
knowledge rather pragmatically. His argument about good and bad can be summarised 
as follows. (i) We do not know whether there is such a thing as the good. (ii) We cannot 
say that a thing is either good or bad. (iii) All we can do is establish whether a thing is 
good or bad in a particular context and relative to other things. Instead of searching for 
the universal meaning of the good, we should be concerned with the particular cases of 
goodness and badness that life confronts us with. 
A contemporary unknown source discusses the same problem: 
[1] Double arguments are put forward by intellectuals in Greece concerning good and bad. 
Some say that good is one thing and bad another, while others say that the same thing can be 
both/that good and bad are the same thing, and that something may be good for some but bad 
for others or sometimes good and sometimes bad for the same person. [2] I myself agree with the 
latter, and my investigation will begin with human life and its concern with food and drink and 
sex; for these things are bad for someone sick but good for someone healthy who needs them ... 
51 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 11, p. 185 
52Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F15, p. 39 
53Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F17, p. 39 
54Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F18, p. 40 
55Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F19, p. 40 
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[3] Sickness, moreover, is bad for the sick but good for doctors ... [6] a victory is good for the 
winner but bad for the losers ... 56 
This unknown author, whose writings have been associated with various Sophists57 , 
agrees with Protagoras' notion of value judgements and illustrates the implications of 
Relativist arguments. A thing (i.e. water) can be good for one thing (i.e. the roots of a 
tree) and bad for another (i.e. the sprouts of a tree). The value of a given thing can only 
be established with respect to another thing. It does not make sense to say that a thing 
is good or bad per se. Even if it could be shown that a thing is good with respect to all 
other things, this would not imply that it is generally or universally good, that is, that it 
is of a different quality or kind than a thing which is only good for some things. 
As this discussion regarding the good and the bad illustrates, Relativism has three 
important implications. First, neither the existence nor the properties of things can be 
generally established. Second, reality is not uniform but multi-dimensional and contra-
dictions are impossible. Third, each of us makes their own reality. Let us consider each 
of these aspects in turn. 
1. We can neither establish whether or not things exist at all, nor determine what they 
are. In fact, we do not even know whether things have a real existence as opposed to an 
apparent existence. All we can say is that a thing can take on many different appearances. 
Protagoras is believed to have said: 'Each thing is no more such than such. '58 This is 
clearly a reference to Gorgias' ontological claim 'things no more are than are not. '59 If 
the existence of things cannot be proven, it logically follows that we cannot determine 
their properties either. Each thing appears differently to different people and we have 
no justification for saying that it is as X sees it rather than as Y sees it. Appearances 
are all there is. And it is impossible for us to transcend these appearances. In this 
view, Protagoras, just as the Presocratics before him, paints a picture of a world in flux. 
But in contrast to the Presocratics, he does not assume that things change; instead he 
56Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 1, pp. 296-7 
57Untersteiner points out that this fragment echoes numerous doctrines and themes reminiscent of 
Sixth and Fifth Century philosophers as diverse as Heraclitus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus 
and Socrates. See M. Untersteiner, The Sophists (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1954), p. 304ff. 
58Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought fr. 26, p. 187 
59 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought fr. 18a, p. 207 
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asserts that they are multi-dimensional. It is this fundamental change of perspective, 
which distinguishes Sophist from Presocratic thinking: while for the Presocratics, things 
are the starting point for their analysis of reality, for Protagoras it is human beings and 
their individual perspective. In the eyes of the Sophists, it is pointless to ask (as the 
Presocratics do) whether things really are this or that or how they have changed from 
one thing into another, because we simply cannot know. Each of us only knows what she 
sees and that is it. What appears to me is because it appears to me. What I see exists 
primarily for me, and is different for everybody else. As Protagoras writes: 'Each of us 
has his own private perceptions, and what appears exists only for that person to whom 
it appears. '60 
2. In a multidimensional world where 'Each thing is to me such as it appears to me, 
and is to you such as it appears to you'61 all attempts at communicating different views 
of reality to one another are futile. We cannot make sense of the world collectively; each 
of us is limited to his or her own perspective. In this respect, Protagoras' philosophy 
reflects Gorgias' epistemological argument about the incommunicability of knowledge. It 
explains why Protagoras asserts that 'It is not possible to contradict.'62 If all perceptions 
are private, it is impossible to contend that something is wrong or untrue and that its 
opposite is right or true. All perceptions are true because falsification is impossible. 
Subjective perceptions, by their very nature, cannot be disputed. Since we have neither 
access to other people's perspectives nor to what these refer to, we can make no meaningful 
statements. As a result, all communication is reduced to the art of persuasion. 
3. In Protagoras' view, Relativism implies the inviolability of individual perspectives. 
The Sophists replace the objectivity of Presocratic world views and their weak notion of 
subjectivity with radical and uncompromising subjectivity. Protagoras holds that 'Man 
is measure of all things, of those things that are, that they are, and of those things 
that are not, that they are not. '63 Although the meaning of this fragment has been 
debated from the Fifth Century up to the present day64 , it is now widely agreed that 
60Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought fr. 19, p. 186 
61 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought fr. 17, p. 186 
62Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought fr. 25, p. 187 
63Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, DK 1, p. 171 
64See Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 17lff. 
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man refers to each individual rather than mankind as a single entity. 65 As opposed to the 
Presocratics, Protagoras is not concerned with the existence of things but with the way 
things are, i.e. their predicates. The existence of things is not uniform and cannot be 
universally determined. Things exist because we perceive them, i.e. they exist through 
our perception rather than having an existence independent of us. Things are as we 
perceive them, both qualitatively and temporally speaking. Things exist for as long as 
they are being perceived, and they have the qualities that we perceive them to have. 
However, Presocratics and Sophists have a distinct view of subjectivity. For the 
Sophists, both sense perception and thinking are inherently linked to the individual sub-
ject, i.e. the person who perceives something or thinks about something. This view 
contrasts with the Presocratics' rather simplistic conception of subjectivity. 
The Presocratics do not seem to acknowledge that the subjective perceptions of indi-
viduals may differ. Instead, they establish an opposition between rational thinking and 
subjective (sense) perception as such. In their view, the world is in flux: things come into 
being, change and perish. This perception is subjective since it is the result of our human 
capacity. However, it does not necessarily bear a relation to the objects we perceive. 
Solely our minds can grasp the truth, which is objective because it lies within the objects 
of perception. 
Parmenides introduces a slightly different form of Subjectivism to Presocratic thinking. 
His philosophy is based on the assumption that Being and Not-Being are determined by 
what we as human beings can or cannot think. Hence the existential make-up of the world 
cannot be understood without reference to our Being (we need to exist in order to think) 
and our capacity (we need to think for things to exist). Parmenides' Subjectivism is 
similar to pre-Parmenidan Subjectivism in that it refers to human beings as such without 
considering different individual perspectives. At the same time, it differs from other 
Presocratic views because subjectivity is inherently linked to our Being. 
Challenging these rather simplistic ideas, the Sophists assert that the subjective per-
ception of things pertains to the individual. Two people can have: (i) different perceptions 
of the same thing(s); (ii) different perceptions of different thing(s); (iii) the same percep-
tion of the same thing(s); or (iv) the same perception of different thing(s). Even if two 
65 See Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 86 
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people have the same perception of a thing, this does not prove the existence or the 
specific qualities of this thing. There is no causal relationship between what we see and 
what is. The true reality of things cannot be established by perception. We do not know 
whether there is such a thing as a true reality of things; and if there is, what it is and 
what relationship it bears to sense perception. 
The fundamental difference between the Presocratic and the Sophist approach is that 
unlike the Sophists, the Presocratics do not seem to regard the potential disparity be-
tween individual sense perceptions as important. In their view sense perception is a 
general aspect of human capacity which produces a more or less homogenous picture of 
the natural world. The Sophists, on the other hand, emphasise the individual nature of 
sense perception. 
We therefore argue that the 'weak' form of Subjectivism spelled out in Presocratic 
thought is brought to a radical conclusion by the Sophists. Gorgias exploits the flaws of 
Parmenidan ideas and by introducing the paradigm of individual perspective changes the 
conception of thinking as well as conception of subjects. 
2.5 Four pillars make a building 
After having examined the different pillars which support the theory of Moral Relativism, 
we would now like to demonstrate how these elements, i.e. ontology, epistemology, Rel-
ativism and Subjectivism, relate to the overall framework of Moral Relativism. Just as 
a house is more than a number of columns held together by a roof, Moral Relativism 
transcends its individual components. It is a philosophical framework, which prescribes 
how to make sense of the world. 
In order to understand this framework, we have traced its roots in Presocratic thinking. 
We proceed from the assumption that new ideas develop from previous ideas. Whether 
new ideas imply a rejection, refutation or reinforcement of prevailing ideas or whether 
they can transcend their origins, they inherently refer to the ideas they originate from. 
The contextualisation of Sophist thinking is therefore crucial to our understanding of the 
philosophical foundations of Moral Relativism. 
Moral Relativism is the Sophist response to Presocratic ontology and epistemology. 
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This response is multi-faceted and can be divided into different interdependent compo-
nents. By eradicating the distinction between Being and Not-Being, the Sophists destroy 
the fundamental tenet of post-Parmenidan Presocratic ontology. On the ruins, they build 
their own theory which is centred on Epistemological Scepticism. If Not-Being and Being 
are identical, nothing meaningful can be said about the existence of things. True knowl-
edge is impossible and individual claims compete with one another. In the light of this, 
questions like What is there? and What can we know about it? are no longer relevant. 
What begins as a deconstruction of Presocratic ontology eventually culminates in the re-
jection of ontology altogether. The Epistemological Scepticism produced by this rejection 
leads to Relativism, which the Sophists apply not only to the sphere of knowledge but 
also to the world of morals. If there is no single truth, there can be no universal morality 
either. Experience reveals that moral norms differ from polis to polis and from culture 
to culture. And neither the gods nor science nor in fact philosophy can provide one with 
universal standards to guide one's actions. What is Right and what is Wrong must be 
determined individually. 
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Chapter 3 
3.1 Background 
The influence of Sophist 
philosophy on Athenian 
foreign policy during 
the Peloponnesian War 
Our analysis of the relationship between Sophist philosophy and Realist Athenian policy 
seeks to address two questions. How does the intellectual environment influence the realm 
of politics? Is there a direct link between philosophical concepts and public policies? 
We will show that Sophist philosophy provides the intellectual foundations for Political 
Realism. In fact, we will argue that Political Realism is the political response to Sophist 
philosophy. Within the realm of politics, Realism gives an answer to the fundamental 
question Sophist epistemology confronts us with: how do we make sense of the world 
knowing that there are no absolute values to rely upon? In a world in which true knowledge 
is unattainable, there are no universal values to guide our actions. Without objective 
standards as a frame of reference, various subjective perspectives compete with each 
other. Nothing is absolute: everything is relative. 
What are the political implications of this world view? The History of the Pelopon-
nesian War by Thucydides illustrates how the Athenians apply Sophist Epistemological 
Scepticism to the political sphere. Athens uses the multiplicity of meaning established 
by the Sophists as an instrument of power. In theory, the perspectives of different states 
perspectives may coexist; but in reality, different world views compete for superiority. In 
the end, how the stronger party interprets reality will prevail. As an imperial superpower, 
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Athens can both portray her own views as universally valid and assert them through the 
use of force. The History of the Peloponnesian War demonstrates how Athens uses both 
methods to force her Might is Right doctrine upon inferior states. 
In Athens, the political interpretation of Sophist philosophy has three dimensions. 
First, there is the dominant role of self-interest in politics. In the absence of absolute 
values, relative values prevail. And with the self as the only valid frame of reference, 
individuals and states make judgements relative to themselves. It logically follows that a 
state's policies are primarily determined by self-interest. Secondly, the lack of a frame of 
reference has implications for morality. If there is no universal morality, moral judgements 
only reflect particular interests. Rhetoric and physical force serve as tools to reinforce 
these interests. Third, without true knowledge, one is forced to be guided by experience 
only. On the basis of our experience of the world, we can determine the laws of nature 
on which we ought to act as a matter of prudence. 
In this chapter we illustrate how philosophy and politics are intertwined in Athenian 
foreign policy. We will contrast Sophist fragments with Athenian political speeches. At 
the beginning of his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides explains the origin of 
these speeches: 
In this history I have made use of set speeches some of which were delivered just before and others 
during the war. I have found it difficult to remember the precise words used in the speeches 
which I listened to myself and my various informants have experienced the same difficulty; so my 
method has been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words that were 
actually used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation.66 
Whether or not Thucydides' speeches are entirely accurate is not crucial. What is 
important is that for him, they are representative of Athenian attitudes towards foreign 
policy. In this respect, we side with Connor, who argues: 
Modern scholars have sometimes contended that the speeches are practically free compositions 
by Thucydides himself, with no basis in historical fact. Yet many of the speeches are carefully 
drawn and even individualized - suggesting that Thucydides not only mastered the situation 
sufficiently to know what arguments would be necessary, but also knew his characters well 
66Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.22.1-8 
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enough to determine the style and approach they would use... My disposition is to admit that 
Thucydides normally kept as close as he could to the general line of approach of a speaker, even 
though he had to guess about the exact wording.67 
For our discussion, the degree of accuracy is not as relevant as the underlying political 
attitudes and principles revealed by the speeches. Our aim is to understand Athenian 
foreign policy as crystallised in Thucydides' speeches assuming that 'by means of his 
speeches Thucydides places a situation in a larger perspective, connecting the present 
with the past and the future but also relating specific decisions to overriding interests, 
general rules, or basic political principles. '68 
3.2 How Athens instrumentalises Sophist philosophy 
to shape the international system 
3.2.1 Subjectivism and self-interest 
Protagoras' philosophy is the cornerstone of Subjectivism. He asserts that 'Man is the 
measure of all things, of those things that are, that they are, and of those things that 
are not, that they are not. '69 In Plato's Theaetetus, Socrates interprets this doctrine 
as follows: 'Socrates: Then does he [Protagoras] mean something like this, that as each 
thing appears to me, so it is to me, and as it appears to you, so it is to you - you and 
I being "man"? Theaetetus: Yes, that is what he means. '70 We as individuals are the 
ultimate arbitrators of both the existence and of the properties of things. Each of us 
creates his or her own reality which is beyond anyone's reach. What I hold to be true 
may very well be untrue for someone else and vice versa. There is thus no point in trying 
to reconcile different perspectives; we simply have to deal with the fact that we interpret 
reality differently. Self-interest is thus a corollary of Subjectivism. In a world where 
people know only their individual perspective; they have no reason to pursue any ends 
67W.R. Connor, The New Politicians Of Fifth-Century Athens (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Com-
pany, 1992), p. 95 
68Solmsen, Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment, p. 32 
69Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 15, p. 186 
70Plato, Theaetetus translated by M.J. Levett (Glasgow, University of Glasgow Press, 1977), 152a7-10 
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but their own. 
The Athenians apply this Subjectivism to the political sphere. They equate Protago-
ras' 'man' with the state and compare each man's self-interest to a state's self-interest. 
Since Relativism induces individuals and states alike to consider only their own inter-
est, the Athenians regard self-interest as the prime motivational force behind a state's 
policies. In the Fifth Century, this idea becomes the central tenet of Athenian policy 
and sets new standards in international relations. Thus Sophist philosophy serves as an 
intellectual foundation as well as a justification for Athenian policy. The History of the 
Peloponnesian War illustrates how Athens spreads the paradigm of self-interest through-
out the Greek World. Guthrie notes how seldom the orators of Thucydides, who aim to 
persuade, see any point in appealing to considerations or right, justice or other normally 
accepted moral standards: 'it is taken for granted that only an appeal to self-interest is 
likely to succeed.m At the Debate at Camarina, which takes place in 415/4 BCE, the 
Athenians claim that ultimately, people follow their own interests: 'We know that when 
people are frightened and suspicious they enjoy for the moment an argument that fits in 
with their feelings, but in the end, when it comes to the point, they act in accordance 
with their interests. >72 In the Athenian view, rational thinking requires people to act in 
their self-interest; any other course of action would be irrational. 
The same holds for states. In international relations, it is reasonable for states to 
pursue their self-interest since it is the only way to secure their safety. In fact, it appears 
that for the Athenians, the state's need of security justifies any policy: they assert that 
'no one can be blamed for looking after his own safety in his own way. '73 The superior 
importance of security is written into the relations between Greek city states. Once it 
has been established that acting in one's own interest is rational, states inevitably expect 
other states to pursue only their own interest. And since it is taken for granted that the 
self-interests of different states are per se irreconcilable, every state is forced to pursue its 
interests at any cost not to put its security in jeopardy. 
These ideas are reflected in the Melian Dialogue (416/5 BCE), in which the Athenians 
71 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 85 
72Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.83.15-19 
73Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.83.10-11 
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assert that leaving the path of self-interest involves unnecessary dangers: 'You seem to 
forget that if one follows one's self-interest one wants to be safe, whereas the path of 
justice and honour involves one in danger. '74 By giving relative/subjective values (i.e. 
self-interest), priority over universal values such as justice, the Athenians remain faithful 
to Sophist philosophy. At the same time, they make a clear distinction between the 
rules that apply to international relations and those valid for domestic politics. In the 
Mytilenian Debate ( 427 BCE), the Athenian politician Diodotus, who holds that it would 
be in Athens' best interest not to destroy the Mytilenians, says: 'this is not a law-court, 
where we have to consider what is fit and just; it is a political assembly, and the question 
is how Mytilene can be most useful to Athens. '75 In his view, the decisions of a political 
assembly should not be confused with the rulings of a court of law. Whereas the latter are 
supposed to bring about justice, the former cannot be expected to meet moral standards. 
On the contrary, they are driven by expediency. This is emphasised by Diodotus earlier 
in his speech: 
The question is not so much whether they [the Mytilenians] are guilty as whether we are making 
the right decision for ourselves. I might prove that they are the most guilty people in the world, 
but it does not follow that I shall propose the death penalty, unless that is in your interests; I 
might argue that they deserve to be forgiven, but should not recommend forgiveness unless that 
seemed to me the best thing for the state. 76 
This statement exemplifies how Realist policies combine Relativism with expediency. 
What is Right and what is Wrong is relative to the state's interest. Any other standards 
such as just desert or proportionality are subordinated to this one criterion. 
However, despite their conviction that states are justified in pursuing policies of self-
interest, the Athenians recognise that the extent to which states can actually realise their 
interests depends on their power position. During the Debate at Camarina (415/4 BCE), 
Euphemus, an Athenian representative, suggests that the greater a state's power, the more 
ruthless its pursuit of self-interest. 'When a man or a city exercises absolute power the 
logical course is the course of self-interest, and ties of blood exist only when they can be 
74Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.107.1-3 
75Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.44.18-20 
76Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.44.3-9 
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relied upon; one must choose one's friends and enemies according to the circumstances on 
each particular occasion. 777 . In this view, states have no obligations to other states. Even 
when they enter into relations with one another, they do it purely out of self-interest. 
However, how can we explain the existence of alliances? Do they not prove that the 
common interest of states can override their distinct self-interests? Thucydides, describing 
the forces gathered in Sicily to either conquer or to defend the island, provides a negative 
answer to that notion. He claims: 'They stood together not because of any moral principle 
or racial connection; it was rather because of the various circumstances of interest or of 
compulsion in each particular case. '78 Thucydides then lists the various parties involved 
and explains their respective motivations for supporting one side rather than the other. 
As it turns out, ethnic ties are a factor in some cases but insignificant in others, many 
states are compelled to serve in an alliance, and some receive pay or expect quick personal 
profits from it. In addition to these rather pragmatic reasons, Thucydides also mentions 
goodwill, friendship and hatred as grounds for joining an alliance. He shows that although 
the circumstances of interest differ in each case, all states act according to what is in their 
best interest. Even states which are forced to support others do so because the penalty 
of not complying is worse than submitting. 
Now that we have explored the Athenian view of the supreme importance of self-
interest in politics, it is useful to ask to what extent this dogma is shared by other 
Greek city states. In fact, the Athenian approach to international relations meets fierce 
resistance by other poleis. Their criticism, however, has a very limited impact on Athenian 
policy and the paradigms of international relations established by Athens. The fact that 
other states have no choice but to deal with the self interest paradigm demonstrates the 
Athenian control of the international agenda. States joining the discourse on the rights 
and wrongs of state behaviour are restricted to the intellectual framework established by 
the Athens. 
Which alternative approaches to international politics do other states propose? The 
Plataeans, after having surrendered their long besieged city to the Spartans, try to con-
vince their vanquishers that state policies need not be informed by self-interest. Since 
77Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.85.1-5 
78Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 7.57.3-6 
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they opposed Xerxes in the Persian Wars, they claim to have been amongst those states 
which 'instead of meeting the invasion by acting in the interests of their own safety, chose 
the path of daring, of danger, and of honour. '79 However, instead of commending the 
Plataeans for jeopardising their safety in the name of Greece, the Spartans threaten to 
punish them for having supported the wrong side, namely the Athenians. The Plataeans 
protest: 'now we are in fear of losing our lives for this very same conduct, for having 
chosen to do the right thing with regard to Athens rather than the profitable thing with 
regard to Sparta. Yet the same principles should be made to apply throughout, and it 
should be recognised that true policy consists not only in safeguarding one's immediate 
interests, but in seeing to it that a brave ally can feel certain of one's gratitude. '80 In the 
Plataeans' view, loyalty towards an ally is as important as a state's self-interest. They ask 
the Spartans to honour their reliability, rather than condemning it because their course 
of action was detrimental to Sparta. But the Spartans refuse to recognise the Plataeans' 
ulterior motives. From their perspective, what is relevant is whether Plataea supported 
Sparta or Athens. Loyalty in itself is not important; only loyalty to Sparta counts. Their 
verdict on Plataean policies is determined by Spartan self-interest only. Each Plataean is 
asked 'Have you done anything to help the Spartans and their allies in the war?'81 And 
as each man replies 'No', he is put to death immediately. 
While the Plataeans refuse to accept the superior role of self-interest in international 
relations, the Melians try to uphold universal principles at first but eventually adapt their 
reasoning to the Athenian world view: 'since you will not let us mention justice, but tell 
us to give in to your interests, we, too, must tell you what our interests are and, if yours 
and ours happen to coincide, we must try to persuade you to the fact. '82 The Melians 
realise that to confront Athens they need to use Athenian arguments. By submitting to 
the logic of self-interest they hope to find common ground between the Athenian and their 
own position. These examples show the influence of the Athenian approach to politics 
on the relations between Greek poleis. Whether or not states subscribe to the paradigm 
of self-interest, when dealing with other powers they have no choice but to cloak their 
79Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.56.23-25 
80Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.56.27-33 
81 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.68.12-13 
82 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.98.2-5 
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arguments in it. 
The discourse on self-interest in the History of the Peloponnesian War reflects the 
interplay between Relativism and the power structures of the Greek World. It reveals 
that the influence of a policy is inherently linked to the power of those who advocate it. 
The Athenians exploit Relativism to justify and to sustain their superiority. They are 
convinced that each state is the 'measure of things' and therefore acts in its own interest. 
Within a Relativist framework of thinking, this assumption is as valid or as invalid as 
any other. But since Athens is in a (power) position to impose her version of the truth 
on other states, it becomes the centre of political discourse and state policy in the Greek 
world. 
As a superpower, it is in Athens' interest to represent what suits herself as a general 
rule. Hegemons do not need to be concerned with the demand of other states. In the 
Mytilenian Debate in 427 BCE, the Athenian general Cleon characterises the interests of 
an imperial power 'To feel pity, to be carried away by the pleasure of hearing a clever 
argument, to listen to the claims of decency are three things that are entirely against the 
interests of an imperial power.'83 And, as the Athenians would argue, any other state in 
their position would act in the same way. 
3.2.2 Relativism and the Might is Right doctrine 
Our analysis of the impact of Sophist Relativism on the policies pursued in the Pelopon-
nesian War should not be based exclusively on a comparison of philosophical fragments 
and political speeches. To understand why certain policies are put in place we also need to 
consider the complex system of political forces and power structures in the Greek World: 
policies are not made in a vacuum. They are the products of political culture, historical 
circumstances, and are instruments of national interest. 
As we have suggested above, Athens' power position is the key to an understanding of 
the policies pursued in the Peloponnesian War. Athens emerges from the Persian Wars 
( 499-448 BCE) as an imperial power capable of shaping the international agenda and 
imposing its interests through the use of force. Most importantly, Athenian politicians 
83Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.40.9-11 
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set the standards of foreign policy and thereby reconstruct the international system in 
line with Athenian interests. 
We have already discussed how the Athenians translate Sophist Subjectivism and the 
self-referential judgements it entails into the dominant role of state interest. We will now 
focus our attention on the influence of Relativism on the system of international relations 
as a whole. 
The law of nature 
Sophist Epistemological Scepticism is a reaction to Eleatic ontology. Parmenides realises 
that the 'Way of Seeming' is false and yet he maintains that rational thinking will lead us 
to the truth. Gorgias and Protagoras radically reject this view; they hold that knowledge is 
impossible. Gorgias says: '[Anything you might mention] is nothing; if it were something, 
it would be unknowable; and if it were something and knowable, it could not be made 
evident to others. '84 Protagoras explores the consequences of Gorgias' Epistemological 
Scepticism. He argues that knowledge is relative and private: 'Each thing is to me such 
as it appears to me, and is to you such as it appears to you. '85 
Without universally valid knowledge we have to act upon assumptions drawn from 
experience. Philosophic doubt is counterbalanced by fact-facing pragmatism: as a mea-
sure of prudence, it is reasonable to expect things to remain as they have always been 
and people to act as they usually do. As we will see, in the eyes of the Athenians, expe-
rience reveals that the weak have always been ruled by the strong. This observation is 
interpreted as a law of nature, which governs not only the relationship between humans 
but also the relations between states. 
The question whether natural (physis) or man-made laws (nomos) ought to govern 
human conduct is widely debated in the Fifth Century. Some of the Sophists are on the 
side of physis, 
thinking not so much about physis of the physical universe as about the promptings and impulses 
that were part of man's organisation as a creature. They were interested in the urges that usually 
were repressed by the rules or laws that society imposed... they... deplored or derided the legal 
84Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18, p. 206 
85Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 17, p. 186 
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restraints placed upon human desires to maximise the products of such emotions as greed, 
power-hunger, lust and cruelty, all of which seemed to be more probable parts of man's natural 
organisation than the agreements to exercise restraint and reasonableness which were laws.86 
Burnet describes the wide-ranging consequences that the opposition between nomos and 
physis has for morality: 'By ... insisting on the opposition between Law and Nature, they 
[the Sophists] tended to do away with the distinction between right and wrong. If that 
distinction is not rooted in nature, but depends solely on human laws and institutions, 
it is valid only for as long as we choose to recognise it. On the other hand, if we appeal 
from human law to a supposed higher law, the law of Nature, all restraint is abolished.'87 
Ultimately and paradoxically, it is man who defines what nature's law prescribes: 'so 
beginnt der Mensch nun, die Welt aus dem Bewusstsein seiner selbst aufzubauen: An 
Stelle der Gottheit ist es der rationale Mensch, der die ethischen Normen gibt, die sich iiber 
das positive Recht erheben. Die selbstbewusste Personlichkeit ist Quelle des rationalen 
Naturrechts .. .'88 In contradiction with Relativist claims, the Law of Nature is as absolute 
as the traditional divine laws: 'da auch die entgotterte Welt des erkenntnistheoretischen 
Relativismus ein Absolutes nicht entbehren kann, [wird] bald die Natur gegen das Gesetz, 
bald dieses gegen jene ins Feld [ge]fiihrt. '89 
For a number of Sophists, however, the requirements of a city's nomoi take precedence 
over any supposed Natural Laws. The word nomos may be translated as law, convention 
or custom; it is a prescriptive and normative term that refers to the behaviour of humans: 
'nomos as law is legally prescribed norm, and nomos as convention is norm prescribed 
by convention. '90 Protagoras is the most prominent advocate of the obedience to man-
made laws. In Plato's dialogue named after him, Protagoras tells a myth to demonstrate 
that man has an innate capacity to develop and live in a society regulated by laws. 
The Anonymous Iamblichi, a fragment of unknown authorship written in a style and on a 
subject typical of the Sophist period, claims that 'people cannot live without laws (nomoi) 
86H.D. Rankin, Sophists, Socmtics and Cynics (London, Croom Helm, 1983), p. 81 
87Burnet, Greek Philosophy - Thales to Plato, p. 122 
88V. Ehrenberg, Polis und Imperium (Ziirich, Artemis Verlag, 1965), p. 366 
89V. Ehrenberg, Polis und Imperium, p. 367 
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and justice (dike). '91 
For the purpose of our analysis, we do not need to further elaborate on this debate 
as the main issues will be amply highlighted in the course of our discussion of Athenian 
politics. 
The Athenian notion of Natural Law is intricately linked to Thrasymachus' view of 
justice as expressed in his opening statement in Plato's Republic: 'Justice is nothing other 
than the advantage of the stronger. '92 Irrespective of whether or not Plato represents 
Thrasymachus' views accurately, what is relevant for us is that he seems to have used 
him to represent views which gain considerable currency in Fifth Century Athens.93 It is 
debatable whether Thrasymachus' definition of justice represents a moral judgement or a 
factual statement. Guthrie defends the latter view convincingly: 'All governments make 
laws in their own interest, and call that justice. Those are the facts: praise or blame 
does not enter into it.'94 We agree, adding only that though Thrasymachus' declaration 
is probably a descriptive statement, it can easily be turned into a prescriptive one, as is 
demonstrated by the Athenians. This is the point of intersection between fact and value. 
Experience provides us with (historical) facts (i.e. the weak are ruled by the strong) but 
it is our interpretation of these facts that turns them into value judgments (i.e. Might is 
Right). And this is exactly what Callicles, a central character in Plato's Gorgias does. 
Apart from his appearance in this dialogue Callicles has left no trace in recorded history. 
He is represented by Plato as a young aspiring Athenian politician who hosts Sophists in 
is house but is not a Sophist himself. In his opinion, justice is expressed in nature: 'But 
I believe that nature itself reveals that it is just for the better man to have a larger share 
than the worse, and the more powerful than the less powerful. This is clearly shown to 
be so everywhere, both for the other animals and for whole cities and tribes of human 
beings: that justice has been decided in this way, for the better man to rule the worse and 
91 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 7, p. 295 
92Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 3, p. 255. It is widely agreed that this 
particular statement most likely represents the position held by the historical Thrasymachus. However, 
the same cannot be said of Plato's representation of his ideas in the rest of dialogue. See Kerferd, Sophistic 
Movement, p. 120ff. 
93J. Beversluis, Cross-Examining Socrates (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 222 
94Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 93 
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to have a larger share. '95 For Callicles, nature provides man with normative prescriptions 
for human life. 'That which nature reveals not only is but must be... That which is 
discovered in the laws of actual events is established as a law of necessity in the sphere of 
individual and social ethic. '96 For Thrasymachus it is a fact that the strong rule, whereas 
Callicles believes that it would be right for them to rule. He holds that human laws are 
made by a majority of the weak. 
Conventions, on the other hand, are made, in my opinion, by the weaklings who form the 
majority of mankind. They establish them and apportion praise and blame with an eye to 
themselves and their own interests, and in an endeavour to frighten those who are stronger and 
capable of getting the upper hand they say that taking an excess of things is shameful and wrong, 
and that wrongdoings consist in trying to have more than others; being inferior themselves, they 
are content, no doubt, if they can stand on an equal footing with their betters. That is why by 
convention an attempt to have more than the majority is said to be wrong and shameful, and 
men call it wrongdoing; nature, on the other hand, herself demonstrates, I believe, that it is 
right that the better man should have more than the worse and the stronger than the weaker. 97 
Both Thrasymachus and Callicles believe that the nomoi of a polis are made by a dom-
inant, self-interested party. In line with Callicles, Antiphon contrasts nomos with the 
requirements of physis in the following way: 
For the requirements of the laws are supplemental but the requirements of nature are necessary; 
and the requirements of the laws are by agreement and not natural, whereas the requirements 
of nature are natural and not by agreement. Thus someone who violates the laws avoids shame 
and punishment if those who have joined in agreement do not notice him, but not if they do. 
But if someone tries to violate one of the inherent requirements of nature, which is impossible, 
the harm he suffers is no less if he is seen by no one, and no greater if all see him; for he is 
harmed not in reputation but in truth. I enquire into these things for the following reason, that 
most things that are just according to law are inimical to nature. 98 
95Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 2, pp. 310-11 
96 Untersteiner, The Sophists, p. 330 
97Plato, Gorgias translated by W. Hamilton and C. Emlyn-Jones (London, Penguin Books, 2004), 
483b4-dl 
98 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 7, p. 245 
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Antiphon associates nature with truth. As long as he follows the requirements of nature, 
man is true to himself. Ultimately, this implies a rejection of life in the polis, which 
is structured by man-made laws: 'So riChtet sich der egoistische Wille des Individuums 
gegen den Nomos, aus dem hemmungslosen Utilitarismus des Einzelmenschen erwachst 
die Theorie, welche die vollige Verneinung der Polis bedeutet. '99 Callicles' and Antiphon's 
advocacy of the supremacy of nature provides the intellectual foundations for the Might 
is Right doctrine. 
Though it is reasonable for the Athenians to adopt this particular view of Natural 
Law, this does not apply to weaker city states. They do not see why it would be just for 
them to serve the interests of the stronger. Hence they dispute the validity of Athens' 
experience and protest against the value judgements that result from it. 
The first notion of a Natural Law surfaces at the very beginning of the History of the 
Peloponnesian War. In 432 BCE, Sparta summons her allies to debate whether Athens 
has acted aggressively and broken her treaties with Sparta. After various complaints 
against Athens have been voiced, the Athenian representatives come forward to defend 
their city's policies: 
We have done nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to human nature in accepting an empire 
when it was offered to us and then in refusing to give it up. Three very powerful motives prevent 
us from doing so - security, honour and self-interest. And we were not the first to act in this 
way. Far from it. It has always been a rule that the weak should be subject to the strong; and 
besides, we consider that we are worthy of our power. Up till the present moment you, too, 
used to think that we were; but now, after beginning to calculate your own interest, you are 
beginning to talk in terms of right and wrong. Considerations of this kind have never yet turned 
people aside from the opportunities of aggrandizement offered by superior strength. Those who 
really deserve praise are the people who, while human enough to enjoy power, nevertheless pay 
more attention to justice than they are compelled to do by their situation. 100 
It is noteworthy that at this point, the Athenians do not speak of a Law of Nature yet but 
merely point out that their actions agree with human nature and with the rule that the 
weak should be subject to the strong. Their emphasis on the facts of nature is enforced 
99Ehrenberg, Polis und Imperium, p. 372 
100Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.76.9-23 
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by rejecting considerations of justice. From Athens' perspective, and this is reminiscent 
of Callicles' views, value-talk is a rhetorical instrument employed by the weaker party 
because it cannot pursue its aims through the use of power. For states strong enough 
to overcome any resistance, morality is secondary. This is re-emphasised later in the 
speech; when international relations are described in the following way: 'the fact being, of 
course, that where force can be used there is no need to bring in the law. '101 Although the 
Athenians pride themselves on treating their allies fairly by settling disputes over contracts 
in impartial law courts, they nevertheless stress that it would be in their power to resolve 
these quarrels by force. Departures from this rule do not change this fundamental truth; 
on the contrary, they reinforce it. The fact that Athens chooses to treat her subjects as 
equals102 is a reflection of her power. Despite the Athenians' attempt to gain credit for 
what they see as benevolent rule, both their allies and enemies are well aware that Athens 
does not hesitate to reach her aims by force if she needs to. 
Though the Athenians represent the requirements of nature as universal, this does 
not prevent them from criticising other states for their power-induced behaviour. In the 
Mytilenian Debate in 427 BCE, Cleon reproaches the Mytilenians for taking sides with 
Athens' enemies and for acting with calculated aggression. In his eyes the Mytilenians, 
'made up their minds to put might first and right second, choosing the moment when they 
thought they would win, and then making their unprovoked attack upon us. '103 Although 
the Athenians justify their own courses of action with Might is Right arguments, they 
do not consider them valid for weaker states. According to Cleon, the right policy for 
Mytilene would have been not to revolt from Athens who has treated her subject 'with 
the greatest consideration.llD4 The Mytilenian Debate reveals the ways in which Athenian 
politicians use Relativism to their own advantage. The purpose of the Might is Right 
doctrine is to justify Athenian policies; it is only valid for whom and for as long as Athens 
pleases. The more powerful can determine what is right, and they are the only ones who 
can legitimately put might first. In that sense, Mytilene's revolt is wrong because it harms 
Athenian interests and since Mytilene is weaker than Athens, the Mytilenians have no 
101Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.77.7-8 
102Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.77 
103Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.39.20-23 
104Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.39.9-10 
3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 45 
right to put might first. 
In the Melian Dialogue ( 416/5 BCE), which Guthrie calls 'the most famous example 
of amoral realism' 105 , Athenian advocacy of the Law of Nature reaches its climax. It is 
difficult to believe that such a dialogue actually took place as 'the setting and the nature 
of the brief exchanges of arguments are intrinsically unconvincing as the descriptions of 
an incident. We cannot be absolutely certain that the actual negotiations did not assume 
some like or comparable form; but it is most improbable. '106 However, Kennedy ought to 
be quoted at length in order to explicate the undisputed significance of the dialogue: 
The dialogue performs no practical, political function, but that does not necessarily prove its 
lack of historicity, for its function in Thucydides' work, and perhaps in fact, was intellectual. 
Things must be talked out first, an attempt at persuasion must be made, the events must be 
understood, there must be no doubt that expediency is in operation ... He wrote it to explain the 
incident of Melos and to express the specific truth for the comprehension of future readers. 107 
At the beginning of the dialogue the Athenians advise the islanders to adjust their 
policies to their power position: 'we recommend that you should try to get what is possible 
for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really think; since you know as 
well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of 
justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what 
they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.'108 At the 
debate at Sparta in 432 BCE, the Athenians have claimed that it is only human to enjoy 
power. In Melos, they represent the maximisation of power as the ultimate goal of foreign 
policy. In their view, it is a fact that the strong exploit their power to the full and this is 
how it should be. This attitude echoes Callicles' perspective on self-gratification: 
For how can a man be happy who is in subjection to anyone whoever? I tell you frankly that 
what is fine and right by nature consists in this: that the man who is going to live as a man 
ought should encourage his appetites to be as strong as possible instead of repressing them, 
and be able by means of his courage and intelligence to satisfy them in all their intensity by 
105 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 85 
106Rankin, Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, p. 116 
107G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 50 
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providing them with whatever they happen to desire.109 
What at first appears to be a description of reality (i.e. the weak have always been ruled 
by the strong) in fact carries a prescriptive meaning (i.e. therefore, the weak should be 
ruled by the strong). 
The Athenian emphasis on the conduct of 'practical people' and on the 'power to 
compel' reveals their Realist attitude. In their eyes, international relations are neither 
determined by values nor by universal laws; the outcome of disputes is solely decided by 
power. This Law of Nature is not primordial; it expresses the facts of life. 
Towards the end of the dialogue, the Athenians finally reveal the origin of their Might 
is Right paradigm: 
Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and 
necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can. This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor 
were we the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it already in existence, and we shall 
leave it to exist for ever among those who come after us. We are merely acting in accordance 
with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in 
precisely the same way. 110 
The initial argument of human nature ('our knowledge of men') is now complemented by 
a reference to the divine ('our opinion of the gods'). This is not new: associating universal 
laws with the divine has a tradition in Greek thought. For Heraclitus, all human laws 
are nourished by the logos, the one divine law of the universe: 'Those who speak with 
intelligence must stand firm by that which is common to all, as a state stands by the law, 
and even more firmly. For all human laws are in the keeping of the one divine law; for 
the one divine law has as much power as it wishes, is an unfailing defence for all laws, 
and prevails over all laws. '111 
The Athenian reference to the divine is also a response to the Melians' earlier claim that 
the gods will support them because they stand for 'what is right against what is wrong. ' 112 
Turning to the gods for support of specific policies or military campaigns is common 
109Plato, Gorgias, 491e5-492a4 
110Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.105.4-12 
111 Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F12, p.39 
112Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.104.4-5 
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practice amongst the Greeks. When the Spartans are about to invade Epidaurus in 419-8 
BCE, they turn back at the border because their frontier sacrifices are unfavourable. 113 
Omens and oracles guide Greek warfare at all times. Classical armies employ highly paid 
soothsayers to consult the gods every step of the way. An army cannot move from home or 
camp, cross a river or engage in combat until it is declared that the signs are favourable. 
War is banned from sacred places as well as during sacred periods; armies are supposed to 
stay clear of temple precincts and estates. However, religion is often cynically exploited 
and its rules stretched to suit military ambitions. 114 Ultimately, military commanders can 
override religious concerns with an appeal to patriotism, glory or necessity - piety and 
expediency are effectively combined. 115 Against this background, it is not surprising that 
the Athenians deem it appropriate to endow the Law of Nature with divine approval. 
By representing the Law of Nature as necessary, Athenian thinking betrays the in-
fluence on ethics of the natural sciences of the day. Necessity as a cosmological force 
runs through Presocratic thought, in the Western tradition (Parmenides, Empedocles, 
the Pythagoreans) with almost mystical or theological overtones, but in Ionian Rational-
ism it appears as a mindless natural force. This association of necessity with nature is 
used as an argument by the opponents of customary laws, which they represent as an 
attempt to thwart natural forces that is rightly doomed to failure. 116 
However, it is clear that the Athenians consider neither nature's nor divine support as 
essential. Despite the fact that they appeal to something beyond themselves, i.e. expe-
rience, the necessities of nature and the divine, it is clear that ultimately, it is their own 
interpretation that matters ('our opinion ... and our knowledge ... lead us to conclude'). 
The Athenians establish their version of reality as a universal truth claiming that they did 
not make this 'general and necessary law of nature' themselves. However, they know that 
given the self-interested behaviour of states, only the powerful will choose to act according 
to the Law of Nature because they profit from it. The Law of Nature will prevail because 
both the weak and the strong act in accordance with it: the strong do so because it is 
profitable and the weak are forced into compliance. 
113Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.55 
114H. van Wees, Greek Warfare - Myths and Realities (London, Duckworth, 2004), p. 119/20 
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In the Fifth Century, the various written laws of different cities and cultures contrast 
with unwritten laws, which are either attributed to the divine or to the forces of nature. 
What the Athenians represent as a Law of Nature falls into the category of unwritten 
laws. By ascribing the Law of Nature both to the gods and to nature, they hope to 
endow it with as much authority as possible. In Rhetoric, Aristotle distinguishes between 
particular and common laws, which he defines as follows: 
There are two kinds of law, one particular and one common. By particular laws I mean those 
determined by each people in relation to themselves, and these again are divided into written 
and unwritten; by laws that are common I mean those in accordance with nature. For in fact 
there is a common idea of what is just and unjust in accordance with nature, which all men 
divine to some extent, even if there is neither sharing in it nor agreement between them.117 
The Athenian understanding of the Law of Nature corresponds to Aristotle's definition 
of a common law. In the Melian Dialogue, for example, the Athenians try to convince 
the islanders that the Natural Law is universal. They use the idea of a Natural Law 
that supposedly expresses 'a common idea of what is just and unjust in accordance with 
nature', to conceal that their Might is Right policy cannot claim universal validity but are 
in fact an unwritten particular law, 'determined by each people in relation to themselves'. 
As Jaeger points out, 
by making the Athenians justify the right of the stronger through the law of nature, and trans-
form God from the guardian of justice into the pattern of all earthly authority and force, Thucy-
dides gives the realistic policy of Athens the depth and validity of a philosophical doctrine ... 
The principle of force forms a realm of its own, with laws of its own, neither abolishing the 
traditional nomos nor admitting its superiority, but simply distinct and separate from it.118 
In the non-philosophical practical sphere, the dichotomy between nomos and physis is re-
placed by a more complex relationship. Backed by military might, the Athenians establish 
their own interpretation of how force and justice interact: when two powers are equally 
strong, justice prevails. When unequal powers confront each other, justice is brought 
about by force. Thus the Athenians dissolve the contrast between nomos and physis: 
117 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 137b4-9 cited by Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 113 
118W. Jaeger, Paideia vol.! (Oxford, Gilbert Highet, 1939) quoted by Untersteiner, The Sophists, p. 
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both justice and force become nomoi of physis. As Rankin observes, 
we entertain belief about the gods; whereas about mankind we can be certain ... Note that the 
word used by the Athenians for "the gods" is not the personalised plural, but the abstract to 
theion "that which is divine", or "the divine". It is impersonal, conceptualised, uninterested. 
And as a cosmic influence it is all the more easily associated with the "necessary impulse of 
nature" that urges mankind towards domination. The phrase used by Thucydides to describe 
this urge is physis anankaia, "compelling or compulsive nature" - a phrase which matches the 
seemingly paradox "law of nature" nomos physeos of Gorgias. Aggression is the activating 
principle not merely of human nature, but also of probably divine nature and cosmic nature. 119 
It has been convincingly argued120 that given the historical circumstances of Athens' 
position at the outset of the Melian Dialogue, the Athenians would not have acted any less 
ruthless without Sophist arguments to support their course of action. In 416 BCE Athens 
has been at war for 15 years, and the loss and hardship caused influence her policies. 
However, 
By casting this description of the opposed interests of the two contending parties in so distinctly a 
sophist mould, Thucydides informs us of the theoretical support given by sophistry, an offshoot 
of the highest Hellenic culture, to deeds of unconscionable barbarism... only arguments of 
expediency are relevant. The fact that the fate of real people is under discussion (it is not 
mere talk in some rich Athenian's house) brings the "Melian Dialogue" to an intense pitch of 
tragedy. 121 
The Athenian line of argument is the ultimate fusion of Relativism with Realism: What 
is expedient for Athens is represented as universally just with reference to a purportedly 
Natural Law. The Melian Dialogue epitomises the skill with which Athens applies Sophist 
Relativism to the political sphere. 
The role of power in international relations 
The idea that the relations between states are determined primarily by their power rela-
tionship is at the heart of Political Realism and a recurring theme in Thucydides' History 
119Rankin, Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, p. 120 
120Rankin, Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, p. 120 
121 Rankin, Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, p. 121 
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of the Peloponnesian War. If power structures are the defining feature of international 
relations, how are they established? In the Debate at Sparta in 432 BCE, the Athenians 
provide an answer to this question. Defending the empire they gained in the course of the 
Persian Wars, they argue that power structures are produced by the interplay of historical 
circumstances and state policies: 
We did not gain this empire by force. It came to us at a time when you [the Spartans] were 
unwilling to fight on to the end against the Persians. At this time our allies came to us of 
their own accord and begged us to lead them. It was the actual course of events which first 
compelled us to increase our power to its present extent: fear of Persia was our chief motive, 
though afterwards we thought, too, of our own honour and our own interest. 122 
All states seek to increase their influence. They seize every opportunity to improve their 
power status and are sometimes compelled by the circumstances to augment their power. 
Power is a relative concept which expresses the relationship between states; it can either 
be forcefully gained by the stronger party or peacefully ceded by the weaker. Athens 
alleges that her allies have asked for her leadership and willingly ceded some of their 
power. Given that these states hope to be protected by Athens, it is in their best interest 
to do so; the urge to survive overrides all other considerations. 
For the Athenians, power is a zero-sum-game; which means that the power one state 
gains another one (or more) inevitably looses. This view is also held by Critias who 
regards strength as a relative concept: 'Those who live close by are not sorry to see a 
neighbour engaged in factional strife: if weaker, they will be less likely to be subjected 
to their rule; if of equal strength, they will become relatively stronger; and if already 
stronger, they can now subject them more easily. '123 In this logic, Athens' post-Persian 
Wars supremacy is made possible by Sparta's weakness and inevitably results in Spartan 
inferiority. As a consequence of Sparta's unwillingness to continue fighting against the 
Persians, Athens seizes the opportunity to take on the leadership of the Greek World. 
The Spartans are well aware that their rival's power increase is equivalent to their own 
loss of power; hence they attempt to de-legitimise Athens' ascendancy. 
Given that states see the conflict over power as a zero-sum game, international relations 
122Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1. 75.4-10 
123 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 26, p. 270 
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are characterised by fierce competition between states and a ruthless race to the top. 
Critias' writings give us an idea of the hostile political environment of the Fifth Century. 
His advocacy of war reveals the fierceness of the power struggle in the Greek World: 
I will show you it is good to heed those who are urging war, and second that it is necessary. 
If we knew how to recognise powers that are by nature hostile to this land, we would have 
recognised them and taken precautions before suffering any harm; we would have used every 
device to render them weaker and ourselves stronger, understanding that a power that is hostile 
by nature will remain peaceful only if it is unable to inflict harm. 124 
During the debate on the Sicilian Expedition in 415 BCE, Alcibiades, one of the 
designated Athenian commanders, argues accordingly: 'The fact is that we have reached 
a stage where we are forced to plan new conquests and forced to hold on to what we 
have got, because there is a danger that we ourselves may fall under the power of others 
unless others are in our power. '125 Power is dynamic; it fluctuates between power holders. 
Rival states have to assess their power status permanently to further expand their power. 
One state's might is another state's impotence. State power is challenged constantly and 
needs to be safeguarded against outside threats. In order to prevent subjugation, states 
conquer their adversaries pre-emptively. The more power a state has, the more energy its 
leaders need to invest in maintaining the status quo. 
In the Melian Dialogue (416/5 BCE), the Athenians explain why an imperial power 
has to display strength permanently: 'those who still preserve their independence do so 
because they are strong, and [that) if we fail to attack them it is because we are afraid. 
So that by conquering you we shall increase not only the size but the security of our 
empire. We rule the sea and you are islanders, and weaker islanders too than the others; 
it is therefore particularly important that you should not escape. '126 The mightier the 
subdued state, the more Athens gains in reputation and in power. If a supreme power 
like Athens misses an opportunity for aggrandizement, this is seen as a sign of weakness. 
Supremacy is the ultimate goal of foreign policy. Sometimes it is more expedient 
for Athens to set up alliances than to use force. In the Dispute over Corcyra in 433 
124Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 26, p. 268 
125Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.18.19-22 
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BCE, the Corcyraeans try to convince Athens that an alliance with their island would 
be in their self-interest: 'Your [Athens'] aim, no doubt, should be, if it were possible, 
to prevent anyone else having a navy at all: the next best thing is to have on your 
side the strongest navy that there is.' 127 Alliances are based on considerations of power 
and common interest. Instead of building on mutual trust, they rely on fear. This is a 
consequence of the permanent state of war in the international sphere, which negatively 
shapes a state's perception of other states and makes fear a prime motive of foreign policy. 
During the Revolt of Mytilene in 428-7 BCE, the ambassadors of the Lesbian city 
describe the characteristics of their alliance with Athens in the following words: 'And in 
an alliance the only safe guarantee is an equality of mutual fear; for then the party that 
wants to break faith is deterred by the thought that the odds will not be on his side.' 128 
Further on, they add: 'In most cases goodwill is the basis of loyalty, but in our case fear 
was the bond, and it was more through terror than through friendship that we were held 
together in alliance. And the alliance was certain to be broken at any moment by the first 
side that felt confident that this would be a safe move to make. '129 For states to enter 
an alliance, the fear on the other side has to be equally strong for both partners. If there 
is an imbalance of fear, the stronger party will eventually break the alliance. Since each 
party waits for the other to grow weaker, alliances are unstable and temporary by nature. 
Van Wees draws a slightly different picture of alliances among Greek states in the Fifth 
Century. He believes that the success and durability of an alliance depends on the shared 
interests and the genuine goodwill of both sides. However, he agrees that when interests 
change or good intentions evaporate, an alliance is liable to be abandoned quite quickly, 
since few states are both able and willing to keep reluctant allies in line by force. Those 
who try, like the Athenians, are resented as 'tyrants'. 130 
The level of fear a state induces in other states is the best indicator of its power status. 
At the Debate at Sparta in 432 BCE, the Corinthians characterise Sparta's foreign policy 
in this way: 'You Spartans are the only people in Hellas who wait calmly on events, 
127Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.35.27-30 
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relying for your defence not on action but on making people think that you will act. '131 
While the Corinthians claim that this policy will ultimately fail to safeguard the city's 
security, the Spartan king Archidamus holds that deterrence is the key to a state's power 
status. Once a state has demonstrated its power and incited fear amongst its allies and 
enemies alike, it does not necessarily have to use military force to prevent aggression. 
States regularly instrumentalise fear in order to keep their enemies at bay. At the 
launching of the Sicilian Expedition in 415 BCE, Nicias, the Athenian commander, sug-
gests that inducing fear in the Sicilians is more effective than conquering the island: 
The best way for us to make ourselves feared by the Hellenes in Sicily is not to go there at all; 
and the next best thing is to make a demonstration of our power and then, after a short time, 
go away again. We all know that what is most admired is what is farthest off and least liable to 
have its reputation put to the test; and if anything went wrong with us, they would immediately 
look down on us and join our enemies here in attacking us. 132 
When a state is too weak to defeat an enemy, calculated demonstrations of power may pro-
duce a sufficient level of fear to avoid open conflict. The psychological instrumentalisation 
of fear is as powerful a weapon as real military strength. 
As a consequence, fear can effectively produce a more stable international environment 
than mutual respect or trust. At the Debate at Camarina in 415/4 BCE, Euphemus, the 
Athenian representative, tries to convince the Camarinaeans to join the Athenian alliance. 
He describes the effects of Athenian dominance on international politics: 
you ought to grasp and make full use of everything in our interventionism and our general 
character which fits in with your interests, and you should reflect that these characteristics of 
ours, so far from doing harm to all alike, are to the majority of the Hellenes a positive blessing. 
It is something which has its effect on all men everywhere, even in places where we are not 
established, because the possibility of our intervention is always something to be considered 
both by those who fear aggression and those who are actually planning an aggressive move; the 
former can hope for our help, the latter must reflect that, if we do intervene, their enterprise is 
likely to be a dangerous one; so in both cases we make ourselves felt: the ·potential aggressor 
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is forced, even against his own will, to behave reasonably, and those who might have been his 
victims are saved without having to exert themselves. Do not reject this security which all who 
ask can have and which is now available to you.133 
As the Greek hegemon, Athens provides her allies with security produced by fear of 
Athenian intervention. A superpower's deterrence potential has a pacifying effect on its 
sphere of influence. 
Given that states constantly compete for power, how does the relationship between 
equal powers differ from that between unequal powers? In the international system, 
states are ranked according to their relative power. More often than not, the relationship 
between states is characterised by inequality in strength. As has been demonstrated 
above, the Athenians hold that the relations between unequal states are ruled by what 
they call the Law of Nature: 'we recommend that you should try to get what is possible 
for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really think; since you know as 
well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of 
justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what 
they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.' 134 
However, when two powers of equal strength confront each other, it is in their best 
interest to consider the other parties' objectives and to find a solution which is beneficial 
for both sides. In the years of the Pentecontaetia ( 479-435 BCE), Themistocles advises the 
citizens of Athens to fortify her walls in order to protect the city against outside attack. 
This puts Athens in a favourable position when confronting her rivals. Themistocles is 
well aware that 'it was only on the basis of equal strength that equal and fair discussions 
on the common interest could be held. '135 
The power structures of the Greek World in the Fifth Century have an impact on 
both the content and on the success of Athenian policies. Athens instrumentalises Sophist 
philosophy to strengthen her superiority and to create an international environment con-
ducive to her interests. The political theory which underlies Athenian policies is built 
on Relativism. For an imperial power, it makes sense to conduct politics based on the 
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assumption that the rightness of policies is relative to the state that pursues them. In 
any case, Athens' power status allows her to pursue any policy she wants. Due to her 
dominance, Realist politics become the paradigm other states are forced to abide by. For 
the Athenians, Sophist Relativism serves to justify the status quo while realist policies 
are used to preserve it. 
Moral Relativism in international relations 
The Epistemological Scepticism of the Sophists combined with their radical Relativism 
has far-reaching implications for morality. In the framework of Sophist thinking all moral 
values are equally valid or invalid and it is pointless to assert the superiority of one over 
the other. In the Dissoi Logoi, an anonymous treatise of uncertain date which shows some 
resemblance to Protagoras' thinking, an unknown author discusses the concept of Right 
and Wrong: 
Double arguments are also put forth concerning right and wrong; and some say that right is one 
thing and wrong another, but others that the same thing is right and wrong. And I shall try to 
support this position. First I shall say that it is right to lie and deceive; one could even assert 
that it is shameful and wicked to do these things to enemies but not to close relatives. Take 
parents, for example. If you need to give a drug to your father or mother to eat or drink, and 
they are unwilling, isn't it right to give it in their porridge or their drink and not tell them it is 
there?136 
What is right and what is wrong can only be determined in relation to the circumstances 
and to the individuals concerned. Moral judgements vary from case to case. Furthermore, 
they reflect a specific individual perspective which is subjective and can therefore be 
neither challenged nor disproved. While one person may consider it right to deceive her 
parents if it is for their own good, another might condemn the same action as wrong. 
Protagoras describes the philosophical consequences of Subjectivism: 'Each thing is to 
me such as it appears to me, and is to you such as it appears to you. '137 We live in 
parallel universes composed of individual perspectives. And since each individual is the 
sole measure of his values moral disputes are inevitable and insoluble. 
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Moral Subjectivism applies to individuals and city states alike. In Protagoras' view, 
a city is the only judge of her policies: 'Whatever each city judges to be just and fine, 
these things in fact are just and fine for it, so long as it holds these opinions. '138 Justice 
has only a temporary meaning; it is valid until the city changes its views. Justice is not 
universal; something might be just for one city but unjust for another city. And what 
seems right in one situation might be considered wrong in another. The author of the 
Dissoi Logoi argues that even breaking into a public building is right if your father is 
imprisoned in it. 139 
In the History of the Peloponnesian War the discourse on morality in international 
relations is centred on two opposing views. The Athenians hold that there are no universal 
standards of justice and that the relations between states are governed by the Law of 
Nature. Athenian allies and enemies alike criticise this approach and try to establish 
general rules that in their opinion ought to govern a state's policies. 
In the Dispute over Corcyra in 433 BCE, the Corinthians claim that states ought to 
observe the rules of reciprocity in their dealings with one another. Athens should treat 
Corinth the same way Corinth has treated Athens: 'you ought to behave towards us as 
we have behaved towards you. '14° Knowing that Athenian politicians are most receptive 
to arguments of security and self-interest, the Corinthians add: 'The power that deals 
fairly with its equals finds a truer security than the one which is hurried into snatching 
some apparent but dangerous advantage. '141 They hold that amongst equals, fairness is 
advantageous to all. Their ideal of fairness is not universal; it does not apply to states 
of unequal might. Unfortunately for them, this is probably why the Athenians ignore 
Corinth's appeals and choose to pursue their immediate self-interest: she enters into an 
alliance with Corcyra despite violating her treaty obligations with Corinth. 
At the debate marking the end of Plataea in 427 BCE, the Plataeans condemn Athe-
nian standards of justice: 'If you are going to take as your standards of justice your own 
immediate advantage [ ... ], you will stand confessed as people who are more interested 
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in pursuing your own interests than in judging sincerely between right and wrong. '142 
Athens' opponents refuse to accept that Athenian politicians have decided once and for 
all what is just: whatever suits their own interests. In their eyes, right and wrong and 
just and unjust are practical concepts only. It is the facts on the ground that decide 
what is morally right for Athens. And this is precisely where the Athenian approach to 
international politics differs from that of other poleis. The majority of Greek city states 
seem to think that there are universal moral values; and the behaviour of states should 
be governed by rules based on these values. For example, the Plataeans demand that the 
principles of international relations should be applied consistently: 'the same principles 
should be made to apply throughout, and it should be recognised that true policy con-
sists not only in safeguarding one's immediate interests. '143 To them, self-interest is not a 
moral principle and therefore not a 'true policy'. These approaches to politics could not 
be any more different. And since there is no common ground between Realist and moral 
arguments, their advocators inevitably clash. 
Unlike the Athenians, the Spartans resort to universal concepts of Right and Wrong in 
order to justify their often ruthless policies. In 424 BCE, Brasidas, after having marched 
against their city tries to convince the Acanthians to cut their bonds with Athens and join 
Sparta's alliance against the Athenians. Faced with their reluctance he threatens them: 
I came here to help you and could not make you understand it. I shall lay waste your land and 
try to bring you over by force. And, once this point has been reached, I shall not consider that 
I am doing anything wrong. I shall consider that I have two good reasons on my side which 
force me to take this action: first, I must prevent Sparta from suffering from the money which 
you, our friends, will go on paying to the Athenians, if you refuse to join us; secondly, I must 
not allow the Hellenes to be hindered by you from throwing off their chains. [ ... ] We Spartans 
are only justified in liberating people against their own will, because we are acting for the good 
of one and all alike. We have no imperialistic ambitions; our whole effort is to put an end to 
imperialism, and we should be doing wrong to the majority, if we were to put up with your 
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opposition to the independence which we are offering to all. 144 
For Brasidas, the ends justify the means. Whether a particular course of action is right 
or wrong is determined by its ulterior motives. Although he clearly argues in terms 
of Sparta's interest (i.e. preventing Sparta from suffering and depriving the Hellenes 
of their freedom), he puts a moral spin to it. Claiming to be acting for 'the good of 
one and all alike', he adorns his policies with the legitimacy of higher moral ends. The 
Athenians, however, dismantle their rival's value-talk asserting that 'the Spartans are 
most conspicuous for believing that what they like doing is honourable and what suits 
their interests is just. ' 145 Indeed, this is the fundamental difference between Athens' and 
Sparta's approach to politics. The Spartans may or may not genuinely believe in the 
importance of justice and morality in international affairs. Either way, they use moral 
principles to justify their self-interested policies. The Athenians, on the other hand, 
refrain from employing value arguments altogether because they fundamentally question 
their validity. Although they make use of the concept of justice, they do not ascribe a 
universal rather a particular value to it, i.e. the fact that it suits their own interests. In 
contrast to the Spartans, the Athenians openly admit that their policies are guided by 
self-interest only. 
The conflict over the role of moral considerations in international politics culminates 
in the Melian Dialogue (416/5 BCE). At the beginning of the debate, the Athenians define 
its purpose. They warn the Melians: 'if you have met here for any other reason except 
to look the facts in the face and on the basis of these facts to consider how you can save 
your city from destruction, there is no point in our going on with this discussion. '146 With 
this statement, the Athenians communicate clearly that they do not intend to engage in 
a value discussion about the rights and wrongs of their policies. They assert that each 
state should seek to maximise its gains given its relative power position. The Melian reply 
defies this realist paradigm: 
Then in our view (since you force us to leave justice out of account and to confine ourselves to 
self-interest) - in our view it is at any rate useful that you should not destroy a principle that is 
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to the general good of all men - namely, that in the case of all who fall into danger there should 
be such a thing as fair play and just dealing [ ... ] And this is a principle that affects you as much 
as anybody, since your own fall would be visited by the most terrible vengeance and would be 
an example to the world.147 
Though the Melians pretend to ignore all considerations of justice, they merely cloak 
their moral argument under the concepts of self-interest and utility. They argue that it 
cannot be in Athens' interest to disregard a principle she may profit from in the future. 
Since power is temporary, all states will eventually benefit from the principle that states 
in danger should be dealt with fairly and justly. Up to this point, the Melian argument 
meets the requirements of Political Realism. However, their reference to the general good 
of all men clearly transcends the boundaries of self-interest and expediency. It betrays 
the Melians' real conviction: that the relations between states should be governed by 
principles that benefit the international community as a whole. 
It is not surprising that the Athenians only respond to the Realist dimension of the 
Melian argument. Contrary to what the Melians believe, Athens is not concerned with 
long term effects but focuses on her immediate interest. What is good and what is bad for 
her empire is decided now; only facts that have an impact on the present state of affairs 
are relevant. For the Athenians, the best possible solution to the conflict would be the 
surrender of the island: 'We do not want any trouble in bringing you into our empire, 
and we want you to be spared for the good both of yourselves and of ourselves. '148 The 
Melians reply: 'And how could it be just as good for us to be the slaves as for you to be 
the masters?'149 The Athenians assert: 'You, by giving in, would save yourselves from 
disaster; we, by not destroying you, would be able to profit from you. '150 The Athenians 
and the Melians have very different ideas of how their conflict could be resolved. The 
Melians expect the dispute to be settled fairly. Any solution ought to be equally beneficial 
for both sides. From the Athenian perspective, the Melians are in a weaker position and 
therefore have to accept a suboptimal resolution. Where there is an imbalance of power, 
there is no room for fairness: 'This is no fair fight, with honour on one side and shame 
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on the other. It is rather a question of saving your lives and not resisting those who are 
too strong for you. '151 This is a question of power as well as a measure of prudence since 
'if one follows one's self-interest one wants to be safe, whereas the path of justice and 
honour involves one in danger. '152 Though the Athenians realise that their policies do 
not conform to conventional notions of justice, they consciously choose to ignore them. 
Firstly, because they profit from it. Secondly, because they can. From a realist point 
of view, the path of self-interest promises more safety than any international law could 
possibly provide. And Athens' supremacy guarantees that she will be able to impose these 
policies with force. 
Athens' approach to international relations challenges Greek traditions and customs. 
This is amply illustrated by a number of references to the customary laws that seem 
to have conventionally governed the relations between Greek city states. At the debate 
preceding the end of Plataea in 427 BCE, the Plataeans justify their resistance against 
the Thebans, who have seized their city in the period of a religious festival as follows: 'we 
acted rightly and in accordance with the general law that one is always justified in resisting 
an aggressor. '153 This reference to a general law indicates that the international system 
composed of Greek poleis is not entirely unregulated. There appears to be a vague set of 
rules widespread enough for states to appeal to them in international conflicts. However, 
what this body of law consists of is difficult to establish. 
There are also hints towards the existence of Hellenic law, referred to by Ehrenberg as 
'interhellenisches Volkerrecht' and described by Guthrie as unwritten laws based on moral 
principles believed to be universally valid, or alternatively valid all over the Greek world. 
'Their authors were the gods, and no breach of them could remain unpunished. They 
were already closely connected with the natural world, for to contrast man with nature 
instead of seeing him as a part of it is a modern rather than a Greek habit.' 154 These 
notions might be identical with the general law mentioned by the Plataeans. Further on 
in their speech, the Plataeans pledge: 'we surrendered to you voluntarily, stretching out 
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our hands as suppliants, and Hellenic law forbids killing in these circumstances. '155 
When Athens is defeated at Delium in 424/3 BCE, a Boeotian herald comes before the 
Athenians and delivers the following message: 'that the Athenians had done wrong and 
transgressed against Hellenic law. It was a rule established everywhere that an invader 
of another country should keep his hands off the temples that were in that country. The 
Athenians, however, had fortified Delium and were living in it.' 156 The law or general rule 
that the Boeotians refer to relates to religious customs. It points to the fact that there 
must have been certain agreements establishing respect for each city's customs. When 
fully weighed however, the evidence is too scarce to allow us to draw conclusions as to 
the dissemination and validity of such a Hellenic law. 
For our purposes, it suffices to point out that the relations between Greek states in 
the Fifth Century seem to be somewhat governed by an oral customary or traditional 
law, which is no doubt uncodified. As the above examples illustrate, this law is believed 
to be universally valid and is attributed to the gods. This is the fundamental difference 
between the unwritten laws the Athenians refer to and those invoked by their rivals. 
Whereas other Greeks regard the moral principles which underlie the unwritten laws as 
emanating from the gods, the Athenians defend a secular view of these laws which gains 
ground by the middle of the Fifth Century. Instead of the divine, an impersonal nature 
is the source behind the unwritten laws, whose decree is nevertheless absolute, and their 
neglect inevitably punished as the laws of the gods used to be. But they do not necessarily 
follow the precepts of traditional morality, for under the influence of mechanistic scientific 
theories the natural world is no longer subject to moral government. 157 The contrast 
between the traditional theistic and the Athenian secular conception of the unwritten 
laws explains the refusal of the Greek states to abandon long-established rules of conduct. 
Athenian politics run counter to Greek conventions in a radical and uncompromising 
way. Their policies demarcate the transition from a religious to a secular view of law and 
spark off intense debates on which rules should govern international affairs. 
In our discussion, we have demonstrated that Sophist philosophy and Political Realism 
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are intricately linked. Athens' policies become more accessible once we interpret them in 
the light of Sophist philosophical concepts. The Athenians use the framework of Sophist 
philosophy to develop a new way of conducting politics. Epistemological Scepticism, Rela-
tivism and Subjectivism allow Athenian politicians to justify their self-interested policies. 
Combined with Athens' super power status, this approach to international politics pro-
vides the basis of Athens' dominance and tightens the Athenian grip on the world of 
Greek city states. 
Chapter 4 
What makes a thought 
thinkable? 
4.1 Fifth Century sense structure and its impact on 
political thinking and political action 
Thus far, we have related Sophist ideas to political concepts and policies. We have demon-
strated that the origins of Athenian Political Realism can be traced to the philosophical 
ideas developed by the Sophists in the Fifth Century. What is the significance of these 
findings? We hypothesise that without Sophist philosophy, Political Realism would not 
have been thinkable. 
In order to substantiate this claim, we will shed light on it from two angles. First, 
we will explore the connections between Sophist philosophy and Political Realism on the 
level of ideas. Second, we will examine the facilitating role of the Athenian cultural and 
intellectual context. It is our aim to establish which factors contribute to the transfer 
of ideas from the philosophical to the political sphere. We aim to understand how the 
intellectual environment influences which policies are thinkable or conceivable, proposed, 
and put into practice. 
4.2 How does Sophist philosophy influence political 
thinking in 5th Century Athens? 
In order to understand why Political Realism emerges at the time of the Peloponnesian 
War, we need to relate it to its intellectual, historical and cultural context. At the 
time, the Athenian intellectual sphere is predominantly shaped by Sophist philosophy. In 
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the previous chapter we have shown that Political Realism is influenced significantly by 
Sophist assumptions, concepts and ideas. We will now justify this claim arguing that in 
fact, Realist policies are Sophist ideas applied to the political sphere. 
The impact of Sophist thought on Political Realism is not limited to a small number of 
philosophical ideas that serve as forerunners to certain political concepts. Rather, Political 
Realism as a whole is profoundly influenced by Sophist philosophy, which permeates all 
aspects of Athenian intellectual life. 
But how is this transfer of ideas from philosophy to politics actually realised? So far, 
we have examined the relationship between specific philosophical concepts and particular 
policies. We have established that a considerable number of Sophist fragments can be 
directly linked to policies pursued by the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War. In 
these cases at least, Political Realism and Sophist philosophy are closely related. But is 
this evidence enough for an inherent relation between the two bodies of thought? With 
the purpose of further substantiating our initial findings, we will now embark on a more 
complex task. Since the explicit links between individual ideas have already been estab-
lished we will now focus on the relation between entire bodies of thought. By treating 
both Political Realism and Sophist philosophy as intellectual entities rather than as mere 
groupings of ideas, we hope to buttress three fundamental claims: the first is that Political 
Realism is the inevitable political consequence of Sophist thinking. Secondly, we assert 
that philosophy gets translated into politics not at the level of individual ideas but on the 
level of entire bodies of thought. Having developed out of Sophist philosophy, Political 
Realism is more than a conglomeration of unconnected policies, it is a political philoso-
phy. Finally, the emergence and the success of Realist policies reveal the influence Sophist 
philosophy has on Athenian society, culture and attitudes. It proves that in a democracy, 
politics need to be responsive to a society's sense structure in order to be successful. 
Before we begin to study entire bodies of ideas let us consider some preliminary 
thoughts on the development of ideas. To understand an idea properly, we need to be 
aware of how it developed. All ideas have a genealogy: they grow out of and are in-
fluenced by previous ideas. Even so-called original ideas, which per definitionem depart 
from traditional conceptions, develop with reference to the latter. Their originality is only 
significant with respect to their intellectual context. 
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Analysing a single idea's lineage does not necessarily imply tracing the origin of each 
of its components; rather, it means locating an idea within the context of its family tree. 
For example, studying the genealogical ancestry of an individual teaches us who his or her 
closest relations are. We can also learn about the individual's family history preceding 
his or her life. We can determine the relationships between people and find out where 
they originated from, how many children they have had and when they died. The same 
method can be applied to trace the origin of an idea. 
However, this family tree model can be misleading as it suggests that ideas develop in 
a linear and causal way. But in fact, rather than supporting a supposed objective order 
and a chronological hierarchy of ideas, this model allows for a multi-faceted approach to 
the development of ideas. There are various ways of deriving and contextualising an idea 
and competition between different interpretations of such a 'genealogical path' can be 
very productive. We have to bear in mind that there is no single correct way of relating 
one idea to other ideas. On the contrary, the strength of the family tree model lies in its 
multi-dimensionality which allows for a co-existence of different interpretations. 
We also have to bear in mind that the family tree model does not imply a qualitative 
progression of ideas. Ideas are not necessarily more complex or more sophisticated than 
their precursors. In order to avoid this logical pitfall, it may be helpful to envision the 
family tree model as a mosaic of ideas. Every idea adds something to the existing pool 
of ideas without the new ideas necessarily superseding the old ones. New ideas broaden 
the mosaic of ideas and diversify the overall pattern. 
With this approach we hope to shed some light on the complex relationship between 
Sophist ideas and Political Realism. It will help us understand the connections between 
ideas as well as those between clusters of ideas. 
The influence of Sophist philosophy on Realist politics is manifested on four levels. 
On the intellectual level, the Sophists' rejection of Presocratic ontology has a significant 
impact on how history and politics are conceived. Epistemological Scepticism, the logical 
consequence of this rejection, is used by Athenian politicians to legitimise their Realist 
policies. This is done in three ways: Firstly by translating Sophist Subjectivism into 
Moral Relativism. Secondly by using the Law of Nature as a justification for Athenian 
Might is Right politics. And lastly by employing rhetoric as an instrument of power. 
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4.2.1 The impact of the Sophist rejection of Presocratic ontol-
ogy on historical enquiry and the concept of the political 
The starting point of Sophist philosophy is the dismissal of all ontological questions. The 
Sophists realise that it is impossible to determine the relationship between Being and Not-
Being and that the only way out of this deadlock is to declare ontological questions per 
se as unsolvable. Thereby, they successfully manoeuvre philosophy out of the impasse of 
Presocratic thought. The implications of this fundamental shift are radical and significant. 
If Being and Not-Being are indeterminate categories, there are no ultimate truths to 
comprehend and our knowledge is by definition limited. 
The Sophist rejection of what are central philosophical questions in the eyes of the 
Presocratics is a turning point not only for philosophy in particular but for Greek thinking 
in general. Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War provides evidence of the impact 
of these intellectual transformations on both the discipline of historical writing and on the 
conception of the political in Fifth Century Athens. The History of the Peloponnesian 
War exhibits two closely related phenomena. On the one hand the conception of political 
events changes, while on the other, policies are conducted differently. 
Against the backdrop of Sophist thought, the study of history is transformed. Just 
as the Sophists abandon ontology, Thucydides abandons myth. In Herodotus' Histories, 
written in the first half of the Fifth Century, myths and actual events are intertwined, while 
in the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides recounts facts instead of legends 
and portrays human beings rather than heroes. What distinguishes his description of the 
Peloponnesian War from earlier historical accounts is that he deliberately puts politics at 
the centre of his narrative. This is a reflection of the focus on human action introduced 
by Sophist philosophy. Unlike Herodotus, Thucydides refrains from associating politics 
with divine intervention and does not represent political conflicts as strife between gods, 
semi-gods and humans. He claims that his description of political events is based purely 
on facts. In the introduction to the History of the Peloponnesian War Thucydides stresses 
his reliance on factual evidence: 'And with regard to my factual reporting of the events 
of the war I have made it a principle not to write down the first story that came my 
way, and not even to be guided by my own general impressions; either I was present 
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myself at the events which I have described or else I heard of them from eye-witnesses 
whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible. '158 Thucydides 
interprets the accounts of witnesses in a rational way. He establishes causal relationships 
between events, and ascertains a chronological order. He is well aware of the novelty 
of his approach. This explains why he feels the need to warn his audience: 'And it 
may well be that my history will seem less easy to read because of the absence in it 
of a romantic element. It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are 
judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the 
past... '159 For him, the events of the war have an objective reality; they are produced by 
men and can thus be known by men. Given his own biography, he feels in the position 
to understand the war adequately: 'I lived through the whole of it, being of an age 
to understand what was happening, and I put my mind to the subject so as to get an 
accurate view of it. '160 Solmsen highlights the centrality of reason in Thucydides' enquiry: 
'No ancient historian has the same confidence that by using his reason to the fullest extent 
he recovers the "truth". '161 Although rational reasoning and analysis are compatible with 
Sophist thought, Thucydides' approach nevertheless conflicts with Sophist philosophy. 
For the Sophists, there is no objective reality which means that there can be no universal 
knowledge of past events. In Thucydides view, objective knowledge of the past is possible. 
Through the use of reason, the historian can reconstruct the actual course of events from 
various subjective accounts. However, the disagreement between Sophist philosophy and 
Thucydides' historical enquiry is balanced by a more fundamental congruity between 
the two. In the same way that Sophist philosophy deconstructs the transcendental (i.e. 
the notion of the universal categories Being and Not-Being), Thucydides discards any 
transcendental meaning of reality. His insistence that there is no ulterior meaning behind 
the reality of facts and events reflects Sophist influence and revolutionises the Greek 
conception of the past. 
The Sophist rejection of ontology is reflected in the political realm as well. Yet again, 
the History of the Peloponnesian War illustrates this change. And since Thucydides is 
158Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.22.9-14 
159Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.22.17-22 
160Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.26.23-25 
161 Solmsen, Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment, p. 175 
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both an Athenian citizen and an Athenian general who writes for an Athenian audience, 
we can reasonably assume that his perspective is representative of a wide-ranging change 
in Athenian political culture. He would not have written a rational historical narrative 
had he not been convinced that his readership would be interested in a factual account of 
political events. As an Athenian citizen, Thucydides is influenced by the Athenian political 
culture. As a general, he has the power to shape that political culture. As a historian, 
he is in a position to reinforce a certain notion of history and politics. Hence studying 
Thucydides' perspective helps us explore the links between the Sophist abandonment of 
ontology and the re-conceptualisation of politics. 
The Fifth Century is a watershed for the conception of historical and political events. 
In Pericles' Funeral Oration in 431/0 BCE we find clear evidence that there is a widespread 
desire amongst the Athenians to know the truth about the past: 'We do not need the 
praises of a Homer, or of anyone else whose words may delight us for the moment, but 
whose estimation of facts will fall short of what is really true. '162 This shift allows Thucy-
dides to introduce a new narrative perspective. With the History of the Peloponnesian 
War this new narrative is firmly established and will go on to influence the subsequent 
intellectual discourses. 
Thucydides represents the new factualism and pragmatism that characterise politics 
in the Fifth Century. In a world in which questions of existence are no longer relevant, 
politics need to focus on the practical issues of life. At the beginning of the Melian 
Dialogue in 416/5 BCE, the Athenians inform their adversaries that their conflict can 
merely be resolved on the basis of facts: 'if you have met here for any other reason except 
to look the facts in the face and on the basis of these facts to consider how you can 
save your city from destruction, there is no point in our going on with this discussion.' 163 
They stress that in political disputes, only factual arguments are valid: 'Then we on 
our side will use no fine phrases saying, for example, that we have a right to our empire 
because we defeated the Persians, or that we have come against you now because of 
the injuries you have done to us - a great mass of words that nobody would believe. '164 
162Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.41.15-18 
163Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.87.2-5 
164Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.89.1-5 
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Furthermore, the Athenians describe themselves as a 'practical people' 165 who think that 
political decisions are determined by considerations of power rather than by morality. The 
pragmatism of Athenian politicians is also reflected in their attitude towards politicians. 
In the Mytilenian Debate in 427 BCE, Clean states that 'as a general rule states are 
better governed by the man in the street than by intellectuals. '166 In his view, Athenian 
politics require a certain type of politician. Clean also asserts that political decisions 
should be based on facts only. He reproaches his audience for being too easily deluded 
by political speeches and not being capable of considering the facts that lie before them. 
These examples demonstrate how the Athenians reach their foreign policy aims. First, 
they pressure other states into conducting their political affairs according to their own 
pragmatic standards. Second, they seek to transform international relations by spreading 
their own political model. The forcefulness with which they pursue these aims betrays 
their strong belief in the transferability of their own political standards. 
The transformation of politics in the Fifth Century is initiated by Athens. In the same 
way that Sophist philosophers cast aside fundamental ontological questions, Athenian 
politicians discard non-factual matters in the political sphere. 
Yet what is the relationship between the conception of political events and the con-
duct of politics? There are three possible answers to this question. We could assert that 
the way politics is conducted has an impact on how it is perceived. This would imply 
that Thucydides' perspective on the politics of the Peloponnesian War differs from former 
historical accounts because of the unique characteristics of Fifth Century politics. Then 
again, it could be argued that Thucydides' distinct perspective as a historian determines 
his representation of politics. And since we cannot prove the accuracy of his account, 
it is very possible that his description of Fifth Century politics reflects his own perspec-
tive rather than what actually took place. However, the most reasonable answer to the 
question would be to emphasise the inseparability of political conduct and the conception 
of politics. Trying to establish which side has a bigger impact on the other will not be 
fruitful. Instead, we should conceive of both phenomena as two sides of the same coin. 
Changes in the conception and in the conduct of politics are part of the fundamental 
165Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.26.11 
166Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.37.21-22 
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transition processes which characterise the Fifth Century. Neither of these changes can 
be understood without reference to the broader changes that take place in the polis. 
4.2.2 The instrumentalisation of Epistemological Scepticism. 
The Epistemological Scepticism of the Sophists implies that it is impossible for us to 
know anything beyond ourselves. As a consequence, our different views of reality cannot 
be resolved. From Thucydides' account of Athenian policies during the Peloponnesian 
War, we can reconstruct how the Athenians translate these philosophical assumptions 
into politics. 
The Athenians instrumentalise Sophist thought to advance their city's interest. They 
subscribe to the view that each individual, and hence each state, has their own distinct 
perspective. And just as individual views clash on the domestic level, so too do state views 
clash in the international realm. But while for Sophist philosophy these contradictions are 
unsolvable per se, the Athenians resolve them through force: Athens compels other city 
states to submit to the Athenian interpretation of politics, i.e. that the strong should rule 
the weak. Though on the surface this policy seems to run counter to Sophist philosophy, it 
actually reflects a Sophist way of thinking. The Athenian reasoning is as follows: though 
theoretically any perspective or policy is equally valid or invalid, one can present one's 
view as universally valid and the more powerful can force the less powerful to accept their 
interpretation of reality. This attitude reflects a specific aspect of Protagorean philosophy. 
Despite Protagoras' insistence that individual views cannot be refuted, he claims that one 
can convince someone else of one's own perspective. He replaces truth and falsehood with 
advantage and disadvantage, and the Athenians follow in his footsteps. 
Now it could be argued that it is primarily due to the distribution of power among 
Greek city states that Athenian politicians can pursue their Might is Right policy. We, 
however, assert that although the balance of power is no doubt favourable to Athenian 
dominance, it is not the central factor determining the formulation of Athenian policies. 
While Athenian power makes Political Realism realisable, it is Sophist philosophy which 
makes it thinkable. Athenian supremacy is clearly not a blank cheque for any kind of 
policy. 
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Why do Athenian politicians employ Sophist concepts to justify their policies? The 
most reasonable explanation is that Athenian democracy requires them to. Since all 
political strategies are discussed and voted on in the assembly, Athenian politicians and 
generals need to argue their case in public in order to gain political support. And since 
Athenian sense structure is strongly influenced by Sophist philosophy, it is reasonable 
for them to propose policies compatible with it. This is reinforced by the fact that 
democratic states need to legitimise their actions. Since domestic conflicts are resolved 
by debate, democratic politicians are expected to justify their state's external use of 
force with arguments as well. Finally, legitimising her policies is an instrument of soft 
power which Athens employs to win the minds of those that will eventually be conquered 
by force. For all these reasons, it makes sense for Athenian politicians to justify their 
policies with reference to the intellectual framework of Sophist philosophy. Rather than 
the policies as such it is the underlying way of thinking which exposes Sophist influence 
on Athenian foreign policy. 
4.2.3 Subjectivism and Moral Relativism 
As a corollary of Epistemological Scepticism, all knowledge is subjective. As individuals 
we are not bound by any external authority; all our judgements are valid because they 
emanate from our private perspective. Protagoras defines the essence of Subjectivism 
as follows: 'A human being is measure of all things, of those things that are, that they 
are, and of those things that are not, that they are not. '167 He applies the same logic 
to states: 'Whatever each city judges to be just and fine, these things in fact are just 
and fine for it, so long as it holds these opinions. '168 These fragments clearly reveal the 
political dimension of Sophist philosophy. Protagoras explores the point of intersection 
between morality and political morality. He applies philosophical standards to politics 
thereby revealing the inherent association of the two realms. 
What about the application of this political philosophy? The Athenians seem to draw 
several conclusions from Sophist Subjectivism. First and foremost, Subjectivism ensures 
the validity as well as the legitimacy of their self-interest policies. It provides the ground 
167Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 15, p. 186 
168 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 14, p. 186 
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for Moral Relativism which, backed up by force, becomes the ultimate tool of Athenian 
foreign policy. In putting Might is Right arguments at the centre of their policies, the 
Athenians treat justice as a relative concept. As long as their policy of dominance is right, 
i.e. beneficial for Athens, it is justified. Any other claims such as an appeal to universal 
morality or justice are dismissed as arguments inspired by the self-interest of other states. 
Hence the Athenians adopt and implement Protagoras' claim that each city determines 
her own standards of justice and rectitude. 
4.2.4 The concept of justice and the Law of Nature 
In Plato's Gorgias, Callicles, who may or may not have been a historical figure, develops an 
argument about justice which is closely associated with the teachings of the Sophists. His 
notion of justice is based on the distinction between nature (physis) and custom (nomos) 
and provides a philosophical justification for the Athenian Law of Nature. His argument 
is set against the backdrop of the nomos vs. physis debate of the Fifth Century, which, as 
Guthrie demonstrates, enters into most questions of the day: 'Discussion of religion turned 
on whether gods existed by physis - in reality - or only by nomos; of cosmopolitanism, 
on whether divisions within the human race are natural or only a matter of nomos; of 
equality, on whether the rule of one man over another (slavery) or one nation over another 
(empire) is natural and inevitable, or only by nomos; and so on.'169 While for the men 
of classical times, the nomoi applicable to all mankind are believed to emanate from the 
divine, the Sophists emphasise the antithesis of the two concepts in the moral and in the 
political sphere. Nomos acquires two meanings: the usage or custom based on traditional 
or conventional beliefs as to what is right or true, and the laws formally drawn up and 
passed, which codify 'right usage' and elevate it into an obligatory norm backed by the 
authority of the state. 170 
Both Antiphon and Hippias are advocates of physis; they think that nature should 
take precedence over custom. Hippias, whose views are expressed in Plato's Protagoras, 
describes the fundamental dichotomy between nature and custom: 'I believe that you 
men who are present here are all kinsmen, family members, and fellow citizens by nature 
169Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, pp. 55-56 
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(phusis) though not by custom (nomos). For by nature like is kin to like, but custom is 
a tyrant over human beings and forces many things on us that are contrary to nature. ml 
Antiphon establishes the primacy of nature over custom: 
Justice, therefore, is not violating the rules of the city in which one is a citizen. Thus a person 
would best use justice to his own advantage if he considered the laws (nomoi) important when 
witnesses are present, but the consequences of nature (phusis) important in the absence of 
witnesses. For the requirements of the laws are supplemental but the requirements of nature 
are necessary; and the requirements of the laws are by agreement and not natural, whereas the 
requirements of nature are natural and not by agreement. Thus someone who violates the laws 
avoids shame and punishment if those who have joined in agreement do not notice him, but not 
if they do. But if someone tries to violate one of the inherent requirements of nature, which is 
impossible, the harm he suffers is no less if he is seen by no one, and no greater if all see him; 
for he is harmed not in reputation but in truth. I enquire into these things for the following 
reason, that most things that are just according to law are inimical to nature. For rules have 
been made for the eyes, what they should and should not see, and for the ears, what they should 
and should not hear, and for the tongue, what it should and should not say, and for the hands, 
what they should and should not do, and for the feet, where they should and should go, and for 
the mind, what it should and should not desire. Thus the things from which the laws dissuade 
us are in no way less congenial or akin to nature than the things towards which they urge us. 
For living and dying both belong to nature, and for humans living is the result of advantageous 
things, whereas dying is the result of disadV'antageous things. The advantages laid down by the 
laws are bonds on nature, but those laid down by nature are free. 172 
Though Antiphon insists on a fundamental opposition between nature and law, he does 
not go as far as referring to any laws of nature. Rather than developing a notion of 
natural justice, he refers to the 'requirements of nature', a more general term which 
seems to express merely a factual condition. 
Callicles' argument reiterates the claims of Hippias and of Antiphon while also exam-
ining its consequences for life in the polis. We have chosen to represent his argument in 
its entirety (while omitting certain repetitions) in order to expose the conclusiveness of 
171 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 5, p. 216 
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his reasoning. 
By nature whatever is worse, such as suffering injustice, is more shameful; and it is only by 
custom (nomos) that doing injustice is worse... In fact, I think it is people who are weak -
common people - who make the laws. It's for themselves and their own advantage that they 
make the laws they make... They are afraid of the people who are stronger and have the power 
to take more than their share, and so to keep them from taking more than their share they 
say that taking more than one's share is shameful and unjust. Since they are weaker, I believe 
they are pleased to have an equal share. That is why people say, by custom, that it is unjust 
and shameful to try to have a bigger share than the common people, and they call this "doing 
injustice". But I believe that nature itself reveals that it is just for the better man to have 
a larger share than the worse, and the more powerful than the less powerful. This is clearly 
shown to be so everywhere, both for the other animals and for whole cities and tribes of human 
beings: that justice has been decided in this way, for the better man to rule the worse and to 
have a larger share. What other kind of justice did Xerxes plead when he invaded Greece, or his 
father, when he invaded Scythia? And one could name any number of similar examples. Now 
I believe that it was in accordance with the nature of justice that these men acted thus, and 
yes, by Zeus, in accordance with the law of nature - though probably not in accordance with 
this law we make. We take our own best and strongest when they are young like lions, and we 
mould them into slaves, bewitching them with incantations, saying that [everyone] should have 
an equal share and that this is what justice and nobility require. I believe, however, that if a 
man is born with a nature that is good enough he will shake all this off and burst through and 
escape. He will trample on our written stuff and magic tricks and incantations and on all those 
laws that are against nature. The slave will rise and show himself our master, and the light of 
natural justice will shine from him.173 
Callicles seeks to demonstrate that the requirements of man-made law are contrary to 
the requirements of nature. In his view, true justice is reflected in the natural world and 
should prevail over the justice established by men. Just as the lion takes the biggest prey, 
strong men are justified in obtaining a bigger share than they would deserve according to 
the standard of equality. Callicles depicts man as a self-interested creature who seeks to 
173Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 2, pp. 310-11 
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maximise his benefits. The weak join forces to impose a system of justice on the strong, 
which guarantees equal benefits for all. Thereby, they obtain more than they would 
have under the reign of the strong and the strong loose what they would have gained by 
suppressing the weak. Just as customary justice serves the interests of the weak, natural 
justice serves the interests of the strong. And since the Law of Nature overrides customary 
laws, Callicles calls upon men born with a good nature to shake off the yoke of civilisation 
in order to rule and reap the benefits of dominion. Nature prescribes men to seek the 
maximum gratification of all their desires and the naturally superior ought to lead a life 
without self-control or self restraint. Just as physis triumphs over nomos, Might is llight. 
It is noteworthy 174 , that the term 'law of nature' which Callicles uses to justify Xerxes' 
invasion of Greece, includes an untranslatable particle in Greek which signifies that the 
term is new. This may be if not the earliest surely one of the earlier mentions of a Natural 
Law in Greek thought. 
Since the idea of the Law of Nature plays such an eminent role in Fifth Century 
philosophical debates it is not surprising that it finds resonance in the political sphere. 
An analysis of the political discourse in the History of the Peloponnesian War reveals the 
similarity of philosophical and political arguments. Thucydides describes Fifth Century 
politics as a battlefield on which the conflict between Natural Law and customary laws 
is fought. Athenian politicians support the Law of Nature and seem to embrace the 
conviction expressed in Gorgias' Encomium of Helen: 'For by nature the stronger is not 
restrained by the weaker but the weaker is ruled and led by the stronger: the stronger 
leads, the weaker follows. 7175 
At the outset of the war, the Athenians claim: 'It has always been a rule that the 
weak should be subject to the strong; and besides, we consider that we are worthy of our 
power.'176 From the Athenian point of view, their power alone is justification enough for 
their supremacy and for any policy which further strengthens it. This rather biased per-
spective on justice in international relations is challenged by the advocates of customary 
law. In 424/3 BCE, shortly after the Athenian fortification of Delium, conflict ensues with 
174See Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, p. 311 
175Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 1, p. 192 
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the Boeotians due to Athens' alleged desecration of the city's temples. The Boeotians 
deliver the following message to the Athenians: 'that the Athenian had done wrong and 
transgressed against Hellenic law. It was a rule established everywhere that an invader 
of another country should keep his hands off the temples that were in that country. The 
Athenians, however, had fortified Delium and were living in it. They were doing all the 
things that men do on unconsecrated ground ... '177 The Boeotians base their claims on 
a customary rule or law that seems to have regulated the conduct of Greek city states. 
The Athenians reply that 'they had done nothing wrong with regard to the temple, nor 
would they do any harm to it in the future, if they could help it; it was not with any 
such intentions that they had occupied the temple in the first place, but only to use it 
in self-defence against the Boeotians, who were the real aggressors ... '178 Although on the 
surface, the Athenians seem to respect what both sides refer to as Hellenic law; they 
clearly consider it to be secondary to their city's self-interest, i.e. self-defence against the 
Boeotians. They agree to respect Hellenic law when possible, but indicate that they feel 
justified in overriding it should the circumstances require them to do so. The Athenians 
believe that in times of war, even the gods would tolerate the transgression of customary 
laws: 'it was reasonable to suppose that even the god would look indulgently on any 
action done under the stress of war and danger ... ' 179 With (assumed) divine approval, 
man-made laws can be transcended with impunity. The customary law can thus be over-
ridden by either divine or Natural Law. Whatever arguments they use, it is clear that 
for the Athenians, their own power and the permanent conflict between states justify any 
course of action. 
The Melian Dialogue in 416/5 BCE shows that in addition to questioning the validity 
of customary law, the Athenians reject the appeals made by other states to universal 
laws. The Melians attempt to convince their adversaries that there are rules from which 
all states benefit: 'Then in our view (since you force us to leave justice out of account and 
to confine ourselves to self-interest) - in our view it is at any rate useful that you should 
not destroy a principle that is to the general good of all men - namely, that in the case 
177Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 4.97.10-15 
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of all who fall into danger there should be such a thing as fair play and just dealing [ ... ] 
And this is a principle that affects you as much as anybody ... '180 These arguments cannot 
change the fundamental conviction that Athens' foreign policy is based on. As Diodotus, 
an Athenian politician says: 'Cities and individuals alike, all are by nature disposed to 
do wrong, and there is no law that will prevent it. '181 Given this outlook on the nature 
of states, Athenian politicians rely mainly on the strength of their polis and on the only 
law that they can enforce: the Law of Nature. For Athens, politics is not about justice, 
it is about usefulness; and the Law of Nature is very useful to Athenian imperial aims. 
However, it is noteworthy that within the polis, Athenian citizens seem to pledge alle-
giance to both codified and unwritten laws. In his Funeral Oration, Pericles describes the 
Athenian attitude towards written and unwritten laws as follows: 'We give our obedience 
to those whom we put in positions of authority, and we obey the laws themselves, espe-
cially those which are for the protection of the oppressed, and those unwritten laws which 
it is an acknowledged shame to break. '182 While the Athenians understand that obedience 
to both customary and natural laws is necessary for a polity to function properly, they 
realise that this does not apply to the international sphere. In the anarchical international 
system, each state is free to secure its benefit in its own way. There are two dimensions 
to this. First of all, in a world where man is the measure of all things, he is only bound 
by his particular idea of justice expressed in his laws. And as conceptions of justice differ 
from polis to polis, the concept of justice (as everything else) becomes relative. Secondly, 
once god-given laws are replaced with man-made ones, moral values come to be seen as 
merely customary and thus also relative. Laws no longer reflect eternal divine will but 
temporary human interests. In the absence of universal moral standards what man can 
impose on his fellows is determined by practicability and expediency. 
4.2.5 The use of rhetoric in Athenian politics 
The epistemological foundations of rhetoric are provided by Gorgias' claim that knowledge 
is generally unattainable, relative at best and impossible to communicate: '[Anything you 
180Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.90.1-9 
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might mention] is nothing; if it were something, it would be unknowable; and if it were 
something and knowable, it could not be made evident to others. '183 From a philosophical 
standpoint, arguments about truth are futile. Just as one's knowledge is doubtful, so too 
is the knowledge of others. And while one may think that we can communicate our 
version of reality to others and vice versa, in the end no one can establish the existence 
of anything. Antiphon describes our fundamental ignorance as follows: 'Someone who 
says one thing does not in fact have one thing in mind, nor does one thing exist for 
him, neither something that the one who sees best sees with his sight nor something that 
the one who knows best knows with his mind.' 184 According to Gagarin and Woodruff, 
'Antiphon seems to mean that a single spoken word does not refer to a single object 
in the speaker's mind or in the real world; no such object could be seen by the person 
with the best eyesight or known by the person with the best mind. '185 Neither existence 
nor knowledge itself can be proven by the mere fact that we can speak about things. 
Contradicting arguments can be made about everything, including truth. The Dissoi 
Logoi, a compilation of texts written by known and unknown writers in the late Fifth or 
early Fourth Century, demonstrate how this is achieved: 
Double arguments are also put forth concerning truth and falsehood. One of them says a false 
statement is one thing and a true statement another, but others say that on the contrary, they 
are the same. I say the latter. First, they are spoken with the same words; second, whenever 
a statement is made, if things turn out just as was stated, then the statement is true, but if 
they do not turn out, the same statement is false. For example, a statement accuses someone of 
temple-robbery: if the act took place, the statement is true, but if it didn't take place, it is false, 
and the same for the statement of the defendant. In fact, the courts judge the same statement 
both false and true. Thus it is clear that the same statement, whenever falsehood is present in 
it, is false, but whenever truth is present, is true ... 186 
Although there is a certain conception of truth in this fragment (that is truth is what 
really happened), the salient point is that, philosophically speaking, a statement can be 
183Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18, p. 206 
184Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 5, p. 244 
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both true and false, depending on reality. When this reality cannot be established, it 
becomes impossible to distinguish truth from falsehood. 
In rhetorical arguments, truth does not refer to ultimate or universal knowledge but is 
synonymous with the subjective perspective of the speaker. Gorgias' Encomium of Helen 
demonstrates that truth can become an instrument of rhetoric. Before defending Helen, 
Gorgias makes some general statements about the characteristics of speeches. He claims 
that a speech ought to be truthful: 'For a city the finest adornment is a good citizenry, 
for a body beauty, for a soul wisdom, for an action arete, and for a speech truth; and 
the opposites of these are indecorous. '187 Revealing the truth (i.e. his version of the 
truth) a speaker frees his audience from ignorance: 'My only wish is to bring reason to 
the debate, eliminate the cause of her bad reputation, demonstrate that her detractors 
are lying, reveal the truth, and put an end to ignorance. '188 The speaker's claim to 
truth gives him the ability to change the opinions of his audience: 'It [speech] can stop 
fear, relieve pain, create joy, and increase pity. How this is so, I shall show; and I must 
demonstrate this to my audience to change their opinion. '189 Rhetoric is both a product 
of Epistemological Scepticism and a method to deal with its consequences. Whether or 
not reality is what one thinks it is one needs to act on certain assumptions in order to 
avoid complete paralysis. Arguments with others cannot establish the truth; they can 
merely establish whose truth prevails. All one can do is try to persuade others of one's 
perspective. Rhetoric is the skill with which one gains a comparative advantage over 
one's contenders; it allows one to establish one's truth as ultimate truth. Rhetoric is best 
described as 'the capacity to persuade others; or a practical realisation of this ability; or, 
at least an attempt at persuasion, successful or not. '190 It is a mode of communication 
with a distinct purpose: to get others to do what we want. For Gorgias, persuasion is an 
instrument of power which can be identified with force 'persuasion, which has the same 
power, but not the same form as compulsion. When added to speech, [it] indeed molds 
the mind as it wishes. '191 Gorgias destroys the traditional polarity between force and 
187Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 1, p. 191 
188Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 1, p. 191 
189Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 1, p. 192 
190R. Wardy, The Birth of Rhetoric (London, Routledge, 1996), p. 1 
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persuasion which prevails in the culture of ancient Greece: 
When Gorgias abolishes the distinction between force and persuasion, he undermines the faun-
dation on which rested the basic Greek division between ways of getting people to do things. 
Why does this matter so much? ... civilised Greeks do (or rather should) fall back on it [violence] 
only as a last resort, and only when circumstances justify the use of force. Greeks, and demo-
cratic Athenians first and foremost, are civilised rather than barbarian in part because they 
try to channel violent tendencies into the persuasive, if competitive, negotiations permitted by 
logos ... 192 
Rhetoric is an instrument used to implement self-interest policies. Those skilled in the 
art of rhetoric know how to adopt their speech to fit their purpose. Critias describes the 
effects of rhetoric saying: 'A good character is more certain than a law, for a speaker 
could never distort it, whereas he often abuses a law, shaking it up and down with 
arguments. '193 Arguments are used as weapons by those who are rhetorically skilled to 
fight for superiority. Whose truth prevails solely depends on the ability of the speaker. 
As Alcidamas points out, a good speaker needs to train his ability to persuade: 'Now, 
to speak appropriately, on the spot, on whatever topic is proposed, to be quick with an 
argument and ready with the right word, and to find just the right speech to match the 
current situation and people's desires- all this is not within the natural ability of everyone 
nor the result of whatever education one happens to have had. '194 
The Sophist theory of rhetoric profoundly influences Athenian politicians. The politi-
cians realise that though it is impossible to resolve contradictions between different ver-
sions of reality, one party can try to persuade the other to adopt her perspective. In the 
international sphere, where the relations between states are determined by their relative 
power, rhetoric becomes an instrument of domination. In the Peloponnesian War, the 
Athenians employ both physical force and political arguments to win their enemies over. 
Rhetoric serves as a means to justify Athenian policies, i.e. to persuade the other side 
that Athenian actions are right and legitimate. Through the use of rhetoric, Sophist 
Epistemological Scepticism is instrumentalised to support Athenian Realist policies. 
192Wardy, The Birth of Rhetoric, p. 44 
193Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 2, p. 260 
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The Athenians use the notion of Natural Law as a vehicle to represent their own 
perspective on justice as a universal truth. This is consistent with the primacy of self-
interest that underlies Athenian politics: 
if you follow my advice, you will be doing the right thing as far as Mytilene is concerned and 
at the same time will be acting in your own interests; if you decide differently, you will not 
win them over, but you will be passing judgement on yourselves. For if they were justified in 
revolting, you must be wrong in holding power. If, however, whatever the rights or wrongs of 
it may be, you propose to hold power all the same, then your interest demands that these too, 
rightly or wrongly, must be punished.195 
Rhetoric also allows for flexible policy-making. What a state deems right today may 
be considered wrong tomorrow and rhetoric may reconcile contradictory policies. What 
is more, Athens applies different standards to herself than to other states. For example, 
while Athenian politicians pursue Might is Right politics ruthlessly, they do not allow 
other states to do the same. In the Mytilenian Debate in 427 BCE, Cleon argues at 
first that Mytilene would have been justified to go to war in order to gain power, and 
later on condemns Mytilene's Might is Right politics. This is a perfect example of how 
the Athenians conceal their double standards with rhetorical skill. 'Now, to act as they 
acted is not what I should call a revolt (for people only revolt when they have been 
badly treated); it is a case of calculated aggression, of deliberately taking sides with our 
bitterest enemies in order to destroy us. And this is far worse than if they had made war 
against us simply to gain power. '196 On the one hand, Cleon pretends to apply uniform 
standards to state politics, whether Athenian or not (i.e. all states have the right to go 
to war to increase their power). On the other hand, the Athenians punish other states 
for pursuing the same policies as them. Later on in his speech, Cleon reproaches the 
Mytilenians for having put Might over Right: 'They made up their minds to put might 
first and right second, choosing the moment when they thought they would win, and 
then making their unprovoked attack upon us. '197 This example amply demonstrates how 
Athenian politicians use rhetoric to buttress their power position. Athens unilaterally 
195Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.40.25-33 
196Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.39.10-15 
197Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.39.20-23 
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establishes standards of conduct in the international sphere that serve her own interests 
only and fortify her hegemony. 
By imposing their own approach to politics on all other states, Athenian politicians 
shape the international political discourse and establish the rules of the political game. 
Athens makes the international sphere hers knowing that no other state is powerful enough 
to challenge her dominant position. By allowing only herself to put Might first and Right 
second, Athens seeks to cement the prevailing order forever. 
Rhetoric plays a central role in Athenian power politics. The use of rhetoric in political 
arguments spills over from the domestic sphere that is the Athenian political assemblies, 
to the international realm. Sophist philosophy influences the Athenian political system 
and produces a new form of politics. What characterises this new form of politics will be 
scrutinised in the following section. 
4.3 Why did Political Realism emerge in Fifth Cen-
tury Athens? 
As we have seen, studying the intellectual context of Fifth Century Athens enhances 
our understanding of the roots of Political Realism significantly. Let us now broaden our 
perspective by taking into consideration the historical and cultural factors that play a role 
in the development of Political Realism. We will sustain our twofold claim that Political 
Realism could not have emerged outside of Athens or at any other period of time. It is 
not a coincidence that Political Realism develops when it does and where it does. 
4.3.1 Historical context 
Political realism is an approach to politics unlikely to develop without the context of 
supreme power. Had Athens not emerged from the Persian Wars as Greek hegemon, she 
would not have been able to develop Might is Right politics. Let us outline briefly the 
historical context of the second half of the Fifth Century. In the course of the Persian 
Wars ( 499-448 BCE), the balance of power in the Greek World fundamentally shifts: 
The Delian League, an alliance between Athens and other Greek city states, provides 
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Athens with an extended sphere of influence while Sparta, her main rival is weakened 
considerably. Victory over the Persians shapes Athens' self-image and nurtures her will 
to power: 'They had been the leaders of the Greek resistance and borne the brunt of the 
Persian attack, and their consciousness of strength developed into an urge to dominate 
the rest and turn their former allies into subjects.'198 Gradually, Athens expands her 
power by restructuring the international sphere according to her interests: 
During the wars, she had assumed the place of leader of all the Greeks engaged in the struggle 
against the barbarians, and she had retained that position ever since. She had organised the 
former allies into a confederation - the Delian League - and gradually, being the only wealthy 
states as well as the only one with a navy, she had seized the chance of the slightest show of 
recalcitrance to impose her law by force. The confederation had become her empire.199 
This move is a real historical revolution since 'for the first time, a Greek polis trans-
formed leadership over her allies into direct control and imperial rule. This meant, above 
all, that the Athenians introduced an amount of military, administrative, and political 
centralization that was unheard of in the world of Hellenic poleis. ' 200 Athens builds up a 
system of political dominion consisting of three components. First, Athenian magistrates 
are installed in the majority of the cities of the empire. Second, Athens confiscates land 
and distributes it to Athenian colonists. Third, all important law courts are moved to 
Athens. However, the Athenian empire is based essentially on her naval power. Raaflaub 
highlights the inherent connection between the two: 'In fact, naval and imperial power 
were interconnected: the Delian League provided both the necessary resources to main-
tain a fleet and the coastal support network that was indispensable to allow this fleet to 
move freely throughout the Aegean and far beyond, while its existence and the Athenians' 
determination to use it usually sufficed to keep the empire together. '201 Due to the con-
tributions of her allies Athens can afford a war fleet of 300 triremes (Fifth Century battle 
ships) and maintain a continued military presence in the Aegean. Athenian naval capa-
198 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, pp. 17-18 
199de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, p. 19 
200K. A. Ra.aflaub, 'The Transformation of Athens in the Fifth Century' in D. Boedeker and K.A. 
Ra.aflaub (eds.), Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens (Cambridge, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1998), p. 16 
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bilities revolutionise Greek warfare. Conventional hoplite warfare, which is traditionally 
conducted in intervals of several years, is replaced by naval actions which last for weeks, 
months or even years. This allows Athenian generals to carry out extensive long-term 
campaigns to expand Athens' sphere of influence. 
But how are these excessive military actions funded? Gomperz explains the intimate 
link between Athens' military and economic power: 
Athens, resting on her sea-power, became the head of a confederacy which gradually transformed 
the conditions of economic as well as political life. She enjoyed lucrative commercial monop-
olies; she derived a rich income from the tolls, and from the tributes and judiciary fees of the 
confederates; and, finally, the confiscated lands of a renegade ally would fall to her from time to 
time for repartition. 202 
As a major maritime trade hub and with her colonies established throughout the Greek 
world, Athens develops an economy of empire: 'Greece as a whole in the fifth century B. C. 
would appear to have surpassed all previous periods in the products of agriculture, in-
dustry and trade. But the transformation at Athens amounted to an economic revolution 
which has been described as a passing from the economics of a city state to the economics 
of empire.'203 At the outset of the Peloponnesian War, Athenian power is incontestable. 
It is based firmly on both military and economic might, the two being dependent. Ulti-
mately, at least in Thucydides' view, it is this very strength which causes the war between 
Athens and Sparta. As written at the beginning of the History of the Peloponnesian War, 
'What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this 
caused in Sparta.'204 At the Debate at Camarina in 415/4 BCE, the Athenians ascribe to 
the same logic claiming that building their empire was a security measure: 'We therefore 
deserve the empire which we have, partly because we supplied to the cause of Hellas the 
largest fleet and a courage that never looked back . .. partly because we wanted to have 
the strength to hold our own in relation to the Peloponnesians. '205 
In the first book of the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides describes how 
202H. Gomperz, Sophistik und Rhetorik (Stuttgart, B.G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, 1965), p. 382 
203Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 15 
204Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.23.27-29 
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the steady growth of Athenian power causes alarm throughout the Greek world, especially 
amongst Sparta and her allies. Initially, they are concerned with the fortification of 
Athens, which they regard as a sign of the city's ill intentions: 
When the Spartans heard of what was going on they sent an embassy to Athens. This was partly 
because they themselves did not like the idea of Athens or any other city being fortified, but 
chiefly because they were urged by their allies, who were alarmed both by the sudden growth of 
Athenian sea-power and by the daring which the Athenians had shown in the war against the 
Persians. 206 
Soon afterwards, they are told by the Athenian leader Themistocles that they should be 
'prepared to recognize that the Athenians were capable of making up their own minds 
about their own interests and about the interests of the rest of Hellas. '207 The Athenians 
'thought it better that their city should be fortified; it was better for their own citizens 
and also would be an advantage to the whole alliance; for it was only on the basis of equal 
strength that equal and fair discussions on the common interest could be held. '208 
The essence of Athenian politics is foreshadowed at the very beginning of the Pelopon-
nesian War. Through military and economic strength, Athens acquires the independence 
which allows her to act without considering other states. Since no other Greek alliance 
is as strong as the Delian League, and no other single state can challenge Athens within 
this league, there can be no common interest, only self-interest. 
Athens' strength can account for her ability to execute Might is Right policies. But it 
does not explain why the Athenians pursue a particular type of policy. Taken individually, 
neither power nor supremacy produces Political Realist attitudes. Though hegemony may 
facilitate a ruthless foreign policy, it does not necessarily have to be justified with realist 
arguments. In our view, it is the interplay of historical with cultural factors that allows 
the Athenians to apply Sophist ideas to the political sphere. 
206Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.90.1-6 
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4.3.2 Cultural context 
The relationship between Fifth Century Athenian culture and Sophist philosophy can be 
described as symbiotic. Athenian culture provides an environment which allows Sophist 
philosophy to flourish, and Sophist ideas have a significant impact on Athens' cultural 
framework. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this work to reconstruct the interplay 
between Sophist philosophy and Athenian culture. Instead, we will highlight only those 
cultural aspects which facilitate the influence of Sophist ideas that serve as a basis for 
Athenian Political Realism. 
The Sophists are attracted by the cultural and political climate in Athens, which 
allows them to develop and to disseminate their ideas: 
All these thinkers, with their new ideas, were born along by the same impetus, an impetus that 
accounts for their common success. But the fact remains that it is in Athens that we find them 
all. It was to Athens that they came, here that they found a welcome, and here that they exerted 
a profound influence ... Without doubt, the vogue for the Sophists only came about thanks to a 
catalyst which Periclean Athens alone could provide. 209 
In Athens, the Sophists find the freedom and the intellectual openness that provide a 
breeding ground for their new ideas. As Wallace points out, 'Democratic Athens did 
not create the sophistic movement, but certainly welcomed it, elite and demos alike. '210 
The importance of the cross-fertilisation between Athenian culture and Sophist philosophy 
should not be underestimated. The Sophists absorb and react to contemporary intellectual 
movements. As teachers, they are in regular contact with Athenian opinion-makers. As 
orators, they are exposed to the ideas held by their audiences. However, we cannot 
go as far as Gomperz who equates the Sophists with their audiences by describing the 
relationship between the two as follows: 'Dependent as they were on their public, they 
necessarily became the mouthpiece of ideas which, if not dominant, were at least rising into 
predominance. '211 To some extent the Sophists are the mouthpieces of contemporaneous 
Athenian intellectual currents. And by asserting that their philosophy could not have 
209de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, p. 18 
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developed outside of Athens, we do attribute a considerable role to Athenian culture. 
However, it is clear that ultimately, Sophist thought transcends the particular movements 
of its time. 
Value crisis 
The most fundamental development of the Fifth Century is the transition from traditional 
to more modern ways of thinking, which is expressed in a value crisis. 'It was a period 
of profound social and political changes . . . Established patterns of life and experience 
were dissolving in favour of new patterns. Beliefs and values of previous generations were 
under attack. The sophistic movement gave expression to all this. m 2 The outbreak of 
the Peloponnesian War exacerbates this crisis further and initiates a tangible reversal of 
values. Thucydides describes the Hellenic world towards the end of the Fifth Century: 
But war is a stern teacher; in depriving them of the power of easily satisfying their daily wants, 
it brings most people's minds down to the level of their actual circumstances ... To fit in with the 
change of events, words, too, had to change their usual meanings. What used to be described 
as a thoughtless act of aggression was now regarded as the courage one would expect to find 
in a party member; to think of the future and wait was merely another way of saying that one 
was a coward; any idea of moderation was just an attempt to disguise one's unmanly character; 
ability to understand a question from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted for action. 
Fanatical enthusiasm was the mark of a real man, and to plot against an enemy behind his back 
was perfectly legitimate self-defence. 213 
This value crisis breeds ruthless and ambitious men such as Alcibiades, about whom 
Thucydides writes: 'For most people became frightened at a quality in him which was 
beyond the normal and showed itself both in the lawlessness of his private life and habits 
and in the spirit in which he acted on all occasions. '214 In times of war, man's perspective 
on life is forced to change. Accepted norms are reversed as a matter of expediency. 'In 
the troubled circumstances of the late fifth century established moral canons were ignored 
212 Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 1 
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and men altered the accepted meanings of moral terms to conform to their actions. '215 
The Sophists contribute to the ongoing crisis of morality by questioning time-honoured 
beliefs and values. Their criticism is all-encompassing: 'In principle, nothing was any 
longer taken for granted, and the fact that something was commonly practiced did not 
in the least protect it from criticism. This criticism . . . spared neither the official religion 
nor institutions, laws, or conceptions of justice on which the structure of the city-state 
was based. '216 The Sophists' fundamental Scepticism which has been described previously 
reflects a critical attitude towards authority reinforced by the social and political life of 
the Fifth century. The processes of change at work in Athens have a profound impact 
on the way people conceive of themselves and of the society they live in. In a period of 
transition, everything and anything can be called into question. On the one hand, this 
doubt widens the scope of individual freedom. On the other, it can lead to moral anarchy, 
which Guthrie sees as the logical conclusion of Sophist thought. 217 
Humanism 
As a result of the widespread critical attitude towards the divine and the mythical, the 
Fifth Century also witnesses the emergence of a humanism that puts human beings in the 
centre. This change in perspective has an influence on all spheres of life. In politics, the 
victory against the Persians increases the confidence of the Greeks. Military success is no 
longer attributed to divine will or intervention, but to human capacity instead. With the 
growth of Athenian democracy, men see themselves increasingly as responsible for their 
city's destiny. The political system empowers citizens to influence domestic political life 
as well as the foreign policy of their polis. 
This focus on human action and human capacity is reflected in all disciplines. In 
the realm of historical enquiry, Herodotus aims to produce a rational record of the past 
which does not recount mythical legends but represents the human world. Rather than 
concerning himself with the founding of towns and the genealogies of heroes, he criti-
cally scrutinises the accounts of eye witnesses in a bid to represent events of the past 
215Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 94 
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objectively. Thucydides goes even further than his predecessor in attempting to explain 
political behaviour by analysing the interplay of reason and irrationality in human na-
ture.218 In literature, the great tragedians Euripides and Sophocles put an emphasis on 
human skills and technical inventions such as speech, writing, hunting, fishing, architec-
ture, the domestication of animals, medicine, mathematics etc. 219 In the figurative arts, 
monsters and all animals except the horse disappear in the course of the first half of the 
Century. They are replaced by the human figure which is captured in its vibrant reality. 
In brief, as human beings become the centre of interest there are fundamental changes in 
every field of thought. 
According to de Romilly, the trend towards anthropocentrism and rationality begins 
long before the Sophists arrive in Athens and in fact prepares the ground for their actions 
and success. 220 She describes the Sophists' interaction with the cultural context of the 
Fifth Century as follows: 'the Sophists clearly fulfilled an expectation and were part of a 
deep process of evolution that was finding expression in many different fields at this time. 
Thinkers and writers in Greece were now tending to allot a greater place than before to 
human beings and reason... Philosophy shifted its attention from the universe to man 
himself, and from cosmogony to morality and politics. '221 
First and foremost, Sophist humanism is a reaction against the natural philosophers. 
The Sophists abandon the Presocratic study of nature and of the universe in order to focus 
on the realities and problems of human life. As practical men, the Sophists concentrate 
on the issues that really matter: how to manage one's own affairs and political matters 
(indeed, this is what Protagoras professes to teach). They establish the relevance of 
philosophy for everyday life, freeing it from the inconsistencies and contradictions of 
Presocratic thought. For the Sophists, putting human beings in the centre has radical 
implications for the way man conceives of himself. There is no higher authority than 
the human; man is the measure of all things. Sophist Subjectivism epitomises the trend 
towards humanism in the culture of Fifth Century Athens; it takes humanism to the 
extreme. 
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Individualism 
It is not just human beings in general but the individual as such that is granted a special 
place in Fifth Century Athens. Whereas traditionally, the individual is less important 
than the family, clan or tribe, the reforms instituted by Pericles and Ephialtes put the 
individual at the centre of the political process. As Athenian citizens, all men are eligible 
for public office and are free if they so wish to pursue a political career. Sophist teaching 
reflects these developments and helps to produce the politicians needed by the state. We 
agree with Ehrenberg that it is primarily the practical side of Sophist philosophy that 
buttresses the development of individualism: 'Deutlicher als selbst die extremste Theorie 
(die fiir sich genommen auch in sehr anderer Zeit moglich ware) macht es die plotzlich 
und machtvoll in Erscheinung tretende Praxis der Sophisten, dass nunmehr wirklich der 
einzelne Mensch in den Mittelpunkt des Denkens wie der Tat geriickt ist. '222 
However, we should certainly not confuse the individualism of the Fifth Century with 
that of our own society. As Solmsen points out, the Athenian state still plays a dominant 
role: 
But for the fetters thus removed from the feet of the individual there had been substituted the 
over-all and binding authority of the Athenian state. The lesser loyalties had been swallowed up 
in the greater but the individual still counted for little. He was, however, content to do so for 
the moment. He had great personal freedom, little or no state-interference with his private life 
or with his efforts to make money for himself and his family or even with his plans to dispose of 
his gains. He had no reason to resent the paramount authority of a city which so provided for 
his needs, and of which he felt himself to be a part. When therefore we speak of individualism 
as manifesting itself about the middle of the fifth century, it is not associated with any assertion 
of the rights of man, stillles an attack on the rights of the polis. Indeed the self-assertiveness of 
the individual and eagerness for better education were indications of a desire to serve the city, 
as well as to win honour and distinction for oneself in doing so. 223 
222Ehrenberg, Polis und lmperium, p. 367 
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Cultural Relativism 
The cultural relativism prevalent in Fifth Century Athens is induced by increased contact 
with other cultuJes and a change of attitude towards them: 'Often adduced as a cause 
of the new humanism is the widening of horizons through increasing contacts with other 
peoples, in war, travel and the foundation of colonies. These made it increasingly obvious 
that customs and standards of behaviour which had earlier been accepted as absolute 
and universal, and of divine institution, were in fact local and relative. '224 Although 
contact with the barbarians is nothing new for the Greeks and their awareness of other 
people's customs and traditions is enhanced by Herodotus' detailed descriptions of other 
cultures, it seems that the Fifth Century nevertheless marks a turning point in Greek self-
perception. This is due to a number of factors. First of all, the establishment of the Delian 
League increased personal and commercial intercourse between Athens and distant parts 
of Greece significantly. As a result, the Athenians become familiar with certain manners 
and customs of other Greek people. Secondly, the geographical extension of the Athenian 
Empire means that Athens is more exposed to non-Creeks at her borders. Thirdly, during 
the Persian Wars, the Athenian tradition to incorporate the cults of vanquished people 
into her own challenges the autocracy of established faiths. As Gomperz rightly observes, 
'the foundation of all criticism is comparative observation'. 225 Being exposed to other 
cultures raises awareness of human diversity and uniqueness. This can lead to rejection or 
to acceptance. In the case of Athens, it seems to have encouraged the critical examination 
of Athenian traditions. The atmosphere of insecurity that results from this introspection 
provides the fertile ground on which the Sophists can sow Moral Relativism and Athenian 
politicians can proclaim that every city decides what is right for her. 
In this section, we have sought to substantiate our claim that Political Realism is 
intricately linked to the historical and cultural context of Fifth Century Athens. It is this 
context which allows the Athenians to translate Sophist philosophy into foreign policy. 
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Chapter 5 
5.1 Background 
Athens: The 
relationship between 
domestic politics and 
foreign policy 
In order to establish why Political Realism develops in Athens in the Fifth Century we need 
to examine thoroughly which historical circumstances facilitate its emergence. Having 
previously highlighted the historical preconditions for Athens' power status, we will now 
focus on Athenian democracy and its impact on the city's foreign policy. We will show 
that the Athenian political system gives rise to a specific political culture which in turn 
produces a particular type of politician, both of which have a decisive impact on Athenian 
foreign policy. 
5.2 Athenian democracy 
At the beginning of the Fifth Century, around 462 BCE, Athenian democracy under-
goes radical democratic reforms instituted by Ephialtes and Pericles, two eminent public 
figures. They introduce a series of laws stripping the ancient Areopagus Council of all 
political and of most judicial powers. In doing so, they limit the extensive regulatory 
authorities of the Council, which are 'not derived from any formal grant of the people, 
but have their source in immemorial antiquity and are sustained by general awe and rev-
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erence. '226 The Council's remaining powers are negligible; they include jurisdiction in 
homicide cases, the care of the sacred olive-trees of Athena, and a voice in the supervision 
of the property of the Eleusinian deities. 227 From this point onwards, Athens' adminis-
tration is supervised by the people. The powers of the Areopagus are divided between 
the Council of the Five Hundred on the one hand and the Assembly and the Heliaea on 
the other. 228 The Council of the Five Hundred becomes the chief executive organ of the 
people. This paves the way for full democracy, that is the exercise of sovereignty by the 
majority of the people. With these reforms, Ephialtes and Pericles succeed in translating 
the 'democratical sentiment among the mass of Athenians'229 into institutional change. 
Democratic control and transparency increase at all levels of the political system: in the 
public administration, in the judicature, and in the executive. 
In the administration, the institutions which represent the Athenian people are now 
in charge of regulating the behaviour of public officials. 'Any magistrate can be relieved 
of his office in the course of his term if his conduct is found unsatisfactory at a monthly 
review. 723° Control is kept in the hands of both the Council of the Five Hundred and the 
Assembly to prevent the special influence any individual politician may have. 
In court, the Athenian people are in charge of all juridical matters: all civil and 
criminal cases are dealt with in dikastic assemblies. 231 As a consequence, the archon's 
role in jurisdiction is substantially curtailed. He 'no longer delivers a verdict, but holds 
only a preliminary hearing, at which the depositions of witnesses are taken and the relevant 
laws are cited. The whole thing is then sealed up and delivered to the court, where the 
archon presides but takes no substantive part in the proceedings at all. '232 
On the level of public policy-making, the introduction of lot and pay is the key element 
of democratic reform. Both the archons and the members of the Council of Five Hundred 
are now determined by lot from all eligible citizens, rather than from elected candidates. 
Archonship and membership of the Council of Five Hundred is turned into paid office, 
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which means that candidacy is no longer restricted to the two richest classes. It is now 
not only legal but practically possible for the poorer citizens to give up their time to 
public affairs. 233 In Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles describes 
the equality Athenian citizens enjoy in his Funeral Oration: 'Our constitution is called 
a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people. 
When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is equal before the law; when 
it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public responsibility, 
what counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man 
possesses. '234 As Guthrie notes, the Athenian democratic system naturally encourages 
the belief that one man's opinion is as good as another's and that as citizens; all Athe-
nians are equally competent in the art of government.235 However, Adkins demonstrates 
convincingly that due to the Athenian value system, Athenians continue to attribute arete 
to those of noble birth and wealth, thereby preventing citizens from lower social strata 
from acquiring high political positions.236 Andrewes adds that the poor remain largely 
excluded from political office for very practical reasons: 'Being a councillor takes a lot 
of time, and, though the developed democracy pays its councillors, it does not pay them 
very much. No really poor man would want to serve ... '237 What is true of public officials 
is also true for politicians; most of whom 
at least during the middle decades of the [fifth] century, are relatively well-to-do. The demands on 
their time are normally sufficient to exclude most poor farmers, day labourers, or artisans. of only 
moderate means from any extensive political career. Pericles and Cimon had extensive estates; 
Thucydides' mother was probably a Thracian princess; the families of Cleinias and Callias were 
notorious for their wealth. Even the allegedly poor politicians, Ephialtes and Aristides, were 
probably poor only by comparison to the often extraordinary wealth of their competitors.238 
In Athens, a well-established family, a strategic marriage and personal wealth continues to 
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play an important role in politics. However, reforms instituted by Ephialtes and Pericles 
establish formal equality between Athenian citizens. In reality, there may not be equal 
opportunities to become a politician or to hold office, but at least any citizen may speak 
and vote in the Assembly, which passes laws, declares war and concludes treaties. 239 The 
core of politics, (i.e. political decision-making), is taken from the hands of a few officials 
and given to the people. Particular (and often partial) judgement is replaced by collective 
decisions: 'The distrust of experts and confidence in the collective judgment of ordinary 
men was the essence of democracy. [ ... ] political decisions were taken after noisy debate in 
the primary assembly, which all could attend if they chose. '240 In practice, only a fraction 
of those eligible would turn up to Assembly meetings: 'Not indeed that in Athens more 
than a small proportion habitually attend - at a time when there may have been as many 
as 45,000 qualified voters, it is rare for as many as 5,000-6,000 to exercise their right- but 
it is clear that men of all classes do attend. The principle that no one should be denied 
that right is the essential principle of democratic freedom and equality.'241 As public 
participation in the political process increases, politics become more accessible and as a 
result public opinion is more widely reflected in political decisions. 
As the responsibilities of each Athenian citizen increase, more and more people gain 
experience in the world of politics. Hammond describes the wide-ranging functions of 
those who serve as councillors: 
The 500 Councillors, changing annually and appointed by lot, dealt with an astonishing amount 
of business: the preparation of the agenda for the Assembly; the scrutinizing, directing, and 
preliminary auditing of all magistrates; the administration of state finance, buildings, festivals, 
docks, and naval and military establishments; the selection of citizens to undertake liturgies; 
the assessment and collection of tribute; and in time of war the preliminary decision on urgent 
matters of strategy and diplomacy.242 
The 1400 magistrates carry out a wide variety of administrative duties whereas the 6000 
Heliasts deal only with cases affecting Athens and her allies. All citizens are involved in 
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their city's politics. As a result, Athenian society is highly politicised: 
the citizens possessed an experience of the details of political and judicial administration which 
has never been paralleled in an ancient or modern state. Moreover, this experience is spread 
through all classes in the citizen community by the use of the lot, the rotation of office, and the 
disregard of property qualification except in the candidature for a few magistracies. 243 
Despite the fact that professional politics and high office remain rather exclusive, the 
introduction of lot and pay empowers the entire Athenian electorate through political 
participation. In his Funeral Oration in 431/0 BCE, Pericles describes the political par-
ticipation of Athenian citizens as follows: 'Here each individual is interested not only in 
his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as well: even those who are mostly occu-
pied with their own business are extremely well-informed on general politics - this is a 
peculiarity of ours: we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man 
who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all. '244 The politics 
of the city state concern all. And since the people are sovereign, one cannot be a citizen 
without taking part in the political process. This distinguishes Athens from other Greek 
city states and is the main characteristic of its political culture. 
5.3 Athenian political culture and its impact on politi-
. 
c1ans 
How does the democratisation of political culture affect the political system? First, the 
nature of public decision-making changes. As the institutions charged with making de-
cisions become more representative of the Athenian public, policies need to be agreed 
upon by a more heterogeneous group of people. This makes finding a consensus more 
difficult and turns every decision into a battlefield of competing opinions. Secondly, the 
new democratic institutions require a specific type of politician. To win political debates, 
politicians have to be convincing orators trained in the art of public speaking and rhetoric. 
Let us contextualise these assertions by examining how the political system functions 
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and in which ways it shapes political agents. The History of the Peloponnesian War pro-
vides examples of the characteristics of public decision-making in Fifth Century Athens. 
Political decisions are the result of a process of open debate followed by a public vote: 'We 
Athenians, in our own persons, take our decisions on policy or submit them to proper 
discussions: for we do not think that there is an incompatibility between words and 
deeds; the worst thing is to rush into action before the consequences have been properly 
debated. '245 These procedures ensure that all policies are fully supported by the public. 
However, the quest for consensus is not always easy as public opinion can change rapidly. 
This is exemplified in 427 BCE, when Athens decides to punish her revolting Mytilenian 
subjects severely, the public demands that this policy be reconsidered shortly afterwards: 
Next day, however, there was a sudden change of feeling and people began to think how cruel 
and how unprecedented such a decision was... Observing this, the deputation from Mytilene 
which was in Athens and the Athenians who were supporting them approached the authorities 
with a view to having the question debated again. They won their point the more easily because 
the authorities themselves saw clearly that most of the citizens were wanting someone to give 
them a chance of reconsidering the matter. 246 
In the debate that ensues, Cleon, one of the leading Athenian political figures at the 
time, condemns frequent changes of opinion as the fundamental weakness of Athenian 
democracy: 
Personally I have had occasion often enough already to observe that a democracy is incapable of 
governing others, and I am all the more convinced of this when I see how you are now changing 
your minds about the Mytilenians... when you give way to your own feelings of compassion you 
are being guilty of a kind of weakness which is dangerous to you... And this is the very worst 
thing- to pass measures and then not to abide by them.247 
In Cleon's view, a strong democracy is characterised by the capacity to act: 
I am amazed at those who have proposed a reconsideration of the question of Mytilene, thus 
causing a delay which is all to the advantage of the guilty party. After a lapse of time the injured 
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party will lose the edge of his anger when he comes to act against those who have wronged him; 
whereas the best punishment and the one most fitted to the crime is when reprisals follow 
immediately. 248 
Cleon is contradicted by Diodotus, probably 'a private citizen whose outrage at the 
policy makes him stand and oppose it. He becomes a temporary politician and wins his 
case by the cogency of his cause and the cleverness of his speech. '249 Diodotus role in the 
Mytilenian Debate demonstrates that the flexible and simple model of Athenian politics 
allows individual citizens to have an impact on domestic and foreign policies without the 
support of the public or of political parties. The ability, capacity and readiness of Athenian 
citizens to speak up about issues of public concern is one of the major characteristics of 
Athenian democracy; it ensures that the public voice is always heard. 250 In this vein, 
Diodotus contradicts Cleon and claims that it lies in the nature of democratic decision-
making to reconsider important issues if necessary: 'I do not blame those who have 
proposed a new debate on the subject of Mytilene, and I do not share the view which we 
have heard expressed [i.e. Cleon's view], that it is a bad thing to have frequent discussions 
on matters of importance. '251 He points to the positive effects of having prolonged political 
debates: 'Haste and anger are, to my mind, the two greatest obstacles to wise counsel 
- haste, that usually goes with folly, anger, that is the mark of primitive and narrow 
minds. '252 Furthermore, Diodotus emphasises that policies are made up of both words 
and actions, which are inherently connected: 'And anyone who maintains that words 
cannot be a guide to action must be either a fool or one with some personal interest at 
stake ... '253 
There is no doubt that Cleon has a point criticising the frequent changes of public 
opinion as they can be detrimental to public policy. Due to fluctuations in public opinion, 
Athenian politics lacks consistency and continuity. For politicians, this means that both 
their policies and their popularity can be very short-lived. Pericles complains about this 
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in his Funeral Oration: 'As for me, I am the same as I was, and do not alter; it is you 
[the audience] who have changed. What has happened is this: you took my advice when 
you were still untouched by misfortune, and repented of your action when things went 
badly with you; it is because your own resolution is weak that my policy appears to 
you to be mistaken. '254 Pericles experiences the extent to which political careers are at 
the whim of public opinion. Every politician's influence depends fundamentally on his 
public support, which is unpredictable. After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians 
around 430, the Athenians are indecisive regarding their city's future course of action. 
This is reflected in their attitude towards Pericles: 'They began to blame Pericles for 
having persuaded them to go to war and to hold him responsible for all the misfortunes 
which had overtaken them... they were then in a state of utter hopelessness, and all 
their angry feelings turned against Pericles. '255 'The general ill feeling against Pericles 
persisted, and was not satisfied until they had condemned him to pay a fine. Not long 
afterwards, however, as is the way with crowds, they re-elected him to the generalship and 
put all their affairs into his hands. '256 Pericles' case exemplifies the fate of Fifth Century 
politicians whose power is not only dependent on the people but resides ultimately in 
their rhetorical capacities. On the one hand 'the skilful speaker in Athens has a source 
of power that frees him from many of the encumbrances of the old style of politics. He 
can be more independent, he can neglect, even offend, influential groups, he might even 
dare to bypass the old process of building up alliances through the often aggravatingly 
slow sequence of discussion, concession, compromise, and coordination. '257 On the other 
hand, 
through his eloquence a politician can swiftly attain a lofty position in the city - but a perilous 
one. What rhetoric gives, rhetoric can take away. If that technique can elevate him to the 
pinnacles of power, it can also abandon him to sudden gusts of popular fancy and plunge him 
quickly to the depths of obscurity, or to the chastisements of the assembly or the law courts. 258 
But regardless of its influence on the success or failure of politicians, the power of the 
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demos is neither omnipotent nor immune to the establishment of quasi-autocratic struc-
tures. If a politician wins the hearts and minds of the public, the rule of the people can 
easily turn into the rule of one. Thucydides describes Pericles' extraordinary talent for 
controlling the people's will which allows him to become primus inter pares: 
Pericles, because of his position, his intelligence, and his known integrity, could respect the 
liberty of the people and at the same time hold them in check. It was he who led them, rather 
than they who led him, and, since he never sought power from any wrong motive, he was under 
no necessity of flattering them: in fact he was so highly respected that he was able to speak 
angrily to them and to contradict them... So, in what was nominally a democracy, power was 
really in the hands of the first citizen. 259 
However, 
neither Pericles nor any other politician in ancient Athens can be sure of a lasting and unshaken 
rule. If one man manages to hold power for a long time, it is because of his ability, his skill, his 
agility in manoeuvring, not because he is unchallenged. The inadequate surviving accounts of so 
many political figures, our ignorance of many men of the second rank, the inevitable tendency for 
the unsuccessful rival to disappear from the pages of history tempt and deceive us. There are no 
long periods of tranquil dominance in fifth century Athens; politics is regularly and vigorously 
polycentric. 260 
In addition to the problems highlighted, making decisions in public assemblies has a 
number of other undemocratic side effects. For example, since a public vote does not 
allow for differentiated decisions, public speakers have a disproportionately high impact 
on policies. A speaker's policy suggestions are usually rejected as a whole or adopted 
as a whole: 'Their [Athenians] reply to the Spartans was the one that he [Pericles] had 
suggested, both on the main issue and on the separate points ... '261 As a consequence, the 
democratic ideal of political equality amongst citizens is not fully realised; citizens in the 
audience do not have the same influence on policies as public speakers. 
Another serious problem with decision-making based on public votes is that the ma-
jority often pressure the minority into compliance. This is what happens at the launching 
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of the Sicilian expedition in 415 BCE: 'The result of this excessive enthusiasm of the 
majority was that the few who actually were opposed to the expedition were afraid of 
being thought unpatriotic if they voted against it, and therefore kept quiet. '262 
Despite its numerous dysfunctional aspects, we believe that on the whole, the political 
system of Athens is democratised by the reforms of Pericles and Ephialtes. As institutional 
structures and political culture change, so do political agents. They have to adapt to new 
political procedures and find ways to partake in and influence the political discourse. In 
order to be successful, politicians in Fifth Century Athens need to be persuasive speakers 
who can convince their audience with personal integrity and rhetorical skills. As Andrewes 
highlights 'at Athens, no man exercises power longer than he can persuade the assembly 
that his views are right, and he has to go on convincing the same or a slightly different 
audience, time after time, without respite. '263 The fluidity of a politician's power base 
requires him to establish permanent ties with parts of the electorate: 
a political career ... would require influence in the various assemblies of the city ... He would need 
some sort of power base, men that would listen to him and men he could rely upon. To win the 
support he needed he would turn to citizens whose interests and attitudes he shared, to men 
of the same economic and social class, and above all to those he had known longest and most 
intimately, his own family. 264 
Also, establishing oneself as a 'man of the people' ensures a broad power base: 
in the late fifth century it is possible to acquire political power by direct appeal to the citizenry 
without the tedious apprenticeship imposed by the system of political friendship, without the 
slow aggregation of alliances and coalitions. A man can win prominence by offering to protect 
the interests of the demos, by presenting himself as a prostates tou demou ["one who stands 
before the people"], and through his success as a rhetor ["one who speaks"] become the leader 
of the people, the demagogos. 265 
However, politicians must be men of action as well as masters of rhetoric: 
Kenntnisse im Bereich der politischen Verhaltnisse der Gegenwart und der Vergangenheit, da-
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raus resultierende Einblicke in politische Zusammenhiinge und vor allem die Fiihigkeit, Folgen 
etwaiger Aktivitiiten richtig abzuschiitzen, ferner natiirlich die Fiihigkeit, seine Mitbiirger von 
dem, was man als das Beste = Niitzlichste erkannt hat, zu iiberzeugen, so classes auch ihnen als 
das Beste erscheint, also iiberzeugungskraft und das heisst: rhetorische Fiihigkeiten, schliesslich 
fiir den aktiven Politiker sicher auch so etwas wie Entschluss- und Tatkraft. '266 
Pericles is the perfect example of a politician whose power is expressed in both his actions 
and in his oratory skills. On his first appearance in the History of the Peloponnesian 
War, Thucydides describes Pericles as follows: 'Among the speakers was Pericles, the son 
of Xanthippus, the leading man of his time among the Athenians and the most powerful 
both in action and debate.' 267 In his reply to the Spartan Ultimatum in 432-1 BCE, 
Pericles proves his powers of persuasion: 'This is the right reply to make and it is the 
reply that this city of ours ought to make. '268 
Given that very few people are born with a natural talent for both action and debate, 
and given that it is more difficult to convince people of a certain policy than putting it 
into practice, aspiring politicians focus on their ability to persuade. How are they trained 
and by whom? 
5.4 Rhetoric and Sophist teaching 
The main effect of democracy on the Athenian political culture is the broadening of partici-
pation in the political process. Before the reforms of Pericles and Ephialtes are introduced, 
politics is dominated by the wealthy. But as Athenian institutions are democratised, cit-
izens from all social backgrounds enter the political arena. Whether in the Assembly 
or in the Council of the Five Hundred, whether as public administrators or as private 
individuals standing trial- citizens have to be able to speak in public and argue their case 
convincingly. The faculty of persuasive speech is a vital skill for all citizens in all political 
positions and concerns all political activities and tasks. Bury describes how central speech 
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is to any political process: 
The institutions of a Greek democratic city presupposed in the average citizen the faculty of 
speaking in public, and for anyone who was ambitious for a political career it was indispensable. 
If a man was hauled into a law-court by his enemies and did not know how to speak, he was like 
an unarmed civilian attacked by soldiers. The power of expressing ideas clearly and in such a 
way as to persuade an audience was an art to be learned and taught. But it was not enough to 
gain command of a vocabulary; it was necessary to learn how to argue, and to exercise one's self 
in the discussion of political and ethical questions. There was a demand for higher education.269 
Traditional Athenian education lacks a systematic curriculum. Boys up to the age of 14 
are taught a combination of one or many of the following subjects: arithmetic, athletics, 
music, dancing, reading and writing. This education does not prepare citizens for the 
political life in the democratic polis. It is the political ambitions of young men of wealth 
in particular, that create a demand which conventional teachers cannot meet. 
And the path to power ... lay open to the man whose speech carried conviction and who could 
claim expert knowledge. Such an education would certainly fit a man for political life at Athens. 
So if any man, citizen or stranger, was able to provide such an education, he would find in 
Athens a splendid and lucrative field for his lectures and demonstrations and an audience eager 
to learn and willing to pay. To political power and material prosperity is added a demand for 
political education, and in this triple combination we have the soil in which much of fifth century 
political thought grew.270 
In the absence of institutions of adult learning the educational gap is filled by a group 
of teachers who travel about to give general instructions in the art of speaking and in 
the art of reasoning, and, out of their encyclopaedic knowledge, lecture on all possible 
subjects. 271 These instructors are the Sophists who charge fees for their lessons. They 
do not confine themselves to teaching but participate in public affairs and diffuse their 
knowledge and ideas through written treatise. 
But what kind of education do the Sophists offer? 'What the sophists were able to offer 
was in no sense a contribution to the education of the masses. They offered an expensive 
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product invaluable to those seeking a career in politics and public life generally, namely 
a kind of selective secondary education, intended to follow on after the basic instruction 
received at school. '272 This kind of teaching is a great innovation which challenges the 
conventional Athenian conceptions of education. As de Romilly points out 'the very idea 
that intellectual teaching could have a practical use was a totally novel one to Athens. 
It was, furthermore, an idea that implied social change ... '273 But although the idea that 
political skills can be taught offers citizens of both high and low birth the prospect of 
excelling in public life, in reality, only the wealthy have the means to profit from Sophist 
teaching. 'Their teaching was costly and aimed only at those rich enough to pay for it: 
the aristocrats, whose families had long been predominant in Athens and who must have 
been particularly concerned to retain or recover their influence. '274 
The teaching methods employed by the Sophists vary. They travel widely in the 
Greek world and teach in different cities. Some of them appear at great festivals to 
introduce their work to the public. Displays are held in private houses, public spaces or 
at communal games. A Sophist often gives a display on a prepared theme from a written 
text and occasionally invites the audience to question him. Most of the instruction is 
given in small circles, seminars or public lectures. Students have to study and criticise 
the writings of poets, analyse forms of speech, learn to speak briefly in question and 
answer exercises and train themselves to defend either side in an argument. Due to the 
lack of sources, it is difficult to establish the exact scope of Sophist teaching. And since 
we cannot deal with every Sophist individually, our analysis is based on generalisations 
which try to capture what the Sophists have in common as teachers of rhetoric. Rankin 
describes what characterises the Sophists as teachers: 
Sophists in this sense were people who professed to teach "wisdom" and "virtue" for a fee. They 
were a profession, but not a homogenous one. Their main points in common were that they 
were paid for their teaching and that they based their teaching upon developed uses of language 
for imparting skill in argument and persuasion. Whether an individual Sophists' claim was to 
teach arete (virtue) or merely some argumentative technique or way of arranging language in the 
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most impressive or convincing style, his concern was with the human realm and the association 
of man with man in the competitive life of Greek society.275 
We may gain a more accurate view by studying how the Sophists conceive of them-
selves. Again, we rely on Plato's account of their profession. In Protagoras, Socrates 
addresses Protagoras: 'While others hide this profession, you advertise yourself openly 
to all the Greeks, calling yourself a sophist, proclaiming yourself a teacher of education 
and of arete, the first to believe he deserves to be paid for his teaching. '276 Socrates has 
reservations regarding the intentions of these new teachers and is suspicious of their pro-
fession for charging fees. In Kerferd's view 'it was not the fact that they charged fees as 
such which gave offence, it was the fact that they sold instruction in wisdom and virtue. 
These were not the kind of things that should be sold for money; friendship and gratitude 
should be sufficient reward. '277 Thus the Sophists embody the fundamental change in 
values of the Fifth Century. Earlier on in Protagoras, Protagoras justifies his profession 
as follows: 
So if any one of us is even a little bit better at helping others advance towards arete, he should 
be welcomed. I believe that I am one of these, that I do a better job than others do in helping a 
person become fine and good, and that I am worth the fee I charge and even more, as the pupil 
himself judges. That is why I have set up this system for determining my fee: when someone 
has studied with me, he pays the sum I charge if hes willing; if not, he goes to a temple, makes 
an oath as to how much he declares the lessons to be worth, and pays that much. 278 
In Plato's Theaetetus, Socrates imagines how Protagoras may have described his task as 
a teacher: 'the wise man replaces each pernicious convention by a wholesome one, making 
this both be and seem just. Similarly the professional teacher who is able to educate his 
pupils on these lines is a wise man, and is worth his large fees to them. In this way we are 
enabled to hold both that some men are wiser than others, and also that no man judges 
what is false. '279 As there is evidence for both views it cannot be established whether 
the Sophists see themselves as teachers of rhetoric or of both arete and rhetoric. While 
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Protagoras claims that his teaching makes men better, in M eno, Plato represents Gorgias 
as a teacher of rhetoric rather than of arete: 'I especially admire Gorgias for this, Socrates: 
you would never hear him promising this [i.e., that he is a teacher of arete]; in fact, he 
laughs at others he hears make such promises. He thinks one should make men skilful at 
speaking. '280 In Plato's Gorgias, the Sophist confirms the assertion that he trains orators: 
'Socrates: Then we are to say that you can make others what you are yourself? Gorgias: 
That is precisely what I profess to do at Athens and elsewhere. '281 'Socrates: ... You 
say that you can make an orator of anyone who wishes to learn from you? Gorgias: Yes. 
Socrates: And consequently in all matters he will be able to get his way before a mass of 
people not by teaching but by convincing? Gorgias: Certainly. '282 
Within the framework of this analysis, we are primarily interested in the teaching 
of rhetoric and the implications for the political culture of Athens. It is clear that 'all 
the leading Sophists were deeply concerned with it [rhetoric], in its forensic, political and 
epideictic branches, both as active practitioners and as teachers, systematizers and writers 
of rhetorical books. '283 Although the Sophists 'were not the pioneers of rhetoric, [but] 
they were certainly ready to step in and supply the demand for it. '284 
We would like to focus on the link between Sophist teaching and Athenian politics. 
Because 'behind the art of rhetoric as it was ultimately fashioned lies the art of being a 
politician, that is, of being a politician specifically as politicians functioned in Athenian 
democracy. '285 Behind the intimate association of rhetoric and politics we can see the 
philosophical foundations of Sophist thought. And since our analysis seeks to establish 
links between philosophy and politics, we must bear in mind that these links are crys-
tallised in the theory and practice of rhetoric. Rhetoric serves both as a bridge between 
philosophy and politics and as a vehicle for the dissemination of Sophist thought: 'Rhetoric 
teaches from the first that what matters is not what is the case, but what appears, what 
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men can be persuaded of. It is the "art of logos", which is not only speech and argument 
but also appearance or belief as opposed to fact, and its goal is persuasion. '286 Rhetoric is 
much more than simply a new way of conducting politics. It is a fundamental change in 
the perspective people have on political activity and has a substantial impact on political 
processes and outcomes. With their teaching, the Sophists contribute dramatically to the 
transformation of Athenian politics. As foreigners, they are not allowed to participate in 
Athens' political life; but through their students, they exert a considerable influence on 
Athenian democracy. 
Protagoras highlights the inherent connection between rhetoric and politics: 
If he comes to me he won't learn about anything but what he came for. And that is good 
judgment about domestic matters, so that he may best manage his own household, and about 
political affairs, so that in affairs of the polis he may be most able both in action and speech. 
Socrates: Am I following what you say? I think you mean political knowledge [i.e. the knowledge 
of how to run a polis or city], and you promise to make men good citizens. Protagoras: That is 
exactly what I proclaim. 287 In order to be good democratic citizens, men need to be capable of 
participating successfully in public affairs. 
As we have demonstrated above, in Athens public speaking is a key political skill: 
The chief instrument of government in practically the whole of Greece was the power of the 
tongue. More than this. It was not merely in the council-chamber and the popular assembly 
that the efficacy of speech was supreme. In the law court too, where hundreds of jurymen would 
sometimes be sitting together, words were the universal weapons, the clever manipulation of 
which was more than half of the battle. The gift and faculty of speech were the sole road to 
honour and power ... It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the art of speech should have 
been cultivated for the first time in the democratic communities of that age as a profession, and 
that it should have assumed a prominent if not actually the first place in the education of the 
young.288 
In Plato's Gorgias, the Sophist describes the power that rhetorical skill confers upon those 
who are in command of it. 
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Gorgias: I mean Socrates, what is in truth the greatest good, which confers on everyone who 
possesses it not only freedom for himself but also the power of ruling over his fellow citizens. 
Socrates: What do you mean by that? Gorgias: I mean the ability to convince by means of 
speech a jury in a court of justice, members of the Council in their Chamber, those attending 
a meeting of the Assembly, and any other gathering of citizens whatever it may be. By the 
exercise of this ability you will have the doctor as your slave, the trainer as your slave, and that 
businessman of yours will turn out to be making money not for himself but for another - for 
you, in fact, who have the ability to speak and to convince the masses. 289 
In On Sophists by Alcidamas, we read that in addition to being powerful, skilled 
speakers are also held in high esteem by their fellow citizens: 'Often events unexpectedly 
present opportunities, and at these times those who are silent will appear contemptible, 
whereas we observe that those who speak are held in honour by others for having god-like 
intelligence. '290 Given the importance of rhetoric skills, it is obvious that orators will 
require a special education. 'Now, to speak appropriately, on the spot, on whatever topic 
is proposed, to be quick with an argument and ready with the right word, and to find 
just the right speech to match the current situation and people's desires - all this is not 
within the natural ability of everyone nor the result of whatever education one happens 
to have had. '291 Furthermore, rhetorical skills need to be practised: 
I am not recommending that one speak offhandedly. I think public speakers should choose in 
advance their arguments and overall organisation, but the actual words should be supplied at 
the time of speaking ... Thus, whoever desires to become a skilful public speaker and not just an 
adequate maker of speeches, and wishes to make best use of his opportunities rather than speak 
with verbal precision, and is eager to procure the goodwill of the audience on his side rather 
than its resentful opposition, and who further wishes that his mind be relaxed, his memory 
quick, his forgetfulness hidden, and is eager to achieve an ability with speeches commensurate 
with the needs of his life - it would be reasonable for him to practice extemporaneous speaking 
on every possible occasion. 292 
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Despite being a fervent advocate of rhetorical education, Alcidamas also warns public 
speakers against losing sight of the purpose of their speech. Political debates should not 
obstruct political processes or harm public institutions. Public speakers should not be 
driven by personal considerations but must contribute to the public interest: 
I have often thought and wondered, gentlemen, about the intentions of public speakers. Why on 
earth do they come forth so readily and give us advice, when they bring no benefit to the public 
welfare but offer a great deal of slander against each other and carelessly throw out arguments 
that are quite inappropriate to the present situation? Every one of them says he only wants to 
gain a reputation, but some also demand payment and give their advice to whichever side they 
think will pay them more. And if someone in the camp does wrong or harms the public interest 
while getting rich himself, we can see that one on thinks anything of it293 
In Gorgias, Socrates, who is notoriously critical of Athenian democracy, asks Gorgias 
whether oratory is only about conviction 'Socrates: ... if I understand you correctly, you 
are saying that oratory is a maker of conviction, and that this is the sum and substance 
of its whole activity... Gorgias: ... the definition which you have given seems to be quite 
adequate; that sums up oratory. '294 Proceeding from this definition, Socrates denounces 
the adverse effects of oratory on political decision-making. 
Now, what are we to think of the oratory addressed to the Athenian people and to the assemblies 
of free men in other cities? Do the orators in your opinion speak always with an eye to what 
is best, and make it the constant aim of their speeches to improve their fellow-citizens as much 
as possible, or do they too set out merely to gratify the citizens, sacrificing the public interest 
to their own personal success, and treating the assemblies like children, whom their only object 
is to please, without caring at all whether their speeches make them better or worse? Callicles: 
There is not simple answer to this question as there was to the other, for some speakers are 
moved in their speeches by a regard for the public interest, and some are as you describe.295 
We find similar reflections in the History of the Peloponnesian War, which provides 
us with invaluable insights into Athenian political culture. For example, the Mytilenian 
Debate in 427 BCE reveals different perspectives on the conduct of political debates. 
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Clean, one of the most powerful men in Athens, argues against using rhetoric in matters 
concerning the state. In his view, rhetorical arguments should not be admitted into 
political discussions, since both the speakers and the audience may mistake them for 
reality: 'As for the speech-makers who give such pleasure by their arguments, they should 
hold their competitions on subjects which are less important, and not on a question 
where the state may have to pay a heavy penalty for its light pleasure, while the speakers 
themselves will no doubt be enjoying splendid rewards for their splendid arguments. '296 
Clean claims that the main problem with democratic decision-making is that people are 
too easily influenced or even deluded by rhetoric. When political decisions are taken in 
assemblies, people tend to forget that words and speeches refer to the real world: 
You have become regular speech-goers, and as for action, you merely listen to accounts of it; if 
something is to be done in the future you estimate the possibilities by hearing a good speech on 
the subject, and as for the past you rely not so much on the facts which you have seen with your 
own eyes as on what you have heard about them in some clever piece of verbal criticism. 297 
Clean's attitude towards rhetoric is reminiscent of Gorgias' characterisation of the power 
of logos: 'The power of speech has the same effect on the disposition of the soul as the 
disposition of drugs on the nature of bodies. Just as different drugs draw forth different 
humours from the body ... so too with words: some cause pain, others joy, some strike 
fear, some stir the audience to boldness, some benumb and bewitch the soul with evil 
persuasion. '298 Clean argues that, politics, instead of dealing with issues, is in danger of 
being reduced to a competition in rhetoric: 
Any novelty in an argument deceives you at once, but when the argument is tried and proved 
you become unwilling to follow it; you look with suspicion on what is normal and are the slaves 
of every paradox that comes your way. The chief wish of each one of you is to be able to make a 
speech himself, and, if you cannot do that, the next best thing is to compete with those who can 
make this sort of speech by not looking as though you were at all out of your depth while you 
listen to the views put forward, by applauding a good pint even before it is made, and by being 
as quick at seeing how an argument is going to be developed as you are slow at understanding 
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what in the end it will lead to. 299 
Surprisingly, Cleon and Socrates share a similar perspective on the motivation of public 
orators, although the latter attacks them from a different angle: 
... Now, what are we to think of the oratory addressed to the Athenian people and to the 
assemblies of free men in other cities? Do the orators in your opinion speak always with an eye 
to what is best, and make it the constant aim of their speeches to improve their fellow-citizens 
as much as possible, or do they too set out merely to gratify the citizens, sacrificing the public 
interest to their own personal success, and treating the assemblies like children, whom their only 
object is to please, without caring at all whether their speeches make them better or worse?300 
Cleon insists that public assemblies are not capable of making reasonable policy decisions: 
What you are looking for all the time is something that is, I should say, outside the range of 
ordinary experience, and yet you cannot even think straight about the facts of life that are before 
you. You are simply victims of your own pleasure in listening, and are more like an audience 
sitting at the feet of a professional lecturer than a parliament discussing matters of state301 
Clean's criticism of the way politics are conducted in democratic assemblies is of par-
ticular interest. Comparing the decision-makers in Athens to the passive audience of a 
professional lecturer, he implies that a political assembly should not be confused with a 
Sophist classroom. Although young Athenians are trained by the Sophists to participate 
in speech competitions, Cleon emphasises the fundamental difference between practising 
rhetorical skills and giving a speech in a public assembly. Even though at first, it seems 
as if he is arguing against the use of rhetoric in politics altogether, what he is really crit-
icising is the lack of realism that rhetoric usually entails. Speeches need to be persuasive 
but they must not put style before content. A political debate can only be meaningful 
and productive if those that participate in it realise exactly what it is: a mechanism to 
make public policies. 
Diodotus disagrees with Clean and argues that the words employed by public speakers 
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are related to reality as well as to actions: 
And anyone who maintains that words cannot be a guide to action must be either a fool or one 
with some personal interest at stake; he is a fool, if he imagines that it is possible to deal with 
the uncertainties of the future by any other medium, and he is personally interested if his aim is 
to persuade you into some disgraceful action, and, knowing that he cannot make a good speech 
in a bad cause, he tries to frighten his opponents and his hearers by some good-sized pieces of 
misrepresentation. 302 
He maintains that democratic decision-making can function if political speakers respect 
a certain code of conduct: 
The good citizen, instead of trying to terrify the opposition, ought to prove his case in fair 
argument; and a wise state, without giving special honours to its best counsellors, will certainly 
not deprive them of the honour they already enjoy; and when a man's advice is not taken, he 
should not even be disgraced, far less penalised. In this way successful speakers will be less likely 
to pursue further honours by speaking against their own convictions in order to make themselves 
popular, and unsuccessful speakers, too, will not struggle to win over the people by the same 
acts of flattery. 303 
Just like Clean, Diodotus is concerned with the hidden motives and the personal interest 
of the speakers, which he fears may have an unduly influence on their speeches. Public 
speakers must not betray their convictions. Diodotus argues that they will only refrain 
from doing so if losing an argument does not mean losing one's honour. In order for the 
state to benefit from public debates, arguments must be evaluated irrespective of who 
makes them. Diodotus goes on reasoning that there are a number of other problems with 
public speech-making. He claims that suspicion of a speaker's personal interest prevents 
the unbiased assessment of his views: 'Then, too, if a man gives the best possible advice 
but is under the slightest suspicion of being influenced by his own private profit, we are so 
embittered by the idea (a wholly unproved one) of this profit of his, that we do not allow 
the state to receive the certain benefit of his good advice. '304 As a consequence, public 
speakers have no choice but to deceive their audience in order to succeed: 'So a state of 
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affairs has been reached where a good proposal honestly put forward is just as suspect 
as something thoroughly bad, and the result is that just as the speaker who advocates 
some monstrous measure has to win over the people by deceiving them, so also a man 
with good advice to give has to tell lies if he expects to be believed. '305 An atmosphere 
of general mistrust is engendered, in which even patriotic acts fall suspect of self-interest: 
'And because of this refinement in intellectuality, the state is put into a unique position; it 
is only she to whom no one can ever do a good turn openly and without deception. For if 
one performs a patriotic action, the reward for one's pains is to be thought to have made 
something oneself on the side. '306 Finally, after having enumerated the various deficiencies 
of public policy-making, Diodotus tries to rehabilitate the role of public speakers. In his 
view, public speakers should be trusted because they have greater insight into matters of 
public concern: 
Yet in spite of all this we are discussing matters of the greatest importance, and we who give you 
our advice ought to be resolved to look rather further into things than you [i.e. the audience] 
whose attention is occupied only with the surface - especially as we can be held to account for 
the advice we give, while you are not accountable for the way you receive it. For indeed you 
would take rather more care over your decisions, if the proposer of a motion and those who voted 
for it were all subject to the same penalties. As it is, on the occasions when some emotional 
impulse on your part has led you into disaster, you turn upon the one man who made the original 
proposal and you let yourself off, in spite of the fact that you are many and in spite of the fact 
that you were just as wrong as he was. 307 
By praising the competence of public speakers, Diodotus echoes Protagoras' conviction 
that some men are better than others at giving good advice. In Plato's Theaetetus, 
Socrates represents the view of Protagoras: 'I certainly do not deny the existence of both 
wisdom and wise men: far from it. But the man whom I call wise is the man who can 
change the appearances - the man who in any case where bad things both appear and are 
for us, works a change and makes good things appear and be for us. '308 According to this 
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notion 'a combination of natural gifts and good training begun in early youth will produce 
citizens whose advice will be better worth seeking than the average. '309 Unfortunately, 
Protagoras does not elaborate on what makes the wise man distinguish good things from 
bad things. He also fails to explain why citizens should entrust their lives to someone 
simply because he is the most skilful at 'changing appearances'. 
In order to defend the position of public speakers, Diodotus highlights that unlike the 
people who vote in favour of a particular decision public speakers are held accountable 
for the policies they propose. They therefore carry much more responsibility and are thus 
easier to blame than those who merely follow them. With his speech, Diodotus justifies 
why in a democracy, public issues should be discussed and voted on in public assemblies. 
For the political process to function, public speakers must focus on content rather than on 
style in order not to hide their agenda. The audience has four primary responsibilities: it 
should (i) not mistrust public speakers but rather scrutinise whether the state can obtain 
good advice from them. (ii) They should not misinterpret every patriotic act as motivated 
by self-interest. (iii) They should not penalise speakers for losing an argument. (iv) They 
must be aware that they themselves are responsible for the policies they vote in favour 
of. If both speakers and audiences abide by these rules, the democratic decision-making 
process will produce optimum results. Whether or not Diodotus' appeal is eventually 
successful, we do not know. However, we may conclude from the above discussion that 
the Athenians are well aware of the deficiencies of the decision-making culture in Athens. 
The fact that eminent politicians attempt to minimise the adverse effects of rhetoric in 
public debates, shows the significant influence of rhetoric education in Athenian political 
culture. Diodotus' 'criticism of the audience as demoralised and Cleon's attack on its bad 
habits are in no way mutually exclusive. They converge to show how sadly tendencies 
of recent origin defeat the purpose for which the democratic assembly with its discussion 
and deliberation exists. '310 Solmsen adds another dimension to our analysis by drawing 
attention to the fact that 'Thucydides knew the weaknesses of the contemporary Athenian 
assemblies from personal experience. He knew the aura popularis and what it was capable 
of doing. We here read his own bitter recollections of habits that he had observed or indeed 
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experienced. Thucydides loved Athens but was not in love with Athenian democracy. '311 
As we have shown previously, rhetoric forms an integral part of Sophist philosophy. It 
is the inescapable consequence of Epistemological Scepticism and Relativism. Protagoras 
asserts that 'On every subject there are two logoi [speeches or arguments] opposed to 
one another.' 312 Contradicting statements can be made about every subject without 
the possibility of resolving disagreement. Whereas in philosophy different arguments 
can coexist, in politics they need to be resolved. The problem discussed by Cleon and 
Diodotus is that public speakers do not seem to be interested in reconciling their policy 
propositions. Instead, they follow the Sophist assumption that subjective perceptions- by 
their very nature -, cannot be disputed. As a result, political debates are reduced to the 
art of deception. Rather than aiming for a policy which benefits their polis, politicians 
use rhetoric as an instrument of power. As Ober points out 313 , this attitude reflects the 
standard ethical code prevalent in Greek culture. According to him, this ethical code 
consists of two prescriptions. (i) The first is the principle of reciprocity: one should help 
one's friends and harm one's enemies. The help received from and the damage done by 
other states should be paid back in at least equal but preferably, in greater measure. 
(ii) The second principle is that of antagonism: one must seek pre-eminence over rivals 
in ongoing agonistic contests. The Sophists teach a particularly strong and naturalized 
version of these standard ethics314 and equip their students with the practical techniques 
for securing victory over their rivals. Hence the functioning principles of rhetoric and 
political arguments are not rooted in Sophist philosophy alone but also reflect the deep-
seated ethical attitudes predating philosophical thought. This accounts for both the 
success of rhetoric and for the way in which it is employed in the political sphere. 
The fact that with rhetorical training the Sophists do not only make men skilful at 
speaking but also diffuse their own philosophy, creates a paradox: on the one hand, the 
Athenian political system creates a demand for rhetorically able men and thus for Sophist 
education. On the other hand, Sophist teaching conveys philosophical concepts which 
actually affect the democratic decision-making process negatively. Rhetoric paralyses the 
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political process rather than helping it to produce policies. It is this relationship between 
the political system and Sophist teaching that helps us understand the link between 
Sophist thinking and Political Realism. Outside this philosophical and political context, 
Realist policies are not thinkable. 
5.5 The impact Athenian political culture on foreign 
policy 
In previous chapters, we have analysed the characteristics of Athenian foreign policy and 
established a relationship between politics and the cultural and intellectual context of the 
Fifth Century. In this chapter, we have demonstrated that in Athens, the political system 
produces a specific political culture and a particular type of politician. It is our assertion 
that these three aspects have a considerable impact on foreign policy. 
The political system creates decision-making processes which combine public opin-
ion with the political leadership of the few. Both domestic and foreign policy issues are 
discussed and determined in the Assembly, where rhetorically apt politicians try to win 
public support through persuasion. Politics is inherently linked to rhetoric and this rela-
tionship has crucial consequences for both domestic and foreign policy. First, politics is 
highly unstable. Rather than representing a specific approach to politics, politicians use 
their rhetorical skills to propose whatever policy they believe will succeed. Likewise, the 
Athenian public changes its opinion frequently. Second, politics is not necessarily about 
content. Politicians can use rhetoric as an instrument of power. Rhetoric allows them to 
persuade their audience of any policy, no matter whether it is in the city's interest or not. 
Third, the central role of rhetoric in politics favours a particular type of politician likely 
to undermine democratic rule. In a democracy, the power of persuasion may translate 
into real power, and thus sow the seeds of despotism. 
We have seen that Athenian foreign policy is characterised by Political Realism. On 
the one hand, Realist policies are inherently linked to Sophist ideas prevalent in the 
intellectual and cultural climate of Fifth Century Athens. On the other hand, Political 
Realism is widely accepted and supported because it reflects the principles embodied by 
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Athenian political culture. The philosophical foundation of rhetoric - the idea that truth 
is what we can be persuaded to believe in, is mirrored in the Athenian conviction that 
as long as a city thinks a certain policy is right, it is therefore just. The Athenian public 
supports Realist foreign policies because they embody the same principles as domestic 
politics. Furthermore, Athenian politicians use the same rhetorical methods to convince 
their own Athenian as well as foreign audiences. 
The History of the Peloponnesian War provides us with various examples of public 
decision-making on issues of foreign policy. Foreign policy decisions are made on two 
levels: at home and abroad In the majority of cases, policies are decided domestically. 
Before Athens deploys generals, soldiers and triremes to the battlefield, their mission is 
determined by a public assembly. This is the case when the Athenians reconsider their 
decision to punish the Mytilenians in 427 BCE: 'So an assembly was called at once. 
Various opinions were expressed on both sides, and Clean, the son of Cleaenetus, spoke 
again. '315 Although all citizens are free to express their views and a number of them 
certainly make use of this right, Thucydides chooses not to represent the various opinions 
voiced at the assembly. Instead, he relates only the speeches by Clean and Diodotus 
in order to familiarise the reader with the views of the most influential politicians from 
both ends of the political spectrum. Though his noticeable omissions make it difficult 
to reconstruct the entire course of the political debate, we may infer the central issues. 
What is most important for our analysis is that when foreign policy is determined by an 
assembly, the political process is democratic and transparent. 
But foreign policy does not always originate from democratic decision-making pro-
cesses. Thucydides reveals that during the Peloponnesian War, foreign policy decisions 
are often made on the battlefield or in direct confrontation with the enemy. The Melian 
Dialogue shows that the leading Athenian politicians and generals often formulate policies 
in direct response to their enemies. In this case, Athens' body politic does not participate 
in the decision-making process; policy formulation is left to politicians. 
On both levels, i.e. in public assemblies and in direct disputes with the enemy, Athe-
nian politicians employ rhetoric to argue their point. Rhetoric is a common element of 
foreign policy decision-making, regardless of whether policies are arrived at democratically 
315Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.36.26-28 
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or not. 
Hence Athenian foreign policy shares its main characteristic with that of Athenian 
domestic politics: all decisions made in political disputes are influenced by rhetorically 
skilled politicians. There are two reasons for the prevalence of rhetoric on both levels; one 
is political the other philosophical. Firstly, since domestic and international politics are 
conducted by the same politicians, they use identical methods to influence the political 
discourse. Politicians such as Clean or Diodotus acquire rhetorical skills in domestic 
politics before they are entrusted with foreign policy. The prevalence of rhetoric in the 
formulation of Athenian foreign policy can be explained by examining the background of 
the political personnel. Secondly, the use of rhetoric across the political spectrum indicates 
that the philosophical dimensions of rhetoric are prevalent in the domestic as well as in 
the international sphere. On both levels, the use of rhetoric is based on the assumption 
that there is no universal truth. Since there is no truth to be established, the outcome 
of political processes depends on the rhetorical skill with which political arguments are 
brought forward. Politicians trained in rhetoric do not believe that there is a single 
right way of conducting politics. In every dispute, they try to convince their audience to 
implement their suggested policy. The Might is Right logic of Athenain foreign policy is 
woven into the mechanisms of rhetoric - both are produced by Sophist Epistemological 
Scepticism. This explains why the Athenians, despite their military superiority, even 
bother to engage their enemies in political debates. They believe that might makes 
right both militarily and politically. Athenian military superiority puts her politicians 
in a position from which they may dictate the terms of international relations. And 
the rhetorical superiority of her politicians allows them to justify any policy. Athens 
contenders are thus defeated on both levels; they lose the physical contest as well as the 
political battle. 
The Melian Dialogue shows how skilfully the Athenians master political debates. At 
the outset of their encounter, they force the Melians into accepting their rules of debating: 
'Suppose that you, too, should refrain from dealing with every point in detail in a set 
speech, and should instead interrupt us whenever we say something controversial and 
deal with that before going on to the next point? Tell us first whether you approve of 
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this suggestion of ours. '316 Though the Athenians pretend they are doing the Melians a 
favour by refraining from holding a set speech and by allowing the Melians to interrupt 
them, it is evident that it is the Athenians who profit from these rules. In fact, they are 
so convinced that these rules are beneficial to their argument that they threaten to call 
off the debate if the Melians do not abide by them: 'If, however, you do as we suggest, 
then we will speak on.'317 The Melian Dialogue is a perfect example of the dual nature 
of Athenian power. Athens' Might is Right policies are played out at two levels: on 
the military level, her superiority brings success at war. At the political level, military 
superiority is represented as a justification for Might is Right policies. By arguing with 
rhetorical superiority, Athenian domination remains unchallengeable. 
In this section, we have explained why Athenian democracy inevitably produces Real-
ist foreign policies. Our reasoning can be summarised as follows: The Athenian political 
system engenders a specific way of conducting politics. Policy decisions are made in demo-
cratic assemblies in which politicians seek to influence public opinion and the outcome 
of public votes. In order to persuade their audiences, politicians need to be rhetorically 
skilled. Athens' foreign policy is made in the same institutions and by the same politicians 
as her domestic policy. As a consequence, rhetoric is used in domestic and international 
affairs alike. In both circumstances, it is an instrument of power. In the domestic sphere, 
public decisions are dominated by those politicians who due to their rhetorical training 
can convincingly argue their point. In the international sphere, rhetoric serves to justify 
Might is Right policies while conveying a Might is Right attitude at the same time. 
In Athens, rhetoric is much more than a political instrument. It conveys a certain 
attitude to politics which influences not only the conduct of politics but also the content 
of policies. Without the democratic institutions and the political culture they create, 
Athenian Political Realism is inconceivable. 
316Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.85.7-11 
317Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.87.5-6 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War is a milestone not only for historiog-
raphy but also for political thought. The importance of Thucydides' contribution to the 
study of history is undisputed. He introduces standards to historiography that are valid 
to this day. The most important amongst those is the necessity of representing historic 
events objectively and without the distortions of personal judgement. However, it has 
often been overlooked that Thucydides' work is also crucial for our understanding of po-
litical thinking. It allows us to study the relationship between ideas and foreign policy as 
well as their effect on international relations. By analysing the political speeches and the 
descriptions of Athenian decision-making processes in the History of the Peloponnesian 
War we can reconstruct the development and the characteristics of Athenian Political 
Realism. And since this is the first historic text in which politics is described as a distinct 
sphere, the insights such an analysis provides have wide-ranging implications for political 
theory. 
The political speeches attributed by Thucydides to the Athenians and to their adver-
saries serve as a starting point of our work. We have explored the policies proposed in 
these speeches in order to expose the underlying notion of politics and of international 
relations. We have seen that the Athenian perspectives on power, the relations between 
states, and foreign policy, differ significantly from that of both her allies and enemies. 
With the aim of explaining this difference, we have studied the background of Athenian 
foreign policy. One cannot isolate politics from history, culture or philosophy. In fact it 
is the interplay of these factors that allows us to answer the question that is at the heart 
of our discussion: What makes a thought thinkable? It is perhaps the most basic and the 
most fundamental question in the discipline of intellectual history. We have attempted to 
answer it in the context of a specific foreign policy put in place during a specific histori-
cal period. This has been a very difficult task for various reasons: first of all, the extant 
sources in general and Presocratic and Sophist fragments in particular, are incomplete and 
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thus not always conclusive. As a result, the evidence supporting our assumptions may be 
at times a little scarce. Secondly, it is impossible to reconstruct events that took place 
2,400 years ago with absolute exactness, especially since we must rely on only one source. 
Thirdly, we ought to be aware that our understanding of the Greek World is limited per se. 
We interpret Greek ideas, politics and policies from our 20th Century vantage point and 
inevitably apply contemporary standards and values. We should therefore bear in mind 
that any historical and intellectual enquiry is limited. But this does not imply that we 
cannot make meaningful statements about the Greek world. On the contrary: exploring 
the complex world of an ancient historic period allows us to transcend our own time and 
culture-bound perspectives. We may assume a new vantage point from which we can see 
other periods while simultaneously gaining a new perspective on our contemporary world. 
This is the rationale behind studying intellectual history: without an understanding of 
how ideas emerged, any discussion of contemporary ideas is futile. 
What is so intriguing about Political Realism is that it comes into being as a result 
of a very complex combination of historical, political and cultural factors. At the same 
time, Realist policies re-appear in later periods and under different historic circumstances. 
Political Realism transcends time. Although this is not unusual in the history of ideas, 
it remains to be established whether the circumstances that facilitate the re-emergence 
of Political Realism bear any resemblance to its origins. Unfortunately, to explore this 
question is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, our enquiry certainly provides 
the ground for a comparative study which would address it. Our analysis of the origins 
of Political Realism is a precondition for understanding the development of Realist ideas 
through time. 
Our key motive for undertaking this study has been the perception that the discipline 
of international relations ignores the importance of the historic, cultural and intellectual 
background of foreign policy. However, we think that the question What makes a policy 
thinkable? is central to the study of international relations. If we can explain why 
a particular foreign policy emerged in the past, it will improve our understanding of 
contemporary policies and may even allow us to predict the development of these policies. 
Furthermore, the awareness of intellectual history enables us to establish connections 
between ideas and to recognise patterns of thinking. For example, by expanding our 
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analytical horizon in the way described, we can examine how Political Realism changes 
over time. 
The central conclusion of this thesis is that the Fifth Century witnessed the birth of 
a set of ideas implemented in the form of Political Realism. The fascinating question is 
how the two are related. Did Political Realism emerge because historic circumstances 
facilitated its realisation? Or did Political Realism shape the circumstances so that the 
ideas it was based on could be realised? Our discussion has shown that with respect to 
Political Realism, the relationship between cause and effect is multi-dimensional rather 
than straightforward. Hence instead of focussing on what came first, the ideas or the 
possibility of implementing them, we should regard both factors as part of the complex 
system which produced Athenian Political Realism. 
In fact, the interplay of different factors often proves to be more significant than the 
impact they have individually. De Romilly emphasises the role thinkers play in shaping 
history: 'In the absence of particular material or political circumstances, the influence 
of thinkers might remain relatively limited; conversely, however, without the thinkers 
the situation itself would not evolve in such a clear-cut or radical manner. Through 
their thinking, their analyses, and the meaning or new emphasis that they give to words, 
thinkers too have a hand in the creation of history. '318 On the one hand, the Sophists 
provide the intellectual and moral basis for a certain kind of thinking and for certain 
actions. On the other hand, they can only formulate their ideas because Athenian culture 
at the time allows them to do so. As a result, Athenian society uses Sophist ideas to 
exonerate their self-interested behaviour they thus firmly establish as the mainstream 
rule of action: 'the Sophists had disseminated ideas from which it was possible for anyone 
to extract a justification or argument in favour of a practical course of action. '319 
Considering another element in the complex politics of Athens, one could also argue 
that had Athens not been at war, Athenian society would not have been receptive to 
Relativism. Thucydides describes the impact of war: it triggers a reversal of values. 
But war is a stern teacher; in depriving them of the power of easily satisfying their daily wants, 
it brings most people's minds down to the level of their actual circumstances ... To fit in with the 
318de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, p. 139 
319de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, p. 148 
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change of events, words, too, had to change their usual meanings. What used to be described 
as a thoughtless act of aggression was now regarded as the courage one would expect to find 
in a party member; to think of the future and wait was merely another way of saying that one 
was a coward; any idea of moderation was just an attempt to disguise one's unmanly character; 
ability to understand a question from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted for action. 
Fanatical enthusiasm was the mark of a real man, and to plot against an enemy behind his 
back was perfectly legitimate self-defence. Anyone who held violent opinions could always be 
trusted, and anyone who objected to them became a suspect. To plot successfully was a sign of 
intelligence, but it was still cleverer to see that a plot was hatching.320 
Without this transformation of values and moral standards induced by the state of war, 
the Athenian people would not have supported the Realist policies of their political and 
military leaders. 
For scholars of international relations, it is essential to understand the various factors 
since it is important to comprehend the birth of an idea that has influenced the foreign pol-
icy of states and international relations throughout history and to this day. We conjecture 
that the longevity of Political Realism is due only partly to the recurrence of analogous 
historical circumstances. A more plausible explanation is that Political Realism allows 
for a particular side of human behaviour to be expressed, that is ubiquitous and persists 
regardless of time and place. Our hypothesis is that when a number of critical factors 
come together, politicians and states will pursue Realist policies. In the case of Athens, 
we have shown that her power status, her political system, the politicians produced by it 
as well as the intellectual and cultural climate of the day facilitated the formulation and 
the implementation of Realist policies. Taking any of these factors as a starting point, one 
could argue, that if state acquires a position of supremacy, she is more likely to pursue 
a Might is Right strategy in her external relations. Likewise, we could assert that in 
societies suddenly confronted with the beliefs and the values of others, one might expect 
Relativist attitudes to develop. We could also claim that in democracies characterised 
by wide public participation, rhetoric will be necessary and almost certainly spill over to 
the realm of foreign policy. And there is little doubt that in turn, rhetoric will change 
the way politics is conducted. In this sense, Fifth Century Athens is exemplary but not 
320Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.82.18-21, 26-39 
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exceptional. It serves as a template for similar historical situations without being an 
absolute model. What we have learnt from studying Athenian Political Realism is that 
the foreign policy of a state is dependent on the historical, political and cultural context. 
But once a policy is put in place, it transcends this background and acquires a meaning 
of its own which can be revived at any subsequent point in time. 
The fact that Political Realism has remained influential to the present day is inherently 
linked to the circumstances of its emergence. As we have shown, Realist policies are 
based on Sophist thinking, which marks the beginning of modern philosophy. As Guthrie 
observes, reading the Sophists 'one feels that there is hardly a question under discussion 
today which was not argued out on both sides some 2,4000 years ago ... '321 This is due to 
the fact that 
With the change that came over philosophy in the fifth century, we are plunged into a discussion 
of questions which are as relevant now as they were when first raised by the Sophists. Whatever 
we may think of the Sophistic movements, we must all agree that [ ... ] no intellectual movement 
can be compared with it in the permanence of its results, and that the questions which the 
Sophists pose have never been allowed to lapse in the history of Western thought down to our 
day.322 
Before the Sophists, intellectual enquiry is focused on the natural world while moral 
contemplation is confined to the religious sphere and to traditional values and customs. 
The Sophists are the first thinkers to focus on human activity and on society. Their 
philosophy lays the foundations for a re-conceptualisation of human action. This new 
approach allows Thucydides to establish politics as a subject in its own right. Therefore, 
the birth of politics coincides with the birth of Political Realism. Sophist philosophy 
liberates man from the bonds of religion: 'Man loses his respect for the actual and the 
given as such, he will accept nothing as true which he has not himself approved, he will 
act only on the basis of his own judgment.'323 Thucydides portrays men, people and 
states as agents shaping their own destiny. Before there is a theory of the state, there is 
321 Guthrie, 'The First Humanists', p. 24 
322 A. Lesky, A History of Greek Litemture (London, 1966) quoted by Guthrie, A History of Greek 
Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 3 
323Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p.9 
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a theory of political action. It has proven to be so important that politicians still abide 
by it and academics continue to study it to this day. 
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